How Much Longer Can He Hold On? Xi Jinping Suffers Another Blow

Xi Jinping's greatest concern is protecting his family. (People News)

[People News] As the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Xi Jinping’s most important subordinates, apart from the two CMC vice-chairmen, include the Director of the CMC Political Work Department. Recently, rumors have been circulating in overseas media and among China's "Red Second Generation" circles that Miao Hua, the Director of the CMC Political Work Department, has been taken away for investigation.

Former Chinese journalist Zhao Lanjian revealed that in recent days, the Beijing Red Second Generation WeChat groups have been abuzz with talk of Miao Hua being taken away by several soldiers while wearing a hood. Many people in his residential area reportedly witnessed the event.

On November 11, Yao Cheng, a former lieutenant colonel in the Chinese Navy Headquarters, stated on the X platform that the internal struggle within the CMC has escalated and become public, with Miao Hua, a CMC member and the Director of the Political Work Department, being taken away for investigation.

Since the 20th National Congress of the CPC in 2022, investigations into senior military officers of the Chinese military have rarely been promptly announced by the authorities. Typically, the news first circulates within the Beijing Red Second Generation circles, then spreads to overseas media, and is eventually confirmed. Given this pattern, I believe that the investigation into Miao Hua is likely true.

Miao Hua was one of Xi Jinping’s most trusted confidants, promoted and heavily relied upon shortly before the former Director of the CMC Political Work Department, Zhang Yang, committed suicide on November 23, 2017.

The investigation into Miao Hua is an extraordinary blow to Xi.

Why? There are four reasons:

First: It May Involve High-Level Infighting Within the Central Military Commission

Less than a year after the conclusion of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Xi Jinping has already taken action against Li Shangfu, a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC), State Councilor, and Minister of National Defense.

Li Shangfu’s issues primarily stemmed from his tenure as the head of the CMC Equipment Development Department. His investigation implicated a group of senior officers within the department as well as top officials from several state-owned military-industrial enterprises.

Who held the position of head of the CMC Equipment Development Department before Li Shangfu? It was none other than Zhang Youxia, the current First Vice Chairman of the CMC.

Zhang Youxia had already been serving as the head of the CMC General Armaments Department as early as 2012. After Xi Jinping’s military reforms in 2015, Zhang Youxia became the first head of the newly established CMC Equipment Development Department. Many of Li Shangfu’s subordinates in the department were originally loyal to Zhang Youxia. By investigating Li Shangfu and his network, Xi was effectively targeting Zhang Youxia as well. This puts Xi Jinping, the CMC Chairman, in direct conflict with Zhang Youxia, the First Vice Chairman of the CMC.

Zhang Youxia’s roots in the military are significantly deeper than Xi Jinping’s. First, Zhang’s father, Zhang Zongxun, was a founding general of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). During wartime, Zhang Zongxun often served as a bodyguard for Mao Zedong and was nicknamed the "Imperial Guard General" due to his extensive network in the military. Second, Zhang Youxia has served in the military since 1968, boasting a career spanning 56 years by 2024—far longer than Xi's. Third, Zhang is one of the few senior PLA leaders with real combat experience, having participated in the Sino-Vietnamese War.

During the Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee in July this year, rumors circulated that Xi suddenly fell ill and Zhang Youxia took the opportunity to curtail Xi's control over the military. A series of post-Plenum anomalies within the CPC leadership, which hinted at a "de-Xification" trend, suggest there may be some truth to these rumors.

A common feature of internal CPC power struggles is tit-for-tat retaliation: “You investigate my people, I’ll investigate yours; you move against my allies, I’ll target yours.” After the Plenary Session, there were successive reports of Xi's confidants being investigated, including Qin Shengxiang (Admiral, former Navy Political Commissar) and Qin Shutong (General, Army Political Commissar). Additionally, two of Xi’s closest allies responsible for purging the military—Zhong Shaojun, Director of the CMC General Office and Xi’s chief aide, was reassigned as Political Commissar of the National Defense University, and Chen Guoqiang, Deputy Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, was moved to Political Commissar of the National University of Defense Technology.

