Cai Qi No Longer Shows Loyalty to Xi Jinping; His Power Also Diminished

Illustration: On March 12, 2023, CCP Politburo Standing Committee members Cai Qi and Li Xi attend a session of the National People’s Congress. (Noel Celis/AFP)

[People News] As growing signs suggest that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping has lost control over the military and that his internal party power is weakening, his wife Peng Liyuan, who once played an active role in military and political circles, has also faded into the background. Meanwhile, Xi’s most loyal aide, Cai Qi, is also reportedly seeing his power diminished. The latest news even suggests Cai is no longer expressing loyalty to Xi.

According to official Chinese state media reports, from May 16 to 17, Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Secretary of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, visited Tangshan, Hebei Province, to inspect and guide educational work related to the in-depth implementation of the Central Committee’s Eight-Point Regulation. The report only mentioned that Cai emphasised studying Xi’s relevant discussions, but notably lacked any language expressing loyalty, such as the usual slogans like the "Two Establishes" (两个确立). This is highly unusual.

Over the past few years, Cai Qi has almost always accompanied Xi on his local inspection tours in his role as Director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee. Therefore, official reports on Cai Qi making solo inspection visits are rare. Besides this trip to Tangshan, the last such occasion was from December 21–22, 2023, when he visited Ning’an County, Shaanxi Province, to carry out the second phase of thematic education.

At that time, state media not only reported that Cai emphasised implementing Xi’s “important speeches and directives,” but also declared the need to “deeply understand the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes’ and resolutely uphold the ‘Two Safeguards’.” Such expressions of loyalty have long been Cai Qi’s trademark.

So now, with Cai Qi publicly refraining from showing loyalty to Xi while inspecting educational enforcement of the Eight-Point Regulation in Tangshan, the question arises: Was Cai warned, or is he submitting to a new, non-Xi-dominated “Party Central” in an effort to protect himself now that Xi's influence is waning? The author believes both possibilities are plausible.

In fact, signs of Cai’s toned-down praise for Xi appeared earlier this year. On March 12, the Party-Building Work Leading Small Group held a meeting to study and implement Xi’s remarks and directives related to the Eight-Point Regulation. Cai Qi and Li Xi, as group leader and deputy leader, respectively, attended and spoke at the meeting.

Compared to a similar meeting in April 2023, two key differences stand out. First, this year’s meeting was convened at the direction of a higher-level “Party Central,” whereas last year’s was initiated by Cai Qi himself. This year’s report said it was “decided by the Party Central,” while last year’s stated it was held “with the Party Central’s consent.”

Second, this year’s media coverage lacked the usual excessive praise for Xi. It merely stated the need to “study and implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speeches and instructions,” and to “align thought and action with the Party Central’s decisions.” In contrast, last year’s report not only included these elements but also praised Xi for “providing key guidance for the party discipline study campaign,” and emphasised “maintaining a high degree of unity with the Party Central with Xi Jinping at the core,” along with expressions of “loyalty.”

Clearly, references to Xi were noticeably toned down in March this year compared to last year. If Xi were still at the core of the Party Central, Cai Qi’s praise would logically be even more emphatic, not less.

Further signs emerged at the April 24 national conference of Party and government general office secretaries in Beijing. Cai Qi delivered a speech that, aside from the opening boilerplate about “guidance from Xi Jinping Thought” and “implementing Xi’s directives,” notably emphasised two new requirements: 1. To “firmly uphold the authority and centralised leadership of the Party Central”; 2. To “implement the reporting system for major issues and further strengthen political vetting functions.”

In comparison, at the same conference in 2023, Xi personally instructed secretaries to “raise political awareness” and stressed loyalty. Cai Qi then told attendees that “Xi Jinping’s speeches and instructions must be implemented throughout every aspect of General Office work.” The change this year is striking. Cai Qi could no longer instruct others to be loyal to Xi’s leadership.

Now, another month has passed, and Cai Qi has gone so far as to omit any mention of the “Two Establishes,” “Two Safeguards,” or “the Party Central with Xi at its core.” Does this suggest that the CCP leadership has already reached an internal agreement on Xi’s resignation? Xi is merely maintaining a facade of power, akin to Hua Guofeng after he was sidelined?

If Xi’s downfall is indeed imminent, then Cai Qi’s future is easy to predict. Multiple signs also suggest that Cai Qi’s power is shrinking—for example, the noticeable decline in his solo diplomatic engagements.

After the conclusion of the 2024 Two Sessions on March 11, neither Xi Jinping nor Cai Qi engaged in any diplomatic activities for the next two weeks, until March 26. Meanwhile, other Politburo Standing Committee members—Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Ding Xuexiang—and Vice President Han Zheng all carried out regular foreign meetings. Compared to the same period last year, this deviation appears quite unusual.

On May 15, when several Politburo Standing Committee members met with foreign guests, Cai Qi met only with a delegation from the Mongolian People’s Party, not with any national leader. By contrast, Han Zheng, who is not even a Politburo Standing Committee member, met with Chilean President Gabriel Boric. Previously, it wasn’t uncommon for Cai Qi, in his role overseeing party affairs, to meet with foreign leaders. For example, at the China-Africa Forum in September last year, he met with three African heads of state. In March 2023, he met separately with delegations led by Le Hoai Trung (Secretary of the Secretariat of the Vietnamese Communist Party and head of its International Department), Kim Song-nam (alternate member of the Political Bureau and director of the International Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea), and Stephen Schwarzman, Chairman and CEO of Blackstone. Now, however, it seems that Cai Qi may have been restricted to only meeting with party delegation visitors.

Cai Qi’s shift in tone and diminishing power further reinforce the narrative that Xi is losing control. A major shift at the top of the CCP leadership may be imminent. 

(First published by People News)