Eliminating Zhang Youxia Has Stirred a Hornet’s Nest — Xi May Be Reaping What He Sowed

Eliminating Zhang Youxia Has Stirred a Hornet’s Nest — Xi May Be Reaping What He Sowed

[People News] As the Chinese New Year approaches, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping would in previous years leave Beijing to inspect various provinces and conduct what were described as holiday visits. This year, however, after removing Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli—figures seen as holding real military power—Xi’s subsequent actions have not demonstrated that he has secured control over the military, consolidated Party authority, or stabilized political power. On the contrary, Xi’s reluctance to leave Beijing has fueled speculation that targeting Zhang Youxia may have “stirred a hornet’s nest.” Some observers suggest that if Xi were to leave the capital, he could immediately become the target of retaliatory forces.

Zhang’s Remaining Faction Waiting for an Opportunity

On February 10, Xi Jinping delivered what was described as a New Year’s greeting to officers and soldiers of the Beijing Military Region. However, rather than visiting a military camp in person, Xi addressed troops via video link. He described the past year as “extraordinary,” stating that the military had undergone “revolutionary tempering” through anti-corruption efforts, and urged grassroots officers and soldiers to remain firm in “listening to the Party and following the Party.”

Anti-corruption campaigns have long been seen by critics as a cover for internal political struggles. According to BBC statistics, during Xi’s first two terms in office, more than 160 generals were investigated within the military alone. Since beginning his third term in October 2022, another 133 generals have reportedly been removed, including Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission.

Overseas political commentator Du Wen stated on his personal channel on February 10 that Xi has refrained from traveling outside Beijing this year because he “does not dare to leave.” Du claimed that after Zhang’s downfall, remaining factions may be preparing for a final confrontation and waiting for an opportunity should Xi expose himself by traveling. Du argued that the Lunar New Year is traditionally a test of political stability; if Xi were confident, visiting a remote region would signal internal security. His decision to remain in Beijing, Du suggested, implies heightened concern.

Beijing serves as the center of military, police, and intelligence authority. As long as Xi remains there, command, security, and information remain tightly controlled. Leaving the capital could introduce delays and uncertainty. With the Zhang incident still unresolved, Xi may fear potential unrest within the military.

Du concluded that following the Zhang episode, the CCP has entered a new phase characterized by inward power consolidation, heightened security concerns, and the prospect of expanded purges.

He outlined three key points:

  1. Zhang Youxia was a senior Central Military Commission figure, a prominent “princeling,” and widely connected within military ranks. His removal signals structural rupture within the armed forces.

  2. The continued high-density purges indicate instability rather than strength. On February 9, the military newspaper again called for intensified anti-corruption efforts, suggesting that investigations will continue. Many senior officers allegedly appointed or promoted under Zhang are now uncertain about their futures.

  3. A system reliant on fear-based loyalty creates uncertainty. Officers may remain silent, but underlying tensions could persist.

Princelings Preparing for a Political Showdown

Australian-based legal scholar Yuan Hongbing recently told Vision Times that core members of the CCP’s “princeling” families are allegedly planning a political move aimed at challenging Xi’s authority at the 21st Party Congress in 2027. Yuan claimed that figures such as Liu Yuan (son of Liu Shaoqi) and Deng Pufang (son of Deng Xiaoping) are discussing a proposal to oppose Xi’s continued tenure.

According to Yuan, the proposal would advocate a return to Liu Shaoqi’s “New Democracy” framework and Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening policies, while opposing what they view as a drift toward leftist or Cultural Revolution–style governance. The proposal may reportedly criticize current Politburo Standing Committee members such as Cai Qi, Zhao Leji, and Li Xi, alleging adherence to hardline ideological approaches.

Yuan further claimed that Zhang Youxia’s previous attempts to influence high-level military appointments were linked to these broader political maneuvers. If Zhang had secured greater control over military appointments, it might have strengthened opposition forces ahead of the 2027 Party Congress. His subsequent removal, however, suggests a setback for those factions—but not necessarily a decisive victory for Xi.

Observers argue that Xi faces a structural dilemma: seeking to maintain centralized personal authority while managing competing interests within entrenched elite networks. This tension, they suggest, continues to surface through political and military instability.