Now, reports of Miao Hua, the CMC Political Work Department Director, being investigated may very well signify an escalation in the power struggle between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping.

Second: It May Involve Senior Military Officers Promoted and Appointed by Xi Jinping

Miao Hua was promoted by Xi Jinping to the position of Director of the CMC Political Work Department in September 2017. By November 2024, he had held this role for six years. During this time, all senior military officers promoted and appointed by Xi were first vetted by Miao Hua.

Between September 2017 and November 2024, Xi promoted a total of 49 generals. In addition, he elevated a significant number of lieutenant generals and major generals during this period. The promotions of these officers were largely based on evaluations conducted by Miao Hua.

During Jiang Zemin’s tenure as Chairman of the CMC, the military was rife with corruption, with the buying and selling of positions becoming common practice. Jiang’s close associates, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, served as CMC vice chairmen and were notorious for marginalizing then CMC Chairman Hu Jintao while engaging in rampant corruption. High-ranking positions—including those of major general, lieutenant general, and even general—had price tags attached. Many senior military officers during that era secured their positions through substantial bribes.

After Xi Jinping assumed the role of CMC Chairman, he launched anti-corruption campaigns targeting numerous high-ranking officers. However, Xi neither prosecuted Jiang Zemin, who was the ultimate patron of these corrupt practices, nor fundamentally reformed the system and mechanisms that bred corruption. Consequently, the PLA remains one of the most corrupt militaries in the world. It is highly likely that many of the major generals, lieutenant generals, and generals promoted during Miao Hua's tenure paid bribes for their appointments.

Miao Hua previously served as Political Commissar of the Navy and held the rank of admiral. During this period, he recommended several senior naval officers to Xi Jinping. For example: Dong Jun, the newly appointed Minister of National Defense, was previously the Commander of the Navy. Hu Zhongming, Dong Jun’s successor and the current Navy Commander, was promoted during Miao Hua’s tenure as Navy Political Commissar. Wang Houbin, the current Commander of the Rocket Force, previously served as Deputy Commander of the Navy. His appointment to lead the Rocket Force was likely based on Miao Hua's recommendation.

Similarly, Lin Xiangyang, Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, joined the 31st Army in 1983, where Miao Hua once served as Political Commissar of the 91st Division and Director of the 31st Army’s Political Department. Lin held various positions during this time, including company commander, battalion commander, regimental chief of staff, deputy regiment commander, and regiment commander. Lin Xiangyang’s promotion might also have been facilitated by Miao Hua.

It is almost certain that some of the individuals recommended by Miao Hua bribed him for their promotions. Given the scale of these interactions, there are likely numerous such cases.

Third: It Could Further Undermine Xi Jinping’s Power

At the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2022, Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term, reaching the pinnacle of his power. However, in less than a year since then, Xi has suffered at least three major setbacks in rapid succession.

1. The Sudden Downfall of Qin Gang, Xi Jinping’s Personally Handpicked and Rapidly Promoted Youngest State and Party Leader

Qin Gang served as China’s ambassador to the United States for only a year and a half before Xi Jinping fast-tracked his promotion to Foreign Minister. Less than three months into his tenure as Foreign Minister, Qin was further elevated to the vice-ministerial rank of State Councilor. This meteoric rise undoubtedly provoked resentment among seasoned ambassadors, deputy provincial-level officials, and even provincial-level leaders.

When Qin Gang suddenly fell from grace, the person hit hardest was not Qin Gang himself but Xi Jinping.

2. Xi Jinping’s personally chosen senior political and military leaders in the Rocket Force—including its Commander, Deputy Commander, and Chief of Staff—were all removed in one sweep. This was a severe blow to Xi, as these individuals were considered core members of his so-called “Xi’s Army.” After a decade of Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns targeting the military, the betrayal of these senior officials dealt a significant blow to his authority.

