China Zun Collision: Xi Jinping Faces Increased Risks of Political Fallout, Many Officials May Become Scapegoats

Upon closer examination, the facial features and hairstyle of the human figure strikingly resemble Xi Jinping.

[People News] On the evening of June 26, the China Zun, a prominent building in Beijing's central business district, was struck by a small light aircraft that disintegrated upon impact. Official reports confirm the pilot's death and injuries to 13 individuals on the ground and inside the building.

Following the incident, videos from the scene circulated rapidly but were later removed en masse, with police cordoning off the surrounding roads. Reports indicate that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has classified this incident as a 'terrorist event.'

China Zun is located not far from Zhongnanhai, which serves as a crucial line of defense for the capital's 'political security.' The fact that a small aircraft was able to breach multiple layers of airspace control and crash into a high-rise building highlights significant vulnerabilities in the capital's low-altitude security, whether due to technical failures or human error. In the highly centralized system of the CCP, such incidents can quickly lead to political accountability, and the ensuing blame game may extend from grassroots air traffic control departments to higher levels, involving both central and local authorities, military and civilian collaboration, and multiple departments. As a result, numerous officials may soon find themselves as scapegoats for this incident.

Xi Jinping's Fear of Death: From International Incidents to Extreme Control in Beijing

This incident took place just before the CCP's July 1st anniversary, making the timing particularly sensitive. Moreover, Party leader Xi Jinping is acutely aware of the risks associated with decapitation. Reports suggest that events such as the capture of Venezuelan President Maduro and the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei in 2026 have heightened Xi Jinping's fears regarding his personal safety. For many years, Xi has been extremely sensitive to extreme threats like assassination and coups, maintaining a high level of vigilance, especially following the arrest of Zhang Youxia. Amid unrest within the military, Xi has conveyed this fear throughout the ranks, transforming it into a stringent requirement for security in the capital.

Consequently, Xi Jinping has implemented extreme security measures. In May of this year, drone flights were entirely banned across Beijing, with regulations on drones described as the strictest ever. Previously, around 300 executives from the CCP surveillance giant Hikvision were taken away by authorities for investigation, ostensibly for reasons related to corruption or technical security. However, this action reflects Xi Jinping's profound concerns about vulnerabilities in the surveillance system and doubts regarding the loyalty of those involved. These measures illustrate Xi Jinping's security paranoia stemming from his fear of death and anxiety over decapitation, where any potential threat to his personal safety from low-altitude flights, surveillance, or technical vulnerabilities is regarded as a risk that must be met with zero tolerance.

In this context, the aircraft crash incident in Beijing has been internally classified as a 'terrorist event,' which is both reasonable and not surprising. Reports indicate that Liu Junhua, a senior executive at ZTE, crashed the A320 aircraft with registration number B-12PP into the China Zun building 15 minutes after shutting off the transponder. During this 15-minute window, Beijing's civil aviation control, public security, and military political departments surprisingly failed to intervene successfully, which is quite astonishing. The supposedly airtight security system in Beijing has revealed such a significant flaw; if there are no major issues with the system and procedures themselves, it suggests that someone may have deliberately chosen to be passive or feigned ignorance.

This indicates that the incident transcends a mere aviation accident and directly touches upon Xi Jinping's most sensitive concerns—the risk of decapitation in the capital's core area. Xi Jinping, who is naturally suspicious and fearful of both death and trouble, will likely amplify his associations with this incident. Following the arrest of Zhang Youxia on January 24 this year, Xi Jinping refrained from stepping outside Beijing for four consecutive months, convinced that his security measures were infallible. However, unexpectedly, before July 1, the security heart of Beijing experienced a significant breach, resembling a miniature version of the 9/11 event. Given Xi Jinping's approach, he will undoubtedly demand a thorough investigation and implement stringent crackdowns and preventive measures to ensure that similar vulnerabilities do not arise again. This also implies that accountability will extend beyond technical issues to encompass political loyalty and security responsibilities.

From grassroots to high-level, there is a multi-level chain reaction of scapegoating effects.

In line with the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) principles of 'territorial management + hierarchical responsibility + political leadership', the accountability for this incident will be thorough within the party, exhibiting characteristics of 'pressure from above and blame-shifting at every level'. Following intense power struggles, the ultimate scapegoat is expected to surface.

