The Hidden Factors Behind the Exposure of the Trial Video of June Fourth Defiant Military Commander Xu Qinxian

Many out-of-town students living in tents on Tiananmen Square died inside them. (Photo: DaJiYuan ImageLib / Dajiyuan)

[People News] Recently, a six-hour video documenting the trial of Xu Qinxian from 1989-1990 has emerged overseas, quickly igniting widespread discussion. The video presents raw and heavy content, fully capturing the trial process of this military commander who refused to enforce martial law orders during the 'June Fourth' incident. This footage has reignited complex discussions surrounding the characterisation of June Fourth, internal power struggles within the Party, and historical assessments.

The historically significant video was first released by June Fourth historical researcher Wu Renhua, who declined to reveal its source, citing the need to 'protect the information source.' This stance has led to increased speculation: does the sudden emergence of such sensitive footage relate to internal power upheavals within the Communist Party?

However, self-media figure Jiang Wangzheng claims that his intelligence indicates the video was actually released by the Communist Party itself. This has resulted in two contrasting narratives: one attributed to the anti-Xi faction and the other to Xi Jinping himself.

1. Reenactment of the Trial Scene: Historical Evidence of Internal Divisions within the Military

The video captures the entire trial of Xu Qinxian by the military court in 1990. The presiding judge accused him of 'refusing to execute martial law orders' and stated that he must bear political and military legal responsibilities.

In court, Xu Qinxian asserted that he did not deny the military order system, but believed that political events should not be resolved through military means, expressing that he was unaware of this. In the political climate of that year, such a viewpoint was undoubtedly risky and became the direct reason for his later dismissal and imprisonment.

Xu Qinxian passed away in 2021, but the video reveals that he maintained his personal judgment during the trial, emphasising that 'this matter will be recorded by history.' It now seems that he has indeed become an unavoidable symbol in history. Public information indicates that Xu Qinxian was sentenced to five years in prison, and after his release, he was relocated to Shijiazhuang, where he was still able to participate in some media interviews. The reason Xu did not open fire on the students was likely due to his benevolent nature, or as he stated, influenced by the Party Central Committee at the time, and he did not support the democratic movement or entertain thoughts of overthrowing the CCP's rule.

2. Why is the video being released at this moment? Political signals amid the shadow of power struggles.

Given Wu Renhua's silence regarding the source of the information, many observers speculate that this video may have been leaked by factions within the CCP that are dissatisfied with Xi Jinping.

The reasons include Xi Jinping's ongoing efforts to rewrite the narrative of party history since taking office, reshaping Deng Xiaoping's image, abandoning reforms, and the discontent among many within the party regarding his political direction and the extensive purges. The military has now become a focal point, and Xu Qinxian stands out as a rare symbol of resistance against authority within the military.

Ideologically, Xu Qinxian embodies 'independent judgment and a refusal to blindly follow,' which sharply contrasts with the current party atmosphere that stresses 'absolute loyalty.' Consequently, some commentators believe that the release of the video represents a covert challenge to Xi Jinping's authority.

However, there is also another possibility. A few days ago, Xi Jinping convened a commemorative meeting for the 110th anniversary of Hu Yaobang's birth, accompanied by Cai Qi, who oversees the Central Guard Bureau, and Li Xi, the head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. The high profile of the meeting and the unusual expressions of the attendees inevitably provoke speculation.

Wang Jizhou, a self-media commentator, analyses that there are currently two factions within the party opposing Xi Jinping. One faction is the elite democratic group represented by the families of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, while the other is the liberal democratic faction influenced by Hu Yaobang's democratic ideals. Professor Yuan Hongbing previously mentioned to the 'Elite Forum' that there are two opposing forces within the party.

The first is the reform and opening-up faction led by princelings of the Communist Party, specifically Deng Pufang and Chen Yun. They argue that Xi Jinping is violating the reform and opening-up policy, which has led China into a dead end and an economic crisis that necessitates a direct confrontation with the United States. This represents a significant opposition force.

The second opposing force is the Cultural Revolution faction within the Communist Party, with Bo Xilai as its spiritual leader, often referred to as the Maoist faction. This group has its own organisations, such as the Red Song Society and the Mao Zedong Thought Research Association. Xi Jinping initially used the Maoist left to counter the reform and opening-up faction. The Maoists believe that Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policy is an extreme form of revisionism that betrays the original ideals of the Communist Party, and this faction is represented by the second-generation red descendants within the party.

