Both Fan Changlong and Zhang Youxia Visited Vietnam, With Different Reports from State Media

Zhang Youxia’s visit to Vietnam received nearly head-of-state-level treatment: red carpet, military honor guards, and gun salutes.Vietnam’s news agency reported that Zhang Youxia’s visit to Vietnam was an “official visit.”(Video Screenshot)

People News– After overseas reports exposed that Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), visited Vietnam and was received with high-level hospitality by the Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary, the President, and the Prime Minister, CCP state media only published related reports on October 26. Previously, other CMC Vice Chairmen, including Guo Boxiong and Fan Changlong, also visited Vietnam; Guo is now serving a prison sentence, and Fan Changlong is retired at home, with reports suggesting limited mobility. Guo served as CMC Vice Chairman during Hu Jintao's tenure, while Fan Changlong was appointed during Xi Jinping’s first term. We can compare the differences in state media coverage of Fan’s and Zhang’s visits to Vietnam.

Firstly, the timing of the reports differs. Fan Changlong visited Vietnam on June 18, 2017, and reports from Xinhua News Agency and the PLA Daily were published the next day, on June 19. In contrast, Zhang Youxia’s visit to Vietnam took place on October 24 this year, but reports from Xinhua and the PLA Daily only appeared on the last day of the visit. What is the reason for this irregularity?

Since Vietnamese state media promptly reported on Zhang Youxia’s visit, it suggests that his visit was not secret but rather that some domestic individuals were unwilling to publish news of his visit. Supporting this, when Zhang Youxia visited Moscow in November 2023 and met with Putin, CCP state media reported on it that same day. News of foreign visits by other CMC Vice Chairmen, such as Xu Qiliang, and officials of similar rank, such as vice premiers, typically appears no later than the second day.

The delay in reporting Zhang Youxia’s visit to Vietnam is indeed unusual, reflecting ongoing internal struggles within the CCP leadership. Signs indicate that, following the Third Plenary Session, the party leader’s military authority has been undermined, and his status within the party has declined. However, for certain reasons, the CCP has not disclosed the full truth and continues to elevate the leader’s image, likely allowing figures like Cai Qi, who oversees propaganda, to create a misleading narrative. Not reporting or delaying the coverage of Zhang Youxia’s visit to Vietnam may be related to this, implying that Zhang’s trip to Vietnam was not a straightforward matter.

Secondly, the titles of the reports differ. The headline for Fan Changlong’s visit in 2017 was “Fan Changlong Visits Vietnam,” a standard format, while the headline for Zhang Youxia’s visit read “Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, President Vo Van Thuong, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh Meet Separately with Zhang Youxia.” Which title better emphasizes the importance of the CMC Vice Chairman's status and grabs attention? Clearly, the latter does, and such a headline is rare. Although Fan Changlong also met with Vietnamese leaders, including General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, President Tran Dai Quang, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, and Defense Minister Ngo Xuan Lich, these details were only mentioned in the article body, not highlighted in the headline. This headline choice subtly hints that Zhang Youxia’s high-level reception in Vietnam had specific reasons.

Thirdly, the content of the reports differs. In the report on Fan Changlong’s visit, state media followed the usual format, emphasizing Fan’s statements. Fan said, “China and Vietnam are neighboring countries connected by mountains and rivers and like-minded partners, forming a strategic community of shared destiny. Under the guidance of leaders from both parties and countries, the current development trend of bilateral relations is positive, with cooperation in various fields yielding significant results... China places great importance on developing Sino-Vietnamese military relations and is willing to strengthen cooperation with Vietnam to further advance military relations.”

Only afterward were the statements of Vietnamese leaders, such as Nguyen Phu Trong, Tran Dai Quang, and Nguyen Xuan Phuc, reported. Trong said, “The current development of relations between the two parties and countries is positive, with deepening exchanges and cooperation in various fields,” adding his belief in achieving the goal of building a well-off society under Xi Jinping’s leadership. Tran Dai Quang noted that “strengthening friendly cooperation between the two militaries will further enhance mutual trust between the two parties and countries.” Nguyen Xuan Phuc stated, “Vietnam is willing to work with China to fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and to reach a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea as soon as possible.” Ngo Xuan Lich expressed willingness to “deepen cooperation and maintain and promote unity and friendship between the two militaries alongside the Chinese military.”

Finally, Fan reiterated China’s stance on the South China Sea issue.

Throughout the meeting, it was clear that the Vietnamese high-level officials regarded Fan Changlong as fulfilling his role as CMC Vice Chairman, and the Chinese report reflected his status. However, the report on Zhang Youxia’s visit contains some unusual elements.

State media reported that “Nguyen Phu Trong extended sincere greetings and best wishes to Xi Jinping through Zhang Youxia,” and that “Zhang conveyed Xi Jinping’s warm greetings and best wishes to Trong.” As Vietnamese state media did not report these comments, nor did reports on Fan Changlong’s visit from either Chinese or Vietnamese media contain similar language, it’s uncertain if these greetings were genuinely exchanged. The CCP state media’s inclusion of these comments appears to highlight Xi’s status, ironically giving an impression of “protesting too much.”

Additionally, combining statements from Vietnam’s three highest leaders into a single expression is rare in CCP media, possibly meant to underscore the importance of Zhang Youxia’s statements and status. Zhang’s tone was also unusual, seemingly representing “the two parties, two countries, and two militaries.” His statement read, “China values the traditional friendship between the two parties, two countries, and two militaries… following historical trends, seizing opportunities of the times, continuously strengthening political, economic, security, cultural exchanges in all fields, and continuously advancing healthy and stable military relations to support the China-Vietnam community of shared destiny onto a new level.” This statement suggests that Zhang’s real status is not simply that of a CMC Vice Chairman.

Fourthly, in the state media report on Fan Changlong’s visit to Vietnam, there was a mention of accompanying military personnel, including Southern Theater Commander Yuan Yubai, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central Military Commission Shao Yuanming, Army Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli, Deputy Navy Commander Liu Yi, and Deputy Political Commissar of the Air Force Song Kun. However, no information on Zhang Youxia’s accompanying personnel was provided during his trip to Vietnam, which is another unusual aspect.

These irregularities in CCP state media coverage further reveal that significant developments have occurred within Beijing’s high-level leadership, with Zhang Youxia playing a crucial role. △

(First published in People News)