On August 5, 2016, a security guard stands outside a restricted compound in Beidaihe, Qinhuangdao, Hebei Province, China. Chinese leaders gather in this coastal city for annual closed-door meetings. (Simon Song/South China Morning Post via Getty Images)
[Dajiyuan] Ahead of the Beidaihe Conference, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has launched a new round of inspections across 16 provinces, regions, and municipalities—many of them known strongholds of Xi Jinping’s loyalists. Analysts believe this wave of inspections, targeting high-level officials including vice-national level leaders, signals intensified internal infighting within the CCP, especially in the lead-up to the secretive Beidaihe retreat. With China’s political climate increasingly tense, local officials are reportedly already taking precautionary action.
New Round of Inspections Targets Xi’s Faction – Is Ma Xingrui in Trouble?
According to China Central Television (CCTV) on July 17, the sixth round of inspections under the CCP’s 20th Central Committee has officially begun, with 16 inspection teams being dispatched. The ninth inspection team has already arrived in Shandong Province.
The targets of this round of inspections, announced on July 14, include: Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, Chongqing, Guizhou, Tibet, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Xinjiang. In cooperation with local party inspection bodies, inspections will also cover 10 sub-provincial cities: Shenyang, Dalian, Harbin, Nanjing, Xiamen, Jinan, Qingdao, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Xi’an.
As per routine, these inspection teams will complete their deployments by late July and work for approximately two and a half months, concluding in mid-to-late October.
Earlier this year, the fifth round of inspections began on April 9 and was fully deployed by April 16. That round also lasted about two and a half months and ended in late June.
Traditionally, the CCP’s Beidaihe Conference is held secretly between late July and mid-August, while the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee is scheduled for October. However, some reports suggest the Fourth Plenum may occur in late August, meaning the current inspections will overlap both events.
Commentator Li Yanming wrote in Dajiyuan on July 17 that this inspection round involves the strongholds of numerous Politburo members and Standing Committee officials, indicating fierce factional battles ahead of Beidaihe and possibly major leadership reshuffles at the upcoming Fourth Plenum.
The Party Secretaries of the municipalities under inspection—Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing—are currently held by Politburo members Yin Li, Chen Jining, Chen Min'er, and Yuan Jiajun, respectively. The current Party Secretary of Guangdong Province is Politburo member Huang Kunming. Among them, Chen Jining, Chen Min'er, and Huang Kunming are close allies of CCP leader Xi Jinping—representing his Tsinghua University faction, former Zhejiang associates, and former Fujian colleagues, respectively. Yuan Jiajun is a key member of Xi’s later-promoted military-industrial faction.
The provinces of Fujian, Guizhou, and Shandong—also under inspection—are strongholds of Xi Jinping’s factions: the Fujian faction, the Guizhou faction, and the Shandong faction. Notably, Shandong is the home province of Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan. Xi's trusted ally Li Zhanshu and former subordinate Chen Min’er are among the high-ranking officials who once governed Guizhou. Xi himself held long-term positions in Fujian, including in Xiamen. Key members of the current Politburo—such as Standing Committee member Cai Qi, Politburo member and Vice Premier He Lifeng, as well as State Councillor and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong—are all former colleagues of Xi from his time in Fujian. Both He Lifeng and Wang Xiaohong previously served in Xiamen. Additionally, State Councillor Shen Yiqin, promoted after the 20th Party Congress, also hails from Guizhou.
Notably, Xinjiang has been subjected to continuous inspections. During the recently concluded fifth round of inspections, several senior officials from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps were dismissed while inspections were underway. These included Song Quanwei, a committee member and deputy director of the Caohu Project Area; Wang Shengping, former Party Secretary of Beitun City and Political Commissar of the 10th Division; and Zhang Xuejun, Party Secretary and Political Commissar of the 4th Regiment of the 1st Division.