3. Li Shangfu, a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC), State Councilor, and Minister of National Defense, along with several of his senior subordinates, also fell from power. While these individuals were originally close to Zhang Youxia, the CMC Vice Chairman, their promotions ultimately required Xi Jinping’s approval. The downfall of this group of high-ranking officers has dealt another heavy blow to Xi’s authority.

These high-profile removals expose a critical issue: Xi’s inability to accurately assess people, select the right individuals, and appoint them to appropriate roles.

When the former CMC Political Work Department Director Zhang Yang was investigated for severe corruption, Xi Jinping needed to appoint a relatively reliable successor.

After careful deliberation, Xi selected Miao Hua. Between 1990 and 2002, while Xi served as Party Secretary of Fuzhou and later as Governor and Deputy Party Secretary of Fujian, he also held military-related roles such as First Secretary of the Fuzhou Military Sub-district Party Committee and Deputy Director of the National Defense Mobilization Committee of the Nanjing Military Region. During this time (1991–2004), Miao Hua worked in the 31st Group Army in Fujian. This decade-long overlap likely established Xi’s trust and goodwill toward Miao Hua.

Despite Xi’s meticulous selection process, Miao Hua ended up following in Zhang Yang’s footsteps.

Miao Hua’s downfall is ultimately a far greater blow to Xi Jinping than to Miao Hua himself.

Fourth: It Could Severely Impact Xi Jinping’s Plans for a Military Takeover of Taiwan

Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin all left the Taiwan issue unresolved. Xi Jinping, however, is determined to cement his place in history by achieving the "reunification" of Taiwan through military action. In recent years, he has been making extensive preparations for such a move.

But things have not gone as planned.

Xi’s strategy to strengthen his grip on the military involved anti-corruption campaigns and structural reforms aimed at consolidating loyalty and creating a cohesive "Xi’s Army." However, the unexpected downfall of senior military officers—many of whom were personally chosen and promoted by Xi—has undermined his plans.

Xi lacked a foundation in the military before coming to power. He has no combat experience or military achievements to his name. His anti-corruption campaign in the military has taken down over 200 high-ranking officers, earning him significant enmity within the ranks. Despite promoting a new cadre of senior officers, the number of those genuinely loyal to him remains uncertain. Xi himself seems unsure of whom to trust, frequently reshuffling top military positions.

Now, with the investigation into Miao Hua, one of Xi’s most trusted allies, Xi’s confidence in his inner circle has been further shaken. This is a troubling development for Xi, as his plans for a military assault on Taiwan rely heavily on a stable and loyal chain of command.

Additionally, Xi’s leadership over the past 12 years has been marked by a series of misjudgments both domestically and internationally, alienating him further. Outside of the military, he has created a growing number of adversaries, further complicating his ability to execute his plans.

Should Xi attempt a military takeover of Taiwan, there’s a real possibility that internal dissenters might strike against him even before the battle begins.

Conclusion

Former Chinese media figure Zhao Lanjian observed that shortly before Miao Hua’s rumored detention, CCTV broadcast rare recent images of Xi Jinping. In these photos, Xi appeared frail, with graying hair, a haggard face, and a "dazed, wooden expression." According to Zhao, Xi’s eyes appeared swollen, his eyelids droopy, and his facial muscles slack, with loose skin sagging from his chin to his neck. Those familiar with Xi in Beijing’s "Red Second Generation" circles interpreted these physical changes as signs of the immense political pressure weighing on him and suggested that Xi is nearing his breaking point.

This interpretation holds some merit. As I have previously noted, Xi carries the burden of all the mistakes from the Mao, Deng, and Jiang eras, in addition to the errors from his 12 years in power. These collective failures are like four insurmountable mountains on Xi’s shoulders.

The scandal surrounding Miao Hua is yet another severe blow to Xi’s already precarious position, striking at a critical point in his leadership. How much longer Xi can withstand this pressure is uncertain. One thing is likely, however: Xi is enduring relentless torment every single day. 

(Reprinted from Dajiyuan)