Official Media Reports Unusual Events, Extending Wishes for the Health of the North Korean Leader.

Image: During the March 2024 Two Sessions, Xi Jinping was photographed by foreign media in the Great Hall of the People with an expression of extreme pain while drinking tea. (Illustration by Qing Yu/People News)

[People News] From June 8 to 9, Xi Jinping, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, and his wife Peng Liyuan conducted a state visit to North Korea. This visit comes nearly seven years after their first trip to North Korea from June 20 to 21, 2019. The itinerary for both visits was largely similar: Xi first published a signed article in North Korean media, followed by his arrival for a welcome ceremony, talks with Kim Jong-un, attendance at a welcome banquet, watching a performance, visiting the China-North Korea Friendship Tower, holding a small-scale meeting, a farewell, and returning to Beijing. This time, an additional activity included Xi's visit to a party school in North Korea where they planted trees together. Throughout these activities, Peng Liyuan accompanied Xi except during the talks and the visit to the party school.

A comparison of the reports from the two visits by the official Chinese media outlet Xinhua News Agency reveals some anomalies. The first anomaly is the mention of Xi Jinping's health concerns. In the official media's report on the welcome ceremony, it states: accompanied by Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping reviewed the honour guard of the Korean People's Army, and the honour guard members shouted in Korean, 'Wishing Comrade Xi Jinping good health.'

Such greetings were not present during the 2019 visit, and Kim Jong-un's decision to include them this time can be interpreted as both a sign of concern and well-wishes for Xi Jinping, as well as an intention to publicly disclose Xi's health condition. This actually reveals a significant secret of the Chinese Communist Party: Xi's health is poor, and it poses a serious issue. In communist countries, the health status of the highest leader is considered a state secret. Kim Jong-un, who himself is dealing with health issues, would certainly be aware of this, and he would also know that Xi is particularly sensitive about it.

However, not only did Kim Jong-un make this information public, but the official media of the Chinese Communist Party also reported on it. Kim's openness is related to his assertive stance, but the implications behind the CCP's media coverage are more complex.

On March 9 of this year, in his response to Xi Jinping's congratulatory message on his election, Kim Jong-un included the phrase: "I wish the Chinese leader good health." There is no doubt that this "Chinese leader" refers to Xi Jinping. At that time, the CCP's official media notably overlooked this response, while the Russian news agency reported it. Isn't that intriguing?

In other words, when the CCP's official media covered the welcoming ceremony, they could have easily omitted the greeting of "wishing Comrade Xi Jinping good health," but they chose not to. So, is Xi's close aide Cai Qi still in control of the Publicity Department? Cai Qi took over from Chen Xi as the president of the Central Party School; is this an expansion of power or a sign of diminishing influence?

The second anomaly pertains to the news regarding Xi Jinping's arrival at Pyongyang airport. The official media merely stated that he was "warmly welcomed at the airport" and included a short video, which did not show any footage of Xi and Peng disembarking from the plane or being warmly greeted by Kim Jong-un and his wife.

According to the conventions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it is crucial to report on the grand receptions Xi Jinping receives at airports during his foreign visits. For example, in 2019, state media provided a very detailed account, covering everything from the weather to the welcome slogans, the crowds, Xi Jinping and his wife stepping off the plane, shaking hands with Kim Jong-un, and riding together in a convertible while waving to the public, all accompanied by numerous photographs.

In contrast, it is clear that North Korea did not fail to warmly welcome Xi; rather, the CCP's state media intentionally downplayed this aspect. What could be the underlying reason for this?

The third anomaly is that the welcome slogan reported by state media only mentioned "The friendship between China and North Korea will last forever," while the slogans from 2019 included phrases like "Warmly welcome Xi Jinping." Kim Jong-un, who is skilled at making a show of things, would not have overlooked this detail. Why is the CCP's state media choosing not to report on it?

The fourth anomaly is that during the welcome banquet, the CCP's state media reported that Kim Jong-un, in his speech, expressed "the most sincere welcome to Xi Jinping's visit," stating, "Today, Pyongyang is filled with friendly sentiments, warmly welcoming the most esteemed guest of the North Korean party, government, and people." However, in 2019, Kim Jong-un had said, "Today, we welcome the most respected Chinese guest, General Secretary Xi Jinping and Madame Peng Liyuan, with immense joy."

It is evident that, out of diplomatic courtesy, Kim Jong-un would not omit mentioning Peng Liyuan in his speech, but it is the CCP that has intentionally left her out. What could be the reason for this downplaying of Peng Liyuan?

Furthermore, regarding the reports on the banquet, the coverage in 2019 was more detailed and passionate, while this year's state media report was straightforward and lacked emotional depth.

The fifth anomaly is the lack of reports regarding the attendance of North Korean officials at all events. This year, the Chinese Communist Party's official media did not publish a single report, while in 2019, a lengthy list was provided. By listing high-ranking North Korean officials, does it not further emphasise North Korea's significance?

The sixth anomaly pertains to the coverage of performances. In 2019, reports not only included slogans welcoming Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan, such as 'Pyongyang-Beijing,' but also noted that 'this performance was specially created for Xi Jinping's visit, with tens of thousands of North Korean performers participating.' In contrast, this year's reports omitted such statements and only mentioned three songs performed by North Korean artists that are considered red songs of the Communist Party. Additionally, there was no mention this year of Xi and Peng, or Kim Jong Un and his wife, stepping onto the stage together or taking photos with the North Korean performers.

The seventh anomaly arose when Xi Jinping and his wife, accompanied by Kim Jong Un and his wife, paid tribute at the Friendship Tower and visited the memorial hall. The recent report indicated that Xi 'seriously reviewed the list of martyrs from the Volunteer Army and introduced the situation of the sacrificed volunteer soldiers to Kim Jong Un,' but this was largely glossed over. In 2019, however, the official media provided a detailed account of several fabricated 'heroes' mentioned by Xi, such as Huang Jiguang and Qiu Shaoyun, along with Xi's reflections. At that time, Xi also inscribed in the guestbook, 'In memory of the martyrs, for generations of friendship,' but there was no report this year regarding whether he made any inscriptions.

All the aforementioned anomalies point to a single fact: the reports by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) official media regarding Xi (Xí) Jinping's foreign visits are facing certain restrictions, particularly in avoiding excessive promotion of Xi. Additionally, it appears that his health issues are no longer being excessively concealed. When considering the recent behavior of high-ranking officials from the CCP's Political Consultative Conference, who refrain from mentioning the maintenance of 'Xi's core' and instead emphasize collective leadership from the center, along with several ministerial adjustments, the unresolved case of Zhang Youxia (Zhāng Yòuxiá), and the military's statements that omit reference to 'Chairman Xi,' could this indicate that Xi's grip on power has not only failed to strengthen but may actually be weakening? Is there a potential shift brewing within the CCP? 

(First published by People News) △