In This Context, Will Xi Jinping Knowingly Take a Gamble Even if It is Not Worthwhile?

Among Taiwan's various outlying islands, Kinmen, Matsu, and Dongsha hold important positions in defence. (Google Maps/Dajiyuan illustration)

[People News] Will the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resort to military force to unify Taiwan, and when might such an attack occur? Recently, the Stimson Centre, a prominent American think tank, released a report titled "Rethinking the Threat." Wu Yijun, the founder of the Jushi Think Tank, published an article in Taiwan's Shang Bao that introduces and comments on this report.

The "Rethinking the Threat" report appears to challenge the mainstream narrative of recent years that "Beijing could use military force against Taiwan at any time." The report argues that the likelihood of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan by Beijing is quite low, significantly lower than the scenarios often suggested by many in policy circles and the media. There are three main reasons for this: the high costs associated with a war against Taiwan, the CCP leadership's preference for non-military approaches, and the strong deterrent effect of cooperation among international anti-communist coalition countries.

The report highlights that the costs of a CCP invasion of Taiwan would be extraordinarily high. Beijing would face international economic sanctions, disruptions in global supply chains, interruptions in maritime shipping in both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, a significant withdrawal of foreign capital from risky areas, and a potential crisis leading to the collapse of China's financial system. Given the high level of economic interdependence between Taiwan and China, the so-called military unification would not only represent an external conflict for both sides but also an act of economic self-destruction. This scenario is certainly not advantageous for the CCP.

Furthermore, the military challenges associated with a CCP invasion of Taiwan are at a "nightmare" level. An amphibious landing operation across the Taiwan Strait would rank among the largest and most complex military operations in human history. While the CCP military is actively expanding, there remains a significant gap in capabilities related to long-range deployment, logistical support, and control of air and sea power.

The report provides a reality-based analysis indicating that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prefers to employ "non-war means" to achieve its objectives. This includes tactics such as the Anti-Secession Law, economic coercion, military pressure, a mix of incentives and threats, legal warfare, cognitive warfare, and various grey zone operations. These strategies gradually undermine Taiwan's international standing, weaken the psychological resilience of the Taiwanese people, diminish their resolve to resist communism, and desensitise them to the threats posed by the CCP.

For these reasons, the Stimson Centre report concludes that, at least in the short to medium term, a military invasion of Taiwan is unlikely to be Beijing's primary option. Instead, it is viewed as more of a tool for intimidation and political manoeuvring rather than an immediately actionable military strategy.

Wu Yijun argues that the Stimson Centre's assessment of the risks in the Taiwan Strait is overly optimistic, as it relies solely on "rational analysis."

He points out that Xi Jinping underscores the legitimacy of the CCP's rule as being rooted in the narrative of the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and the "completion of the unification mission." The risks associated with his potential for "irrational decision-making" may far exceed what democratic nations can foresee or prepare for.

The significant downturn in the Chinese economy, rising unemployment, and a looming population crisis could lead to social unrest. Many analysts believe that Xi Jinping might take drastic measures, fully aware of the high risks, and could initiate conflict with Taiwan as a means to deflect internal issues.

Wu Yijun emphasises that Taiwan's true risk does not stem from whether the CCP determines that "a military invasion of Taiwan is not cost-effective," but rather from whether Xi Jinping would be willing to "gamble even when aware of the costs," and whether he possesses sufficient mobilisation capabilities.

Wu Yijun urged Taiwan and its anti-communist allies not to be 'overly fearful' or 'blindly optimistic', but to prepare thoroughly on two fronts: rationally, by strengthening defence, deepening international alliances, and reducing the incentives for war; and irrationally, by establishing a stronger deterrent capability. This way, even if Beijing attempts to take a gamble, it will be aware of the potentially high cost of regime collapse, deterring it from acting recklessly.

Jin Canrong, the vice dean of the School of International Relations at Renmin University of China, who is known as the 'vanguard against America' and referred to as the 'national master of the Communist Party', recently claimed in a speech that the Xi Jinping administration is likely to take military action by 2027 to resolve the Taiwan issue. While there are no military concerns, Xi Jinping still needs to be wary of two factors: 'economics' and 'politics'.

Last year, Jin Canrong also addressed the issue of military unification with Taiwan, stating that as an observer, he believes the likelihood of 'non-peaceful unification' is more realistic. However, he acknowledged that for the Communist Party to pursue military unification, it still needs to achieve two conditions: economic strategic autonomy and understanding from the international community.

Following the military parade in Beijing, the Eastern Theatre Command of the People's Liberation Army, which is the main force of the Communist Party towards Taiwan, released a new propaganda song on September 13 titled 'Planting the Flag of Victory on the Treasure Island'. The music video prominently features military exercise footage, including iconic landmarks such as Taipei 101 and Sun Moon Lake, conveying a strong message of intimidation. Some scholars from the mainland interpret this action as a signal that 'Taiwan has little time left'.

The music video begins with a confrontation between two armies on an ancient battlefield, followed by footage from the end of World War II and the Chinese Civil War. It also simulates the occupation of the 'Presidential Office' by raising the five-star flag, which seems to imply that the current situation in the Taiwan Strait is a 'continuation of the unfinished liberation war of 1949.'

As reported by The Mirror, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China has increasingly dispatched aircraft and submarines to cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait in recent years to intimidate Taiwan. The number of sorties has been particularly remarkable during Taiwan's presidential elections and other significant events.

The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of China indicated that from 6 AM on September 13 to 6 AM on September 14, a total of 27 sorties of various types of military aircraft from the PLA were detected disturbing Taiwan, with 26 of these crossing the median line of the Strait and entering northern, central, southwestern, and eastern airspace. Additionally, 14 naval vessels and 6 government ships were observed lingering around the Taiwan Strait.

The Ministry of National Defence stated that the recent PLA operations included main and auxiliary fighter jets as well as drones, with nearly all crossing the median line of the Strait, thereby exerting pressure on Taiwan's air defence identification zone. In addition to deploying mission aircraft and warships for close monitoring, the military also employed shore-based missile systems for vigilance to ensure the security of the Taiwan Strait remains uncompromised.
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