Arrest of PAP Political Commissar Zhang Hongbing and CMC Political and Legal Affairs Secretary Wang Renhua

Caption: Rumours from Beijing suggest plans to bring down the "New Gang of Four." (Illustration by People News)

[People News] Amid widespread speculation that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping may step down—either partially or fully—at the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session, recent reports that three of Xi's handpicked generals are under investigation have sparked renewed global attention. These include Wang Chunning, Commander of the People’s Armed Police (PAP); Zhang Hongbing, Political Commissar of the PAP; and Wang Renhua, Secretary of the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Political and Legal Affairs Commission.

On May 8, 2025, the CCP launched a training seminar for senior political and legal cadres, but both Wang Chunning and Wang Renhua—who is also a CMC general and member of the CCP Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission—were notably absent. As early as January 12 this year, Wang Chunning missed the CCP Central Political and Legal Work Conference, sparking rumors of his downfall. Multiple foreign media outlets have reported that he has been absent from key events since November 2024, including the promotion ceremony for PLA generals and the CCP’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) meeting.

At the recent opening ceremony of the political-legal seminar, Lieutenant General Cao Junzhang, Vice Commander of the PAP, made a rare appearance on the rostrum. Reports indicate that he is now acting Commander of the PAP.

Public records show that 62-year-old Wang Chunning is the son of former Nanjing Military Region Deputy Political Commissar Wang Yongming. He was appointed commander of the PLA’s 12th Group Army in 2014, commander of the Beijing Garrison in 2016, and a member of the Beijing Municipal CCP Standing Committee in January 2020. He became Commander of the PAP in December that year and was promoted to general by Xi Jinping. Wang is a full member of the 20th CCP Central Committee and a former alternate member of the 19th Central Committee. His rise has mirrored Xi’s consolidation of military power, leading many to consider him one of Xi's trusted confidants.

The appearance of Cao Junzhang, a long-time subordinate from the 13th Group Army and protégé of CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, suggests a power shift. Two months ago, another Zhang Youxia protégé, Fu Wenhua, commander of the Beijing Garrison, was transferred to the PAP as a vice commander and promoted to lieutenant general. These shake-ups in the PAP leadership lend further credence to rumours that Xi has lost control of the military, while Zhang Youxia has emerged as its de facto leader.

More trouble for Xi emerged with reports that two of his top allies—PAP Political Commissar General Zhang Hongbing, a member of Xi’s “Minjiang New Army,” and Wang Renhua, a naval officer serving as Secretary of the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission—have both fallen from power. Former Chinese journalist Zhao Lanjian revealed on X (formerly Twitter) that the military-political purge has now extended from the Rocket Force, Equipment Department, and aerospace sector to the PAP and the legal-political apparatus.

Zhang Hongbing previously served as Director of the Political Department for the 20th Group Army. In March 2017, he became Political Commissar of the 76th Group Army under the Western Theatre Command, formerly the 21st Group Army of the Lanzhou Military Region.

Miao Hua, former head of the CMC Political Work Department (2017–2024), oversaw senior military appointments during this period. He held senior political roles in the Lanzhou Military Region from 2010 to 2014. Zhang Hongbing was promoted to lieutenant general in December 2019 while serving as Political Commissar of the Eastern Theatre Army, then elevated to General and PAP Political Commissar in January 2022 at the age of 56.

From December 2019 to January 2022, Zhang Hongbing worked alongside Lin Xiangyang, then commander of the Eastern Theatre Army. In recent months, Lin has also been rumoured to be under investigation.

Lin, Miao Hua, and He Weidong all served in the former 31st Group Army. Reports in late November 2024 suggested that Lin Xiangyang had already been taken into custody. Additionally, He Weidong—commander of the Eastern Theatre from December 2019 to January 2022—has not appeared publicly in over two months. Recently, all news about him has been scrubbed from official PLA and Defence Ministry websites, adding weight to speculation about his downfall.

Searches on Baidu for “PAP Political Commissar Zhang Hongbing” produce related queries like “Why was Zhang Hongbing suspended?”, “What happened to Zhang Hongbing?”—indicators of growing public awareness.

As for Wang Renhua, Secretary of the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission, public records show he once served as Head of the Security Department of the General Armaments Department’s Political Office. In 2012, he became Political Director of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre; in January 2015, he was appointed Director of the Political Office for Army Equipment Research and Procurement under the General Armaments Department; and in January 2017, he became Discipline Inspection Secretary of the Navy’s East Sea Fleet. In December 2019, he was promoted to Secretary of the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and in March 2024, promoted to Navy Admiral.

His career links him to the Equipment Department, Rocket Force, and Navy—all entities already embroiled in major scandals. This raises the likelihood that he had ties to disgraced figures like Li Shangfu, Li Yuchao, or Miao Hua, and may have been exposed by them. Regardless, Wang’s career trajectory closely parallels Xi’s rise to military dominance, marking him as one of Xi’s loyal appointees.

Since the CCP’s Third Plenary Session in July 2024, Xi Jinping has faced persistent health and power crises, amid rumours that party elders, princelings, and “Red Second Generation” factions are working together to unseat him. Three months ago, rumours circulated that Xi’s retirement had already been decided and was pending formal announcement, with party elders Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Hu Deping—born in 1942—now wielding influence behind the scenes. Zhang Youxia is said to be in de facto control of the military. With Miao Hua's downfall already confirmed and He Weidong’s fate all but sealed, the recent purge of three Xi-loyal generals seems part of a pattern. These developments suggest that the political storm inside Zhongnanhai may be reaching unprecedented levels. With the Fourth Plenary Session—widely believed to focus on CCP leadership restructuring—possibly just three months away, recent reports claim that a Politburo Expanded Meeting has decided to reshape the Politburo Standing Committee and formally limit Xi’s powers, possibly leading to his complete retirement. This may not be idle gossip. In any case, given the CCP’s long tradition of internal political struggle, the fierce infighting ahead of the Fourth Plenary Session is likely to be more intense than ever imagined.