Then, on July 1, 2025, Politburo member Ma Xingrui was removed from his post as Xinjiang Party Secretary and reassigned. He was replaced by Chen Xiaojian, Executive Vice Minister of the United Front Work Department.
Ma Xingrui, a trusted member of Xi’s military-industrial faction and a native of Xi’s wife’s hometown (Yuncheng, Shandong), has now been out of office for over two weeks with no clear reassignment. Many speculate he may, like his predecessors Zhang Chunxian and Chen Quanguo, be moved to a ceremonial or inactive role.
Li Yanming points out that this renewed inspection of Xinjiang after Ma's removal suggests an ongoing purge and casts further doubt over Ma’s future.
Commentator Li Linyi adds that in CCP political tactics, this may be a case of “removing the tiger from the mountain”—shifting Ma Xingrui out before launching inspections that may reveal problems tied to his tenure. Since Chen Xiaojian has a background with the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), this move may be particularly detrimental for Ma. Still, his ultimate fate remains uncertain.
In addition, Qinghai and Shaanxi—both included in the sixth round of central inspections—are considered strongholds of current National People's Congress Chairman Zhao Leji. Meanwhile, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region is a former stronghold of Guo Shengkun, the former Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. Over the past three months, several high-ranking provincial and ministerial officials with career ties to Guangxi have been investigated. These include Lan Tianli, former Chairman of the Guangxi Autonomous Region Government; Peng Xiaochun, former Vice Chairman of the Guangxi People's Political Consultative Conference; and Jin Xiangjun, currently Governor of Shanxi Province, who previously served as Party Secretary of Fangchenggang City and Secretary of the Party Working Committee of the Dongxing Key Development and Opening-up Pilot Zone in Guangxi. All three are considered former subordinates of Guo Shengkun during his tenure in Guangxi.
Political Sensitivity Heightens—Local Officials on Alert
Several sources told Dajiyuan that security along the Beijing–Beidaihe corridor was tightened as early as late June. Checkpoints along the route have increased, and train stations and trains now carry out multiple layers of inspections. Petitioner groups and dissidents are under strict surveillance in both Beijing and Beidaihe.
Observers are closely watching for sudden, high-level shakeups within the CCP leadership amid growing secrecy and tension.
On June 30, the CCP Politburo reviewed the Regulations on Central Party Decision-Making and Coordination Bodies, sparking speculation.
Then, on July 17, Nikkei Asia published an article by veteran journalist Katsuji Nakazawa, noting that since Xi took power in 2012, internal CCP bodies have proliferated, intruding deeply into policy, staffing, and budget decisions. This has gradually weakened the authority of the State Council. The review of these decision-making bodies, he suggests, reflects rising internal concerns over Xi’s overcentralization of power, and local officials are highly sensitive to these political winds from Beijing.
Sources familiar with Chinese political and economic dynamics told Nakazawa that officials in regions like Shanghai and Shandong had already sensed subtle shifts from Beijing by early June, prompting them to start political repositioning in advance.
He believes this internal power struggle will likely escalate at the Beidaihe Conference. The CCP’s political manoeuvres this summer suggest a new round of factional infighting is quietly unfolding.
On July 16, independent scholar Wu Zuolai published an article on Taiwan’s Central Broadcasting System, arguing that the newly formed “Central Coordination Mechanism” is more authoritative than past “leading groups.” He suspects that CCP elders may be stepping in to influence leadership-level decision-making. Faced with severe crises in both domestic and international politics and diplomacy under Xi’s authoritarian rule, it's inevitable that elders, rival factions, vested interests, and even the military might unite to counter Xi, potentially triggering a major political shakeup.
In July, independent commentator Du Zheng wrote in Taiwan’s Up Media that the current Politburo is fragmented and engulfed in cutthroat internal strife, with Zhongnanhai (the CCP’s power centre) resembling a “scene of collapse.” Given mounting internal and external challenges, the regime may soon face serious disruption or even collapse.
Editor-in-Charge: Lin Congwen
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