Mysterious Account Tests the Waters: Xi–Zhang Power Struggle Loosens Externally, Tightens Internally

Zhang Youxia counterstrikes against Xi Jinping (People News illustration)

[People News] Recently, former CCP Central Party School professor Cai Xia revealed that He Weidong and Miao Hua had formed a secret army in Langfang, Hebei, sparking widespread attention and heated discussion. Around the same time, a mysterious mainland social-media account called “Wind Direction Observer” (风向观察) suddenly released alleged court documents detailing the trials of former Rocket Force leaders Li Shangfu, Wei Fenghe, and others accused of colluding with foreign powers.

Both incidents were not from official sources, yet occurred in close succession. Coupled with the recent, markedly softer diplomatic tone Xi Jinping adopted in meetings with U.S. and Japanese leaders, these developments highlight that, after the CCP’s 20th Fourth Plenary Session, fierce internal struggles within the military persist — and that the complexity of the power structure at the top far exceeds what is visible on the surface.

Mysterious “Wind Direction Observer” Exposes Scandals Within the Rocket Force

On October 31, several overseas websites reprinted a shocking exposé originally posted by the mainland WeChat account Wind Direction Observer.
The article revealed detailed corruption case files involving former Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, former Rocket Force commander Li Shangfu, and multiple other generals, claiming to cite excerpts from prosecutors’ indictments and military court verdicts. The post first appeared on a domestic platform but was swiftly deleted.

The article described an intricate web of corruption among successive Rocket Force commanders and related senior officers:

• Wang Hongyao, the first “tiger” felled within the Rocket Force, allegedly embezzled 430 million yuan, laundering the money through a Hong Kong shell company.

• Lt. Gen. Zhang Zhen awarded the “Dongfeng-26 missile chip” contract to Beijing Tian×Microelectronics Co., whose hidden shareholders were a U.S. fund. He took 117 million yuan in bribes and received a $8.5 million Manhattan apartment.

• Zhou Yaning stored 328 kg of gold bars, 78 crates of 1960-vintage Maotai, and 59 classified operational plans of the Rocket Force through 2025 in his underground vault in Baoding.

• Wei Fenghe split the DF-31AG simulation-training software project into 12 sub-contracts, awarding them to companies controlled by Lockheed Martin subcontractors; he pocketed 274 million yuan and a Los Angeles hillside villa.

• Li Shangfu leaked bidding data on a hypersonic-vehicle carbon-carbon composite project to Beijing Hang× Technology Co., which used raw materials from the U.S. Carbon Valley company, inflating costs by 70 percent.
  Li’s son allegedly received $138 million over three years in a Credit Suisse trust account.

The article even outlined how the U.S. military obtained secret intelligence — inviting Rocket Force scientists to American “missile-control conferences,” offering Wei Fenghe’s son free admission to MIT, and arranging Li Shangfu’s aide to hand a U.S.-Chinese intermediary a flash drive and wire payment on the spot.

The post’s explosive content gave readers the impression of near-collaboration between the PLA and the U.S. military, as if the two enjoyed “a friendship with no limits.” Even if visible only for minutes or hours before deletion, such a post would normally ignite heated online debate. Strangely, it vanished quickly and caused little domestic uproar.

Behavioral Analysis: A Test Balloon From Xi’s Camp?

When did the post first appear, and how long did it survive? What is the background of Wind Direction Observer? How credible is the information, and what was its purpose?

On the X (Twitter) platform, independent commentator Zheng Xuguang cited an in-depth NetEase News article titled “The Defense Minister and Rocket Force Commander Fall in Succession — U.S. Infiltration Shocking,” dated October 27, bylined “Wind Direction Observer.”
It stated that “all times, names, sums, items, and verdicts below are taken from the CCDI’s 2023–2025 announcements, effective Supreme Court and Military Court rulings, Xinhua and PLA Daily reports, and the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) ‘PLA Rocket Force Order of Battle’ PDF (Oct 2023).”

Yet by October 31, the NetEase article of the same title had been completely rewritten, its case details erased — implying deletion of the original. Zheng’s timeline suggests the exposé appeared on or before Oct 27 and was removed the same day.

A full web search finds only two items under the Wind Direction Observer byline:

1. the Oct 31 exposé on Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, and

2. an April 21 2025 China Digital Times archive titled “Netizen Test Shows Excessive CO₂ Levels on High-Speed Trains.”

The two differ sharply in subject, tone, and structure but share the same signature and an emphasis on citing official data — making authorship uncertain.

Thus, the Li Shangfu/Wei Fenghe article appears to be an isolated, one-time release from a single channel — exceedingly odd under China’s strict censorship, where any editor knows the lethal risk of posting such material.

The pattern suggests Wind Direction Observer was a special-purpose account, displaying these traits:

• Extreme sensitivity — exposing high-level military treason and collusion.

