Miao Hua's Possible Downfall: Experts Say Xi Jinping May Be Under Intense Pressure

On October 29, 2024, the CCP’s training program for provincial and ministerial-level cadres began at the Central Party School, where Miao Hua appeared on CCTV with a seemingly furrowed brow. (Video screenshot)

People News - Reports about Miao Hua’s arrest, initially disclosed by former Chinese media figure Zhao Lanjian and ex-naval officer Yao Cheng, have gone unrefuted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for nearly a week. Recent chatter in Beijing’s “Red Second Generation” WeChat groups suggests that "Miao Hua was taken away wearing a hood by several soldiers, and many people in his neighborhood witnessed it." Notably, Chinese state media and military outlets have been silent on Miao Hua’s recent activities.

The Ministry of Defense spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang, in his November 15 press release addressing military-related issues, did not mention Miao Hua. Similarly, updates about recent events, such as the "Cooperation-2024" joint army training with Singapore and the "Shared Maritime Destiny" international naval forum, have omitted any reference to him.

A Google search for "Miao Hua's latest activities" shows his last known public appearance was over a month ago, at the "70th Anniversary Celebration of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps," where he read congratulatory messages from the CCP Central Committee and the Military Commission.

Miao Hua is the Director of the Political Work Department and a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The current CMC consists of: Chairman: Xi Jinping; Vice-Chairmen: Zhang Youxia and He Weidong; Members: Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin

Miao Hua is considered part of Xi Jinping’s inner circle. However, analysts believe Miao may not have had Xi’s full trust. This skepticism is evident in the appointment of Dong Jun as Minister of Defense. Unlike previous defense ministers, Dong Jun does not hold the titles of CMC member or State Councilor, reducing his rank to below vice-ministerial level. This awkward arrangement, where Dong Jun sits with junior officials during State Council meetings chaired by Premier Li Qiang, signals a lack of confidence.

This sidelining of Dong Jun may stem from his connection to Miao Hua, who recommended him. Miao, coming from a naval background, promoted several naval officers to high-ranking positions, some of whom have faced scandals or been rumored to be under investigation—examples include Qin Shengxiang (head of the Military Reform Office), Yuan Huazhi (naval political commissar), and Qin Shutong (army political commissar).

Could Miao Hua Be Involved in Corruption? Analysts believe that Miao Hua had the most favorable conditions and access to resources for engaging in corruption. As the Director of the Political Work Department, he controlled the promotions and demotions of military officers across the entire armed forces. Any officer aspiring to reach high-ranking positions had to gain Miao's approval, either through his direct promotion or recommendation to Xi Jinping. While other officers could only accept bribes or engage in corruption within their own jurisdiction, Miao had the capacity to influence all military branches and related industries. Consequently, any officer seeking advancement was compelled to bribe him.

Based on the pricing established by former corrupt officials Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, the cost of promotion was substantial:

A division commander (师长) would require a bribe of "millions" (referred to as "百万雄师"). A corps commander (军长) would cost "tens of millions" (referred to as "千军万马"). For a commander or colonel (上校) or higher-level positions, if an officer embezzled 100 million yuan, at least 40 million would need to be handed over as bribes to secure promotion.

Is Miao Hua’s Arrest Likely?

Since the Third Plenum earlier this year, various sources have reported that Xi Jinping’s power has been curtailed, while Zhang Youxia’s influence has grown significantly. These reports are widely available online, so they will not be analyzed further here. However, there is a strong possibility that the CCP’s top leadership has begun preparing for “succession planning” following the perceived weakening of Xi’s authority. A series of political, economic, and diplomatic setbacks have underscored the limitations of a governance model where all decisions are dictated by a single figure.

Xi himself seems to recognize that his previous initiatives—such as the aggressive zero-COVID policy, shutting down private education businesses, “wolf warrior” diplomacy, aligning with Russia against the U.S., plans for the forced reunification of Taiwan, the construction of Xiong’an New Area, personnel appointments from the "Xi faction," and the crackdown on Hong Kong—have not consolidated his power. Instead, these moves have resulted in significant failures, providing ammunition for opposition from retired CCP elders and political adversaries. Reportedly, Xi is also experiencing physical strain, which has prompted him to share power with senior CCP figures in Zhongnanhai, creating a collective leadership structure to distribute risks and responsibilities.

In this context, if senior military leaders who have long harbored dissatisfaction with Miao Hua seek to hold him accountable for certain failures and make him a scapegoat, there is a significant possibility that Xi Jinping may abandon him.

Wang Youqun, a former speechwriter for Wei Jianxing, the ex-CCP Politburo Standing Committee member and head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, analyzed that Miao Hua’s potential arrest could be linked to internal power struggles among the military’s top echelons. Recently, Zhong Shaojun, Xi’s close aide and Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission, was reassigned as Political Commissar of the National Defense University, while Chen Guoqiang, Deputy Secretary of the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission, was reassigned as Political Commissar of the National University of Defense Technology. These moves could indicate escalating tensions between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping.

If Miao Hua falls, it could further weaken Xi’s power, signaling his inability to protect or cover for his allies. Xi might be forced to reluctantly sacrifice Miao, akin to “shedding tears as one slays Ma Su.” This would lead to a significant decline in Xi’s prestige. Wang suggests this outcome stems from Xi’s strategic mistake of shouldering some of the CCP’s historical crimes from the Jiang Zemin era to protect the party, leaving him under immense daily pressure.