Currently, there are three forces: Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up faction, the Maoist left, and Hu Yaobang's liberal democratic faction. Previously, Xi Jinping allied with the Maoist left to suppress the reform and opening-up faction; now, during the commemoration of Hu Yaobang, he appears to want to repeat this strategy by allying with the liberal democratic faction against the reform and opening-up faction. From this perspective, the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin factions are indeed Xi Jinping's true adversaries.

3. From Deng Xiaoping to Zhao Ziyang, the debate over the characterisation of the June Fourth incident is still unresolved.

The leaked video has once again led the outside world to reassess the divisions among the leadership during the June Fourth period:

Deng Xiaoping took a hardline stance, asserting that it was essential to 'resolve the issue from Beijing' and that the use of force to clear the square was unavoidable, while he believed that Western condemnation would 'fade in a few months.'

In contrast, Zhao Ziyang advocated for a more moderate approach, emphasising the importance of listening to the youth's demands, and he addressed students at Tiananmen. However, this action was perceived as a sign that he had lost his initiative within the party, and today, he is viewed with suspicion regarding his support for the student movement.

Over the following decades, the official narrative surrounding the June Fourth incident has undergone several adjustments: it has shifted from being labelled a 'counter-revolutionary riot' to 'political turmoil,' and finally to 'serious political disturbance.' This evolution reflects the Communist Party's desire to avoid absolute statements on historical matters and highlights ongoing internal debates about 'how to incorporate June Fourth into history.'

Currently, some commentators suggest that Deng Xiaoping had aspirations for democracy at that time. Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui leveraged the student democratic movement to transition from being a successor of the Kuomintang to becoming a democratic leader of Taiwan, a position he has maintained to this day. Deng hoped to emerge as a new leader akin to Lee Teng-hui through democratic means, thereby completely rejecting Mao Zedong's legacy. However, the public then rallied behind Hu Yaobang, and if the student movement had continued to gain momentum, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun would have shifted from being the supreme leaders of the Communist Party to subordinates of Hu Yaobang, a scenario they were keen to avoid. Thus, one might wonder if Xi Jinping harbours ambitions of becoming a democratic emperor. If so, he would become yet another founding emperor, with all the rules dictated by him, which would surpass the power he currently wields.

4. The leak of Xu Qinxian's video suggests a coexistence of dissent and purges.

For many observers, the symbolic significance of Xu Qinxian extends beyond 1989 and resonates with the present day. Xi Jinping's military purge has fostered an atmosphere of anxiety within the military, leading to the emergence of anti-party and anti-Xi sentiments among the ranks.

Xu Qinxian's resoluteness and critical thinking are regarded as rare qualities within the current political system. Consequently, the resurfacing of the video is interpreted as a subtle critique of the existing power structure.

At the 50-minute mark of the video, Xu Qinxian remarked: 'At that time, there was a split within the party, a mistake of splitting the party. Various public opinions and the tone of speeches from leading comrades were not entirely consistent, and there was a lack of ideological unity.' This had a significant impact on his perspective.

'Chairman Deng's speeches, the April 26 editorial, and others, as for Zhao Ziyang, there is no need to elaborate further, as they supported chaos and division. The issues that arose at the Party Central level had repercussions on the lower levels, and they should be analysed based on factual circumstances.' He argues that these issues cannot be solely attributed to a group of army commander, as their understanding of the situation is also quite limited.

In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping proposed ideas for political system reform. For instance, he abolished the lifetime tenure system for officials, separated the party from the government, promoted the discourse of the rule of law, and advocated for the nationalisation of the military, thereby reducing its politicisation. He also stated that 'officials must accept supervision from the masses.' However, many outside observers view this as a mere façade of democracy; Deng emphasised the need for democracy under party leadership, which essentially meant leadership by himself and Chen Yun. Currently, how many major families within the Communist Party control the deep state? Reports suggest that it includes the families of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong, Ye Jianying, the Yun family from Inner Mongolia, and Xi Jinping. The question remains: can these families achieve co-governance, or will they turn against each other?

As for Xu Qinxian's video, it is unclear whether it was created by the anti-Xi faction in hopes of allowing different voices to emerge, or if it was initiated by Xi himself to rally Hu Yaobang's faction against Deng Xiaoping's faction. For ordinary citizens across any dynasty, a lack of stability will inevitably lead to resistance.

(First published by People News)
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