• Targeted detonation — a one-off aimed at the Zhang Youxia–linked Rocket Force faction.

• Timing precision — right after the Fourth Plenum, as attention focused on He Weidong–Miao Hua’s “private army” and amid Xi’s intensive diplomacy.

• Professional detail — sources apparently from restricted military documents, yet narrated in the tone of an independent leak.

• Controlled operation — single WeChat post, rapid cross-reposts, then swift deletion.

This points to a covert, semi-official propaganda test, an instrument for gauging public reaction and guiding limited opinion. Specifically, it may have been a trial balloon by Xi’s faction against Zhang Youxia: the implicated officers were tied to weapons procurement — many during Zhang’s tenure as head of the Equipment Development Department — leaving no doubt about the target.

Xi–Zhang Struggle: Outwardly Relaxed, Inwardly Tight — Xi’s Diplomacy Turns Weak

After the Fourth Plenum, Xi nominally retained control of party, state, and military posts, and official media reinstated his “2442” formula of supreme authority. But real military command has already changed hands.

On October 17, Zhang Youxia ordered the Defense Ministry to pre-emptively announce the purge of nine generals including He Weidong and Miao Hua. During the Plenum, Central Military Commission discipline chief Zhang Shengmin rose to Vice Chairman — leaving Xi effectively a commander without troops.

On October 25, Cai Xia’s revelations about He Weidong and Miao Hua forming a secret force in Langfang confirmed the true reason for their fall and further proved that the Xi–Zhang power struggle was real.

Three days later, on October 28, the 18th session of the 14th NPC Standing Committee stripped multiple figures of deputy status — including former Hunan Party Secretary Xu Dazhe, CMC Auditor General Sun Bin, and former Navy Political Commissar Adm. Yuan Huazhi.
Xu Dazhe, once an aerospace executive under Ma Xingrui, dragged Ma himself into controversy.

Meanwhile, the CCP embassy in North Korea posted that on Oct 25 it hosted a reception marking the 75th anniversary of “the PLA’s overseas combat operations.” Attendees included a military delegation led by National Defense University Political Commissar Xia Zhihe.

This implies that Xi’s longtime aide Zhong Shaojun had been dismissed from that post.

Independent journalist Zhao Lanjian stated on X that Air Force Commander Ma Xiaotian had been arrested; Ma was linked to Xi’s ally Ding Laihang.

All signs show Xi’s allies are being systematically cut down.

Though Xi did not step down at the Plenum, if he intends to seek another term at the 21st Party Congress, he will inevitably strike back — and controlled information leaks are one weapon.

However, spreading stories of senior generals selling secrets to the U.S. is ludicrous and self-defeating — “hurting the enemy ten-thousand while losing eight-thousand.”

If Xi’s camp releases only old Rocket Force cases while avoiding mention of the nine generals’ new scandals, it only brands itself a faction.

Thus, the current elite struggle appears soft on the surface but tight underneath.

Xi still sits atop the hierarchy, but his grip may be slipping — as seen in his suddenly meek diplomacy.

With his long-standing “wolf-warrior” style, Xi once preferred to let the Chinese people “eat grass” rather than bow to the U.S. or Japan.

Yet in reality, he served Trump a dish of “mashed potatoes”: retreating completely on rare earths, soybeans, and fentanyl, winning only a 10 percent tariff cut. On Taiwan, he dared not mention a word.

In Xinhua’s rare coverage of the Trump–Xi meeting, Xi said only: “Let the two nations be partners and friends. Dialogue is better than confrontation. Compress the problem list and lengthen the cooperation list.”

Premier Li Qiang told the U.N. the U.S. and China should “act like a married couple,” and Xi echoed, saying the two should “be friends.”

Gone were the combative slogans — “we’ll talk with the door wide open; if they fight, we’ll fight to the end.”

Those wolf-warrior lines now stay buried in little notebooks, never to be read aloud.

Then came Xi’s meeting with his nemesis, new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

In their first summit, Xi found himself completely on the defensive. After the CCP failed to interfere in Japan’s election, Xi sulked and withheld congratulations; Takaichi ignored him and confronted him head-on.

She listed every sore point: the East China Sea (including the Senkaku Islands), rare earths, concern over detained Japanese citizens, safety of overseas nationals, the South China Sea, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and North Korea abductions — directly challenging Xi’s regime on all fronts.

Xi was speechless.

Unprepared and without his cue cards — or with cards that lacked any answers — he was utterly stumped.

Such questions went far beyond the CCP’s script; even Cai Qi, his chief of staff, would never dare write responses for these.

Xi’s once-aggressive diplomatic “art style” has turned feeble and drained.

Whether due to his waning power or the CCP’s worsening internal and external crises, both Xi and the regime are tightening belts — and their days are growing ever more difficult.

(First published by People News)
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