Yue Shan: Trusted Ally Miao Hua Reportedly Arrested, Xi s Overseas Trip at Risk of Domestic Turmoil

On October 29, 2024, the CCP’s training program for provincial and ministerial-level cadres began at the Central Party School, where Miao Hua appeared on CCTV with a seemingly furrowed brow. (Video screenshot)

[November 11, 2024] On November 8, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Xi Jinping would embark on a nine-day trip to South America on November 13, attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Informal Meeting and the G20 Summit. Xi has previously taken trips lasting nine days or more, primarily early in his tenure, such as his first visit to Russia and Africa from March 22 to 30, 2013, and a visit to Europe from March 22 to April 2, 2014. However, this has not occurred in the last five years. Given China’s current internal and external difficulties and the CCP’s intense internal struggles, Xi’s prolonged absence may leave domestic stability in jeopardy.

Cai Shenkun and Yao Cheng Both Reveal: Xi’s Trusted Ally Miao Hua Reportedly Arrested

On November 11, independent commentator Cai Shenkun posted on X that Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC), director of the CMC Political Work Department, and navy admiral, was taken away by the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission two days earlier. This could indicate a purge of Xi’s faction from military propaganda and personnel management, potentially affecting a large number of high-ranking officers promoted by Miao, including new Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun.

Cai suggested that Miao Hua’s downfall signifies a major blow to the military’s “Fujian clique,” favored by Xi.

On the same day, former CCP Navy Command Lieutenant Colonel Yao Cheng also shared on X that factional infighting in the CMC had escalated and become public, and that CMC member and Political Work Department Director Miao Hua was taken away for investigation.

While this information remains unconfirmed by CCP authorities, reports on incidents involving high-ranking officials in the Rocket Force, such as Commander Li Yuchao and other generals, as well as executives in military-industrial enterprises, have emerged from overseas and were later verified. Cai Shenkun and Yao Cheng, both currently residing in the United States, maintain connections within the CCP system and often provide relatively accurate inside information.

According to activity records on the Ministry of National Defense’s website, Miao Hua’s last appearance was on October 7, when he attended the 70th-anniversary celebration of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps as the deputy head of the Central Delegation. Research indicates that Miao Hua was last seen on CCTV on October 29 at the start of a training session for provincial and ministerial-level cadres at the Central Party School, appearing visibly tense.

Negative reports on Miao Hua surfaced earlier this year. In February, freelance writer Du Zheng published an article in Up Media, describing Miao as a “silent tiger” within the military. As head of political work, he allegedly filled the military with his own people. All political commissars in the armed forces were reportedly his followers and informants, and any military promotion required his approval before reaching Xi. Allegedly, generals vied for Miao’s favor, and he was perhaps “the most corrupt person in the military.”

At 68, Miao has long-standing ties with Xi Jinping, having served for an extended period in the 31st Army of the Nanjing Military Region in Fujian, where Xi worked in his early career. Miao transferred from the army to the navy in December 2014, transitioning from political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region to navy political commissar. In August 2017, he became head of the CMC Political Work Department and joined the CMC that October, overseeing military personnel.

Rumors of Miao Hua’s downfall surfaced amid reports of factional infighting within the CMC, with purported tension between the “Shaanxi clique” led by CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and the “Fujian clique” led by CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong. While neither He nor Miao is a native of Fujian, they both served in the former 31st Group Army stationed there, aligning them with Xi’s Fujian faction.

Rumors of Xi’s Military Control Waning After the Third Plenary Session, CMC Infighting

Since mid-July’s Third Plenary Session, the CCP’s political landscape has been marked by anomalies, with rumors that Xi’s power, particularly over the military, has weakened. Zhang Youxia, a prominent military elder from the princelings’ faction, reportedly supported by CCP veterans, has appeared frequently in high-profile events.

In October, Yao Cheng revealed on X that there were signs Zhang was targeting the navy, with former political commissar Qin Shengxiang and current political commissar Yuan Huazhi under investigation. Both officials were promoted between 2014 and 2017, when Miao Hua served as the navy’s political commissar, and both are seen as close allies of Xi. Yao noted that if Political Work Department head Miao Hua were to fall, Xi would effectively lose control of the military.

On July 9, He Hongjun, executive deputy director of the CMC Political Work Department, was promoted to general. He had long served in the General Political Department and later the CMC Political Work Department. Initially deputy director, he was promoted to general and executive deputy director, becoming a top-level theater commander. This promotion to a position of authority under Miao seemed to signal plans for Miao’s retirement or a potential fall. He Hongjun, a native of Yang County in Shaanxi, is associated with Zhang Youxia’s Shaanxi clique, potentially indicating Zhang’s influence in this appointment.

Many recent high-ranking officials promoted by Xi have fallen or have unclear career paths. Xi’s close aide Zhong Shaojun, appointed director of the CMC General Office, was recently rumored to have been replaced and transferred as political commissar of the National Defense University, though unconfirmed. Additionally, Lieutenant General Chen Guoqiang, 61, deputy secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, was assigned as political commissar of the National University of Defense Technology in late September, seen as a loss of power. His predecessor, Major General Fu Aiguo, 60, left with an unknown destination. These events suggest a potential power redistribution among military elites, with Zhang Youxia possibly at the helm.

Will Xi Worry About Domestic Instability During His Nine-Day Overseas Trip?

Looking back at Xi’s upcoming nine-day trip, could he face a “backyard fire”?

During Xi’s visit to Vietnam last December, the author obtained a classified document from the Public Security Bureau in Weinan City, Shaanxi, circulated by the provincial Public Security Department. The document, titled Notice on the Emergency Duty and Integrated Intelligence Operations Plan of the Weinan Public Security Bureau During General Secretary Xi Jinping's Overseas Visit, was issued to county and district public security bureaus, divisions, and various city bureau departments.

The ten-page document emphasized security and stability measures during Xi’s Vietnam visit, closely monitoring enemy propaganda, hostile foreign media attacks, overseas disturbances, and domestic stability risks to ensure “national political security and overall social stability” during Xi’s visit. 

This precedent suggests that Xi’s upcoming trip will likely raise similar concerns over domestic unrest, including potential uprisings or internal revolts within the CCP and military.

Recently, in Zhengzhou, Henan, a large event involving 200,000 people cycling at night to Kaifeng occurred, known as the “Night Ride Revolution.” The movement has spread across the country, with Beijing’s Tiananmen Square becoming a target for young cyclists. Authorities reportedly suspect hostile forces’ involvement and are tightening control.

Although Xi has yet to leave, his trusted ally, CMC member Miao Hua, is reportedly under scrutiny. Although unconfirmed, the spread of factional infighting rumors spells bad omens for Xi and the CCP regime. This might unsettle Xi during his trip to South America, reminiscent of the unexpected moment last August in South Africa when his entourage was blocked by security outside a conference venue, leaving him briefly bewildered. Xi might worry that he could face a domestic upheaval, unable to return to Beijing.

History’s transformations often arrive suddenly, and anything is possible!

Editor: Sun Yun