What Major High-Level Personnel Changes Will Occur at the Fourth Plenary Session?

Cai Qi met Xi Jinping before the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session. (Video screenshot)

[People News] The four-day Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Fourth Plenary Session has already passed two days. Although state media is attempting to shift focus to the “15th Five-Year Plan,” outside attention remains centered on personnel changes, mainly in four areas:

1. Has Xi Jinping’s Power Status Changed?

Will Xi, as speculated and reported abroad, “resign” from the posts of Central Committee member, General Secretary, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, while temporarily retaining the title of State President? If so, who will replace him?

There is precedent in CCP history.

At the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in 1980, the meeting approved the resignations of Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, and Chen Xilian, removing them from Party and state leadership posts. At that time, Wang Dongxing was a CCP Vice Chairman and Politburo Standing Committee member; Ji Dengkui was a Politburo member and Vice Premier; Wu De was a Politburo member and Vice Chairman; Chen Xilian was a Politburo member and Vice Premier.

At the Fourth Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee in 1985, 64 Central Committee members and alternates—including Ye Jianying, Deng Yingchao, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Ulanhu, and Wang Zhen—voluntarily stepped down, and their resignations were accepted.

Beyond voluntary resignation, there are three other methods of removal:

First, dismissal proposed by the Politburo. For example, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee in 1989, Premier Li Peng presented the Politburo’s report on Zhao Ziyang’s “errors during the counterrevolutionary turmoil.” The plenary session approved it, announcing Zhao’s removal from all Party and military positions.

Second, the plenary session may issue a resolution removing one or more members—rare, but it occurred at the Third Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee in 1977, which expelled the “Gang of Four” (Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan).

Third, most commonly, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) or the Military Discipline Commission submits a report on a member’s case to the plenary session for approval—used for figures such as Chen Xitong, Yu Youjun, and Kang Rixin.

For Xi, the first method is most desirable for the Party’s upper echelons—it avoids political or social shock and ensures his and his family’s safety from retribution. But if Xi refuses to resign or attempts to reverse his fate through internal votes, Party elders and opposing military factions may resort to forced measures, such as the second method. After all, without military control, Xi’s limited Central Guard Bureau and MPS Special Service personnel could not match special forces.

2. How Many Central Committee Members Will Be Removed or Disciplined?

At least 20+ Central Committee members are expected to be publicly disciplined or confirmed as such during the session—all personally approved or promoted by Xi Jinping.

This includes numerous senior military officers: recently expelled CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong, Political Work Department heads Miao Hua and He Hongjun, Joint Operations Command Center deputy Wang Xiubin, Eastern Theater commander Lin Xiangyang, Army political commissar Qin Shutong, Navy political commissar Yuan Huazhi, and PAP commander Wang Chunning.

Others possibly confirmed as removed include:
Logistics Support Department Minister Zhang Lin (dismissed as NPC deputy), missing and reportedly detained Western Theater commander Wang Haijiang, CMC Political and Legal Affairs Secretary Wang Renhua, Navy commander Hu Zhongming, Tibet commander Wang Kai, Army commander Li Qiaoming, Information Support Force political commissar Li Wei, Central Theater commander Wang Qiang, and political commissar Xu Deqing.
Alternate member and CMC General Office Director Fang Yongxiang is also said to be in trouble.

Among Party and government members:
Former Agriculture Minister Tang Renjian, ex–Shanxi governor Jin Xiangjun, deceased Customs chief Yu Jianhua, ex–International Department head Liu Jianchao, former MIIT Minister Jin Zhuanglong, military-civil integration deputy Lei Fanpei, former CSRC chairman Yi Huiman, ex–Guangxi chairman Lan Tianli, and ex–Inner Mongolia chairwoman Wang Lixia are all implicated or awaiting official confirmation of removal.

3. Will Xi’s Loyalists Resign?

How many of Xi’s close allies in the Politburo Standing Committee (Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Wang Huning, Li Xi), Politburo (Ma Xingrui, Li Ganjie, Li Shulei, Chen Wenqing, Chen Min’er), and Secretariat or State Security (Wang Xiaohong) will voluntarily—or under pressure—resign their Central Committee and leadership posts?

4. Who Will Be Newly Added to the Central Committee or Leadership?

Vacancies arise from removals or deaths, so many alternate members will likely be promoted. If Xi steps down, could Wang Yang, a retired Politburo Standing Committee member, return to the Central Committee? Another key figure under speculation is Hu Chunhua, long rumored as a potential successor.

According to CCP statistics, since 1992, each Central Committee term has seen an average of 4.75 alternate members promoted (3.1% of the total). But this plenary session will far exceed that average—the main business of the meeting is personnel reshuffling.

Because of these sensitive top-level changes, Beijing is exercising extreme caution: troops stationed in the capital, stricter internet controls, and tighter social surveillance. Reports say major Beijing universities were ordered to keep staff on duty from October 20–29, including weekends—an unusually long post-session alert period, rare in the past two decades. This likely reflects fears of social unrest or student reactions to leadership upheavals, indirectly confirming that major personnel changes are highly probable at this Fourth Plenum.

(Source: The Dajiyuan)△