To begin with, this incident will have repercussions for the CCP's military, with the Beijing Garrison District being the most affected. On platform X, the account 'Xie Wanjun' reported that the Central Military Commission's Discipline Inspection Commission has set up a special investigation team to look into the troops of the Beijing Garrison District, particularly the Air Defense Command, regarding their negligence during the aircraft collision with the China Zun building. Chen Yuan, the commander of the Beijing Garrison District, was the first to be taken in for questioning. Chen Yuan was previously transferred to this position by Xi Jinping for his assistance in the alleged assassination of Li Keqiang while serving as the commander of the Shanghai Armed Police. Furthermore, former Shanghai entrepreneur Hu Li recently claimed that Xi Jinping has lost military authority, relying solely on the 50,000 troops of the Beijing Garrison District under Chen Yuan's command for protection. It remains uncertain whether Chen Yuan will be taken away, with estimates suggesting a low probability. Nonetheless, it is a fact that the Beijing Garrison District has completely failed in its responsibilities during this incident, and Xi Jinping, known for his vengeful tendencies, is unlikely to let this matter go unaddressed.

Secondly, Cai Qi is expected to face increased pressure. As Xi Jinping's chief aide, he is directly responsible for the security of the central core area of the capital and cannot evade leadership responsibility for this incident. This minor version of the 9/11 event may represent a more intense version of 9/11 for Cai Qi's political career, as it is undoubtedly a significant political setback. According to foreign media reports, Cai Qi is already regarded as the de facto number two figure within the party and a potential candidate to succeed Xi Jinping. Given Xi Jinping's desire to maintain power, he is likely to adopt a dual strategy towards Cai Qi, being both supportive and cautious. The recent incident involving the Chinese respect collision provides Xi Jinping with a strategic opportunity to manage Cai Qi effectively.

Thirdly, local officials in Beijing and Chaoyang District will visibly face repercussions.

At the municipal level in Beijing, the deputy secretary and deputy mayor responsible for public security, emergency management, urban enforcement, low-altitude coordination, and capital security are expected to be dismissed soon. In the 2024-2025 "Xinhua Gate Car Collision" incident, the deputy mayor responsible for the Tiananmen area management committee and security coordination, Gao Peng, was swiftly investigated and ultimately sentenced to 12 years in prison for bribery and dereliction of duty, becoming a typical scapegoat. Furthermore, the district party secretary, district mayor, and deputy district mayor responsible for emergency management and public security in Chaoyang District will also be held accountable under the principle of local jurisdiction. It is likely that district-level leaders will face investigations. Lastly, the secretary of the Beijing Municipal Political and Legal Affairs Commission, who is responsible for maintaining stability in the capital, will need to take responsibility for coordination failures. The heads of the Public Security Bureau and the Emergency Management Bureau, along with their deputy officials, are also likely to be impacted.

Fourth, officials from the civil aviation and low-altitude management sectors are not exempt from accountability. Those involved in the joint military-civil air traffic control system, the Beijing Regulatory Bureau of the Civil Aviation Administration, heads of general aviation management agencies, and officials from departments promoting the low-altitude economy may face repercussions due to a safety management veto. The investigation of senior executives from Hikvision has already demonstrated that such incidents can extend to executives of related companies.

In light of the entire incident, the scale of accountability could involve dozens to hundreds of individuals across various systems within the party, government, and military. Driven by a fear of repercussions, Xi Jinping is expected to address the situation with strict and swift measures to ensure a deterrent effect. Concurrently, this incident is likely to lead to an unprecedented downturn for Beijing's low-altitude economy, inflicting severe damage. Future approval processes will see significantly increased thresholds; compliance costs for businesses will rise sharply; production and sales will tighten; and the industry as a whole will contract passively, resulting in reduced investments, project delays, and challenges for small and medium-sized enterprises. Sub-sectors such as general aviation training and leisure flying are anticipated to experience a dramatic decline.

The emphasis on stability maintenance takes precedence over all else, yet it may trigger an uprising among the elite.

It is important to highlight that Liu Junhua, a senior executive at Zhongxing involved in the China Zun collision incident, is considered a successful individual and an elite member of Chinese society. Typically, such individuals are not seen as potential instigators of extreme social events within the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) narrative of maintaining stability. The CCP usually resorts to economic control measures and public opinion monitoring to manage the elite class and ultra-high-net-worth individuals. Xi Jinping operates under the belief that by controlling their financial resources, he can effectively restrain them. By tightening passport regulations and enhancing public opinion surveillance, he assumes that these elites will comply. However, the China Zun collision incident has completely disrupted the CCP's stability narrative concerning the elite class. Xi Jinping never expected that while stability could suppress all dissent, it would instead drive social elites towards rebellion, resulting in a significant event that took everyone by surprise. These elite individuals emerged as lone heroes in the heart of Beijing, willing to sacrifice their lives for justice, igniting a spark of resistance against the tyranny of the CCP. This incident holds immense significance, comparable to the Peng Zaizhou Sihongqiao incident, signaling the dawn of a new era for the elite class in Zhejiang to engage in social system reform. This is precisely what the CCP and Xi Jinping fear the most.

(First published by People News)△