China’s New Predicament and Breaking the Deadlock Again After Great Change (Part One)

A half-finished (abandoned) building in Zhengzhou. (Video screenshot)

[People News] For many years, people have predicted that China’s deepening economic crisis would lead to regional splits, especially between the wealthier South and the political North. History provides a telling example: more than a century ago, when the Qing dynasty was collapsing, provincial leaders in the southeast declared “mutual protection,” effectively refusing to obey the imperial court in Beijing. A similar dynamic is not yet visible today—but the conditions for it are gradually forming.

The Legacy of “Reform and Opening”

The post–June Fourth (1989) period of reform and opening created a paradox. On one hand, one generation of Chinese did see real improvements in material living standards. On the other, two generations ultimately paid the price: a return to poverty, social stagnation, and a cycle of mutual harm. The leaders who managed China’s economy after 1989—premiers Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao, and Li Keqiang—were technically capable, but their role was essentially like “paperhangers” patching over cracks. Compared to late-Qing figures like Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zhang Zhidong, even their craftsmanship was not necessarily superior.

If Mao’s era was defined by cruelty and stupidity, then the post-1989 CCP became defined by cruelty, insatiable greed, and pervasive corruption. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping could hardly have failed to notice this. Yet under the illusion of control, they pressed forward. Now, the bill is coming due.

Today’s crisis is not just about bad loans or shrinking growth. It is also about hidden dangers: crumbling infrastructure, looming public health incidents, ecological collapse, and the rebound effects of decades of reckless development. These problems are already emerging, and their full eruption is only a matter of time.

The Deeper Wounds

Even more troubling than visible crises are the hidden wounds: the large-scale degeneration of the population caused by decades of distorted governance. The Cultural Revolution still scars Chinese society today, but its impact on human capital was limited compared to what came after. To blame everything on Xi Jinping’s “left turn” or the COVID pandemic is shortsighted. Xi may rightly be called the “accelerator-in-chief,” but the structural rot long predates him.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once remarked that China would be “the poorest country in twenty years, because it has no thought.” While emotionally charged, her statement contained truth: the lack of intellectual vitality is crippling. For those in power, the future holds little concern. As long as their families survive unscathed, they are content to let the nation drift toward disaster.

Why South China Matters

For now, southern provincial leaders remain obedient to Beijing. Any sign of disloyalty is quickly reported by spies, and Beijing swiftly replaces “problem” officials with centrally appointed parachute candidates. That makes a repeat of the “mutual protection of the southeast” unlikely in the short term.

But unlikely does not mean impossible. In late Qing history, such moves only appeared when the dynasty entered its terminal decline. Similarly, once today’s crisis deepens, local protectionism and regional autonomy will begin to grow. Business leaders, financial officials, and provincial administrators will eventually prioritize survival and self-preservation over loyalty to the center.

The logic is universal: when economic interests become a matter of survival, and central authority cannot meet basic demands, autocratic rhetoric loses all power. From that point, the countdown to structural change begins.

Why the North Is Different

Can North China lead such a change? Unlikely. Historically, regime change is not driven by the heartland’s majority, but by minorities acting first. The majority follows only once momentum has shifted.

For North China, obedience is deeply ingrained, and absent external shocks, the CCP could conceivably endure for decades longer there. Even in the event of a coup, the most likely outcome would simply be new faces singing the same “red songs.”

But once South China erupts, North China will inevitably be drawn in. If cities like Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Shanghai ignite, and other provincial capitals echo their anger, then Beijing and the northern provinces will follow suit.

Toward a Turning Point

The CCP’s real vulnerability lies in the erosion of loyalty within its own ranks. Officially, the Party boasts more than 100 million members. But of these, perhaps only a fraction are truly capable or committed. The rest are opportunists, parasites, or reluctant followers. In a crisis, they are unlikely to stand firm. Just as an undisciplined army collapses when faced with defeat, the CCP could crumble when its “rabble” members scatter at the first sign of failure.

At that point, even Zhongnanhai may be forced into partial concessions: loosening internet controls, devolving economic power to local governments, or sacrificing officials as scapegoats. The White Paper Movement already showed how a spark of dissent can force sudden retreat. With China’s vast catalogue of man-made disasters, the potential for another eruption is ever-present.

A New Path

When regimes are cornered, their instinct is to “break out.” This does not mean clinging to the same failed path, but trying new ones. If Beijing eventually launches “political reform,” it will be out of necessity, not conviction. And once such a process begins, it will take on a momentum of its own.

Yet even if CCP rule ends, the future is uncertain. North and South may agree on ending dictatorship, but they may diverge sharply afterward. The South, more exposed to global commerce, may push toward liberalization. The North, more accustomed to state dependency, may call for a return to socialist control.

This possibility is not remote. Both Chinese history and global experience show that when a system collapses, regions often move in different directions.

Conclusion

China urgently needs to take a new path—fearlessly, decisively, and with the courage to leave behind the poisoned legacy of the CCP. The reshaping of global power, particularly after a likely Russian defeat in Ukraine, will only make China’s position more precarious. Unless China not only changes its regime but also transforms its state structure, it cannot claim to be on a truly new road.

The coming decades will decide whether China finally breaks free—or remains trapped in cycles of cruelty, greed, and stagnation.

(Source: Democratic China)△