Zhou Xiaohui: Reports on the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo Meeting Are Missing “Xi Thought”

On January 16, 2024, the Chinese Communist Party's Provincial and Ministerial Cadre Finance Seminar opened at the Central Party School in Beijing. All Politburo Standing Committee members, except Li Qiang, were seated on the rostrum. (Video Screenshot)

October 29, 2024 – While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia received a high-level reception during his visit to Vietnam, with some unusual statements sparking external attention, the CCP’s Politburo convened a meeting on October 28, as per routine. According to official media, the meeting was held to review the “Comprehensive Report on the Third Round of Central Inspections of the 20th Party Congress,” with Xi Jinping presiding over the meeting.

Undoubtedly, since the third-round inspection report is being reviewed, there should also have been Politburo meetings reviewing the first and second rounds of inspection reports. CCP state media shows that the Politburo meeting reviewing the first round of reports was held on September 27, 2023, and the second round on March 29, 2024. Comparing the state media reports on these three meetings with similar content reveals three unusual aspects in the just-convened Politburo meeting.

First Unusual Aspect: “Xi Thought” Is Nowhere to Be Seen

In the news on the Politburo meeting reviewing the first round of inspection reports, there was a statement saying, “combine inspection rectification with studying and implementing Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” In the news about the second-round inspection report review, there was also a similar statement, specifically, “uphold and strengthen the Party’s leadership, and thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”

However, in the news just released regarding the meeting to review the third-round inspection report, “Xi Thought” has disappeared from view. This should be a very serious issue. If the CCP leader still held an “authoritative” position, would this situation have occurred?

Second Unusual Aspect: “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” Are Nowhere to Be Seen

Many people in mainland China know that the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” are standard language in CCP media reports on news regarding the Party, government, military, and society. Even if many people do not know what they specifically mean, they are very familiar with these two phrases. The “Two Establishes” refer to establishing Xi Jinping’s core position in the Party’s Central Committee and the whole Party, and establishing the guiding role of Xi Thought. The “Two Safeguards” refer to safeguarding the authority and centralized unified leadership of the Party’s Central Committee and safeguarding Xi’s core position.

In the news on the meeting reviewing the first round of inspection reports, after mentioning Xi Thought, there is immediately a call to “profoundly understand the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes’ and resolutely achieve the ‘Two Safeguards.’” In the news about the second-round inspection report review, after mentioning Xi Thought, there is again an immediate commitment to resolutely achieve the “Two Safeguards.”

Looking back at December 2023, in the Politburo meeting reports on economic and anti-corruption work, not only was Xi Thought mentioned twice, but the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” were also mentioned on cue.

Strangely, in the just-convened Politburo meeting, both the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” disappeared. Interestingly, however, these phrases that disappeared in the Politburo meeting were subsequently present in speeches by Li Qiang and Li Xi. Particularly, Li Xi, a close confidant of Xi, strongly praised Xi. Does this imply that there are members of the Politburo who disagree with such statements, making it impossible to include them in the news? Does it suggest that the position of the “supreme leader” is weakening?

Third Unusual Aspect: The Mention of “Promoting Both the Ability to Rise and Fall” Among Leading Cadres

How to deal with leading cadres in the inspected units, especially the “top leaders,” was differently phrased in the news of the recently held Politburo meeting.

In the news about the meeting reviewing the first-round inspection reports, the expression was to “tighten and fulfill the primary responsibility of Party committee (Party group) secretaries as first responsible persons, the ‘one post, two responsibilities’ of leading team members, and the supervisory responsibilities of disciplinary inspection and supervision agencies, with a focus on strengthening oversight of all levels of ‘top leaders.’” In the news on the second-round inspection report review, the expression was “strengthen supervision of ‘top leaders’ and the leadership team, and maintain high-pressure anti-corruption efforts.”

In contrast, the news of the just-convened Politburo meeting stated, “strengthen the building of the leadership team, strictly implement democratic centralism, and promote the ability of leading cadres to both rise and fall.”

Mentioning “strict implementation of democratic centralism and promoting the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall” in the Politburo meeting inevitably raises associations, as this clearly does not target only responsible persons in inspected units but carries an underlying message.

In recent years, although the CCP occasionally mentioned “democratic centralism,” everyone understood that it was merely talk. In reality, the CCP leader was concentrating various powers in one body, pointing the way in various fields and issues, with the Party essentially being a “one-man show” and other Politburo Standing Committee members just window dressing. At the same time, the Chinese economy is irreversibly deteriorating, people’s livelihoods are difficult, the national finances are on the brink of bankruptcy, public resentment is boiling, officials are lying low, and a comprehensive social crisis is imminent.

However, since rumors spread during the July Third Plenum that the supreme leader might be in trouble, multiple unusual events have occurred within the CCP’s Party, government, and military. One such event was an article published in the main news section of the military’s PLA Daily and on the military website on August 10 titled “Adhere to Scientific Decision-making, Democratic Decision-making, and Decision-making According to Law.” The article stated that recently, the “Reader on Democratic Centralism,” organized and compiled by the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, had been distributed throughout the military. The article throughout advocated that military decisions should no longer rely on “slap-of-the-head” or “one-size-fits-all” decision-making and opposed personal authoritarian direction, one-man decision-making. In the future, the military should adhere to scientific, democratic decision-making and decision-making according to the law.

These statements run counter to the previous approach of the CCP leader. Does this indicate that the rumors of significant turmoil at the top levels in Beijing are not without foundation?

As for the phrase “promoting the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall,” it has rarely been seen in Politburo meetings since the 20th Party Congress. On June 26, 2015, the Politburo meeting reviewed and approved the “Regulations on Promoting the Ability of Leading Cadres to Rise and Fall,” which the General Office of the CCP issued in July. On August 19, 2022, the Politburo Standing Committee revised it, and on September 8, the General Office issued it for a second time.

The primary change to the “Regulations” was removing the requirement to “strictly enforce the systems for retirement and term completion,” replacing it with “strictly enforce relevant systems for accountability, disciplinary and administrative sanctions, organizational measures, resignation, term of office, and retirement based on actual circumstances, ensuring pathways for cadres to step down.” This was clearly to remove certain obstacles to Xi Jinping’s re-election at the 20th Party Congress, specifically the obstacle of the “term completion and departure” system.

Since Xi’s re-election, the phrase “promoting the ability of leading cadres to rise and fall” has been almost invisible. The sudden reappearance of this phrase at the recent Politburo meeting, combined with the disappearance of “Xi Thought,” “Two Establishes,” and “Two Safeguards” rhetoric, along with the supreme leader’s previous statements about maintaining the “Party Central Committee’s centralized leadership” and various anomalies in the top-level CCP since more than three months ago, suggests the following: the CCP’s internal environment is indeed unsettled, upper-level struggles continue, and some top leaders may be about to “step down.”

Editor: Pushan