[People News] The number of “tigers” (senior officials) taken down by the CCP this year is expected to surge dramatically, as can already be inferred from January’s figures. The reason is that this year is crucial for the CCP’s personnel layout. Next year the CCP will hold its 21st Party Congress, key provincial- and ministerial-level posts are being contested this year, and local governments are also beginning leadership transitions.

Last year, the CCP said it investigated 65 centrally managed officials. This year’s number will almost certainly far exceed that. Moreover, the high-risk areas for senior officials’ downfall are likely to concentrate in Party and government organs, finance, state-owned enterprises, and energy sectors. At the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) plenary session held at the beginning of 2026 to deploy anti-corruption work, authorities specifically named the “key minority” in finance, SOEs, and energy. Perhaps the CCP has already grasped evidence of disloyalty among these “key minorities” and is simply following the clues. Among the officials investigated in January, nearly half came from Party and government systems, making that sector another high-risk area.

At the CCDI plenary session, Xi Jinping made it clear: “The anti-corruption struggle is a major battle that we cannot afford to lose and must never lose.” The plenary communiqué said anti-corruption must “resolutely eliminate ‘two-faced people’ who harbor divided loyalties and say one thing but do another.” This bluntly shows that the underlying tone of so-called anti-corruption is about political loyalty. Economic corruption is merely a pretext; political discipline and absolute loyalty are the true tools the CCP uses to intimidate officials, with “zero tolerance” as the political standard.

Tang Yijun served for many years in Zhejiang and had deep ties with Xi’s allies in the so-called “Zhejiang clique.” What characterized his corruption?

From 1991 to 1997, Tang served as a full-time secretary in the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee General Office, mainly serving then–provincial Party secretaries and deputy secretaries, including Liu Feng, who later became chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial CPPCC. After 1997, Tang held senior posts in Zhoushan and Ningbo in Zhejiang. In April 2002, he returned to the provincial level as secretary-general of the Zhejiang Discipline Inspection Commission. He worked for about six months with Zhang Dejiang, then Zhejiang Party secretary and later chairman of the National People’s Congress. In October 2002, Xi Jinping was transferred to Zhejiang as vice governor and soon replaced Zhang Dejiang as Party secretary. Tang and Xi worked together in the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee for more than two years.

In 2016, when Ningbo Mayor Lu Ziyue was taken down for currying favor with Ling Jihua’s wife, Tang became acting mayor and then Party secretary of Ningbo. In April 2017, he was promoted to deputy Party secretary of Zhejiang. Half a year later, he was transferred to Liaoning Province as governor.

These moves were reportedly closely linked to support from Xi’s allies and the Zhejiang clique—especially the retired Zhejiang CPPCC chairman Liu Feng. Liu reportedly approached then–Organization Department head Zhao Leji. Liu had long worked in Qinghai in his youth, where Zhao also served and had been Liu’s subordinate. One important reason Zhao promoted Tang was that Tang was a Zhejiang official, fitting Xi’s preference for promoting the so-called “Zhijiang New Army.” Zhao believed he had read the chessboard correctly.

In April 2020, when hardline official Fu Zhenghua was removed as minister of justice, Tang was “transferred to Beijing” to take over as minister of justice, becoming a key member of Xi’s cabinet. But in January 2023, he was suddenly moved to the largely ceremonial post of Party secretary and chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial CPPCC.

In April 2024, Tang was officially announced to be under investigation, and in October the same year he was expelled from the CCP and removed from public office. The notice at the time included an unusual charge: improper family conduct and failure to properly manage and educate his spouse. Later investigations revealed that Tang used companies actually controlled by his wife, Xuan Minjie, to disguise corrupt dealings as market activities, engaging in a new type of corruption described as “one family, two systems.”

Xuan Minjie reportedly controlled 34 investment companies. Bribes were mainly received through so-called market operations such as obtaining original shares before IPO listings. For example, from 2012 to 2017, a tech company gradually merged and absorbed a small company controlled by Xuan. After the merger, Xuan effectively held 4.5 million original shares in the tech firm. Tang used his official influence to help the company obtain government confirmation letters and accelerate asset verification during its listing process. After the company went public, the value of those shares surged, bringing Xuan profits of over 40 million yuan. The investment network controlled by Xuan was said to be connected to the “Zhejiang clique” around Xi Jinping, directly touching the core of the top leadership circle.

(People News first release) △