Insider: He Weidong Unable to Compete with Zhang Youxia Under Zhang Shengmin s Surveillance

On March 4, 2025, He Weidong attended the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. (Photo credit: Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images)

[People News] Following the Fourth Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping appears to maintain his three positions unchanged. However, despite continuing as Chairman of the Military Commission, he is believed to have completely lost military authority. Independent commentator Du Zheng recently published an article in Taiwan's 'Shang Bao' detailing how Zhang Youxia emerged victorious in this internal military conflict, revealing insider information about his dominance in the military.

On November 3, the first report meeting for the entire military to study and implement the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session was held. Zhang Shengmin, who had just been promoted to Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, appeared alongside Zhang Youxia, the First Vice Chairman, and Liu Zhenli, a member of the Central Military Commission, to meet with members of the propaganda team and listen to the report.

With several generals having been dismissed, only four generals were present: Zhang Youxia, Zhang Shengmin, Liu Zhenli, and Dong Jun. Zhang Youxia was the only Politburo member in attendance. During Zhang Youxia's speech, the newly appointed Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin and Military Commission member Liu Zhenli sat in the front row, while Defence Minister General Dong Jun and the lieutenant generals occupied the second row.

Du Zheng noted that Zhang Youxia is clearly dominant, effectively 'ruling' the military alone. Compared to the propaganda meeting following last year's Third Plenary Session, his speech this time carried more weight and confidence, as he had just decisively defeated the military's Fujian faction.

The military leaders favoured by Xi Jinping are divided into several factions, with the Fujian faction led by He Weidong and Miao Hua, while the Shaanxi faction is led by Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin.

Once seen as Xi Jinping's most trusted military faction, the core figure of the "Fujian Gang" that shapes the strategy towards Taiwan faced near-total dismissal on October 18, with nine generals, including Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong, former Political Work Department Director Miao Hua, and former Eastern Theater Command Commander Lin Xiangyang, being swiftly removed from their positions.

He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Lin Xiangyang are central figures within the "Fujian Gang." All three hail from Fujian and were previously part of the now-defunct 31st Group Army of the People's Liberation Army, which was based in Xiamen, Fujian. Xi Jinping is well-acquainted with this southeastern coastal province, having worked there from the mid-1980s until 2002, starting as the Vice Mayor of Xiamen. The 31st Group Army was under the Nanjing Military Region at that time. Xi Jinping has promoted several former officers from this unit, including He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Lin Xiangyang, to significant positions.

Du Zheng argues that Xi's extensive practice of selling positions to Miao Hua and others has inadvertently led to a chaotic situation characterised by the "promotion of those with issues."

Zhang Youxia, as Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, is responsible for military affairs, including equipment development and training management. In contrast, He Weidong primarily oversees political work, including military discipline, personnel matters, and propaganda, effectively acting as a "military supervisor."

Du Zheng noted that both are members of the Politburo; while Zhang Youxia holds a higher rank, He Weidong possesses greater actual power. However, after assuming office, He Weidong's ambitions began to grow, leading him to target Zhang Youxia.

In July 2023, He Weidong focused on Zhang Youxia's vulnerable arms procurement operations, initiating a thorough investigation that resulted in the removal of Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao and former Minister of Equipment Development Li Shangfu, both of whom were close allies of Zhang Youxia.

During the Chinese Communist Party's "Two Sessions" in March 2024, He Weidong made statements at a military representatives' meeting, emphasising the need to address the military's "false combat capabilities." The South China Morning Post reported on March 9, 2024, that it had obtained the minutes from this meeting.

Du Zheng analysed that He Weidong's remarks may have been aimed at the defective equipment procured under Zhang Youxia's supervision, as well as the deceptive practices occurring within the troops during training. U.S. media have reported that the missiles used by the Chinese military are filled with water instead of fuel.

Members of Zhang Youxia's faction did not remain passive and launched a counteroffensive. An ally of He Weidong, Miao Hua, was reported for selling positions, which compelled Xi to agree to an investigation. Shortly after Miao Hua was "suspended for investigation," He Weidong also mysteriously "disappeared."

Du Zheng remarked that He Weidong, who comes from a civilian background, simply cannot compete with the entrenched interests represented by Zhang Youxia.

Du Zheng further disclosed that at that time, General Zhang Shengmin, who was the head of the Rocket Force and Secretary of the Central Military Discipline Inspection Commission, played a nuanced role when He Weidong targeted Zhang Youxia. It was later confirmed that he assisted Zhang Youxia in secretly monitoring He Weidong and gathering evidence against him.

Political commentator Chen Pokong previously analysed that Zhang Shengmin, as the political commissar of the Rocket Force, could not remain unaffected amid the downfall of all Rocket Force generals. In this precarious situation, he chose to align himself with Zhang Youxia. As the Secretary of the Military Discipline Inspection Commission, Zhang Shengmin was instrumental in taking down He Weidong and Miao Hua, announcing it ahead of the Fourth Plenary Session. Without Zhang Shengmin's support, it would have been quite challenging for Zhang Youxia to achieve this.

Following the major purge within the Chinese military, Du Zheng pointed out that there are three significant crises lurking beneath the surface.

Firstly, Zhang Youxia stands as the singular dominant figure. Although he and Zhang Shengmin outwardly express loyalty to Xi, Zhang has effectively marginalised Xi's military authority. Should the two harbour genuine ambitions, they could resemble Lin Biao, becoming figures who 'command the party with guns' and where 'the guns do not protect Xi'.

Secondly, the entire structure of the Chinese Communist Party's military has deteriorated. The system of selling official positions established by Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, along with the so-called democratic evaluation and reserve cadre system, continues to persist in Xi's era. Despite more than a decade of anti-corruption campaigns, corruption has only intensified under Xi's leadership. He must undertake a self-reform, unless he is willing to risk his own life. The corrupt 'double-faced individuals', along with incidents of leaking secrets and defection, are likely to proliferate in the future.

Thirdly, the morale within the military is shifting.

Following the downfall of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others, they were charged with 'disloyalty and betrayal, severely undermining the trust of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, and seriously violating the principle of party command over the military and the accountability of the Chairman of the Military Commission'. This reflects the ongoing toxic legacy of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. After the Fourth Plenary Session, military media accused He Weidong and others of betraying Xi, asserting that political risks had been mitigated. In truth, it was Xi himself who promoted these 'big tigers' while in a weakened state, irretrievably losing his authority. The rise of 'military tigers' in large numbers is indicative of a decaying scene at the twilight of the Red Era.