March 11, 2025 — Exterior of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. On this day, the CCP’s National People's Congress concluded.(Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images)
[Dajiyuan] On April 25, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo proposed an "international economic and trade struggle," and party media followed up with numerous articles loudly calling for "struggle." Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to deny any economic and trade negotiations with the United States. However, on May 2, China's Ministry of Commerce suddenly responded to inquiries about the "status of China-U.S. economic and trade talks." Within just a week, the CCP's tone shifted sharply from "struggle" to "dialogue and consultation," suggesting something unexpected has happened within Zhongnanhai.
A Sudden U-turn from “Struggle” to “Dialogue and Consultation”
On April 25, the CCP held a rare large-scale Politburo expanded meeting. There were 22 Politburo members and 29 non-members in attendance. The meeting focused on analysing the current economic situation and work, acknowledging that "external shocks have intensified" and proposed a coordination of "domestic economic work and international economic and trade struggle." However, key officials such as Finance Minister Lan Foan, People’s Bank Governor Pan Gongsheng, and Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao were absent. Even Wang Yi, the top diplomat in charge of external "struggles," was missing.
The state media’s interpretation only vaguely explained that "economic and trade struggle" reflected the Central Committee's latest assessment of the severity, long-term nature, and complexity of the current international situation.
Just a week later, on May 2, Xinhua News Agency suddenly released an article titled “Ministry of Commerce Spokesperson Answers Questions on China-U.S. Economic and Trade Talks”. Although government departments were already on holiday and the Ministry of Commerce had paused press conferences, their website published a self-Q&A article claiming that "the U.S. has recently made multiple requests to China through various channels expressing a desire to resume discussions. China is currently assessing the situation."
In the days leading up to this, President Donald Trump and members of his cabinet had been frequently discussing China-U.S. trade talks. On April 22, Trump said that negotiations with China were “progressing well.” On April 25, he said that CCP leader Xi Jinping had personally called him, but Beijing denied this. Both the Foreign Ministry and the Commerce Ministry insisted there were no discussions or negotiations. The Politburo meeting still set the tone for "economic and trade struggle." Yet that tone only lasted seven days before a dramatic change. The reason for this shift does not appear to be external—it seems the CCP abruptly decided to change course.
At around 8:00 a.m. on May 2, Xinhua issued its news bulletin, and then updated it around 2:00 p.m., suggesting high-level orders came suddenly and caused confusion in state media.
Why Is the CCP Suddenly “Cooperating” with the U.S.?
On May 1 at 9:59 a.m., the CCTV commentary account Yuyuan Tantian published an article titled “The U.S. Actively Contacts China Through Multiple Channels, Hoping to Discuss Tariffs.” This was a day ahead of Xinhua’s statement.
The article claimed that “the more frequently the U.S. sends messages, the more desperate they appear to resume talks… the U.S. must be the more anxious side.”
According to typical CCP "struggle" logic, if the U.S. is more anxious, China should not be; it should stall negotiations to pressure the U.S. further. The article also claimed the U.S. was under multiple pressures: economic downturn, falling stock markets, a weak dollar, and public opinion.
However, the same article then stated that if the U.S. wants to engage, “it’s no harm for China to talk at this stage.” This marks a stark reversal from Yuyuan Tantian’s previous tone of "we’ll fight to the end" or "we’ll ignore them," and it clearly struggled to pivot.
The article tried hard to paint the trade war as hurting the U.S. more, even gloating about America’s troubles. But if this were really true, then the CCP should double down on the “struggle” instead of rushing to negotiate. Yet the CCP abruptly made a U-turn.
Despite the media narrative of U.S. hardship, the CCP appears more anxious, suddenly pivoting to talks, essentially helping the U.S. solve its own problems. Isn't that a “sell-out”? Obviously, Beijing realised it couldn't hold out much longer. The pro-“struggle” camp was quickly overruled, and the pro-“negotiation” camp seized decision-making power and promptly re-engaged with Washington.
On May 2, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that China had reached out to the U.S. and tariff negotiations were about to begin.
Reportedly, the CCP had already quietly lowered tariffs on about one-quarter of U.S. imports. The Trump team had demanded that China first lift retaliatory tariffs. China has made some reductions but dared not announce them publicly. Now, its sudden change in tone suggests it may be preparing to go public. If Beijing publicly rolls back tariffs and agrees to negotiate, the U.S. may also ease its tariffs on China. This should have happened a month ago, but the CCP insisted on “struggle.” Now that it’s stuck in a corner, it’s scrambling to back down.
Key Shift During Xi Jinping’s Visit to Shanghai
The reversal in the CCP’s stance likely occurred during Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Shanghai, during which several unusual events unfolded.
On April 30, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) concluded in Beijing and revoked the delegate status of four individuals, most notably Miao Hua, a long-time Xi loyalist in the military. His downfall was officially announced while Xi was out of Beijing, which is quite telling.
Also on April 30, Zhao Leji gave a speech at the NPC closing session, merely stating that the NPC was implementing the “decisions of the Party Central Committee” without mentioning Xi Jinping at all. This mirrors Premier Li Qiang’s approach during his April 27 State Council meeting. By contrast, Wang Huning took a different stance.
On April 29, Wang Huning chaired a CPPCC meeting and referenced multiple Xi Jinping speeches, including those at the Politburo and Central Border Work Conference.
Wang Huning’s remarks strongly supported Xi, while Zhao Leji’s completely sidestepped him—indicating internal divergence.
Xi Jinping arrived in Shanghai on April 29 and on April 30 hosted an economic forum with officials from several provinces to discuss the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). However, state media coverage omitted any mention of Xi hearing reports from Shanghai officials—a major omission for such an inspection.
The forum ostensibly looked ahead to the next five years but effectively dodged immediate economic issues. Xi should have emphasised the Politburo’s recent economic strategies, but didn’t mention them at all.
Xi neither heard from local officials nor gave specific instructions. His inspection of AI projects offers no real solutions to pressing economic problems—his Shanghai trip seemed more like an awkward showpiece.
Politburo Decisions Reversed
At the April 25 Politburo expanded meeting, high-ranking CCP officials likely clashed. The final statement emphasised “economic and trade struggle.” But when Li Qiang chaired the State Council meeting days later, he pointedly omitted any mention of Politburo directives—perhaps signalling his disagreement with the confrontational approach.
On April 30, Li Qiang travelled to Shanghai to attend the 15th Five-Year Plan forum. Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang was notably absent. The speakers at the forum—party secretaries from Inner Mongolia, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, and Gansu—may have voiced views opposing the “international trade struggle” stance. The very next day, China’s attitude toward the U.S. changed. Perhaps a more authoritative voice outside the Politburo also intervened, suppressing the “struggle” faction.
The reversal of a Politburo decision shows that the Politburo does not hold real final decision-making power, or cannot make effective decisions.
The result of the CCP’s internal “struggle” is the collapse of its external “struggle” rhetoric. Trump’s renewed trade war has deepened internal CCP infighting and exposed the chaos within Zhongnanhai. That may be the most unexpected outcome.
(First published by Dajiyuan)
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