What is Wang Huning's purpose for visiting North Korea? 

File Photo: On October 23, 2022, Wang Huning, a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Standing Committee, attended a press conference at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing alongside other newly appointed members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and both domestic and international journalists. (Photo by Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

[People News] According to an announcement from the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on July 14, Wang Huning, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, will visit North Korea from July 15 to 17. Xi Jinping recently conducted a state visit to North Korea in June, and North Korean Premier Pak Tae Song also just visited China from July 10 to 12. What could be the reason for Wang Huning's visit to North Korea at this time? Is it merely a continuation of the 'frequent interactions between high-level officials of China and North Korea' as suggested by some media? This explanation seems rather superficial.

Since the 1990s, Chinese Communist Party leaders such as Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping, and Premiers (Vice Premiers) Wen Jiabao, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, and Li Qiang have all visited North Korea, with the exception of Zhu Rongji, who did not visit North Korea during his tenure but did visit South Korea. Given that North Korea lacks a political consultative conference, Wang Huning's predecessors—Li Ruihuan, Jia Qinglin, Yu Zhengsheng, and Wang Yang—also did not visit North Korea, although Li and Jia did visit South Korea.

In comparison to several predecessors, since taking on the role of Chairman of the Political Consultative Conference, Wang Huning has only visited three countries: Vietnam in 2024 to pay respects to Nguyen Phu Trong, and Laos and Indonesia in 2025. As the head of a politically symbolic institution within the Communist Party, Wang Huning is aware of his role and has kept a close watch on the situation. Thus, it seems unlikely that sending such a fourth-ranking official, who has minimal ties to North Korean affairs and almost no interaction with Kim Jong Un, to North Korea at this time is a straightforward decision.

Firstly, there are no significant activities occurring in North Korea at this time. Historical records indicate that the two most important events in July are the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea on the 11th. This year marks the 65th anniversary of the treaty, and North Korea sent Pak Tae-sung to represent it. However, during the 60th anniversary in 2021 and the 55th anniversary in 2016, both Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un only exchanged congratulatory messages and did not send high-level delegations to attend any physical celebrations.

In contrast, during the 50th anniversary in July 2011, the highest officials from both sides not only exchanged congratulatory messages but also sent high-level delegations and held commemorative receptions. At that time, Zhang Dejiang, who was the Vice Premier of the Communist Party of China, led a delegation to Pyongyang on July 10, attended the commemorative events, and met with North Korean Premier Choe Yong-rim. Meanwhile, Yang Hyong-sop, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, led a delegation to Beijing. This year, North Korea surprisingly sent a delegation led by the Premier, but Beijing did not send a delegation at the same time. Therefore, Wang Huning's visit is not related to the anniversary of the treaty signing.

Another significant event in July is the commemoration of the Korean War Armistice on July 27, with various activities held by China, North Korea, and South Korea each year. In 2023, marking the 70th anniversary of the armistice, the Communist Party of China sent a delegation led by Li Hongzhong, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, to participate in the celebration activities. This year is neither a 'five' nor a 'ten', and the dates are relatively far apart, and given Wang Huning's higher rank, it is unlikely that he is here for that reason.

Thus, it can be concluded that Wang Huning's visit is not for participating in North Korean celebration activities, and the official Chinese Communist Party has not issued any relevant announcements.

If Wang Huning is not attending the celebration activities or visiting North Korea for leisure, it is highly likely that he is acting as a representative or that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is conveying messages to Kim Jong-un. After all, face-to-face communication is much safer than using international satellites.

Why do we suggest that he might be conveying messages on behalf of the Central Committee? In the past month, there have been increasing signs, including unusual statements from the second, third, and fourth-ranking officials of the Communist Party regarding Xi Jinping's speeches. High-ranking members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference have shifted from mentioning 'maintaining the core' to discussing 'collective leadership' and 'the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee' as part of Xi's party-building ideology. Additionally, Vice Premier Liu Guozhong has equated Xi's spirit with that of the Central Political Bureau meetings in his research speeches. All these developments indicate that after several months of internal struggle, the Communist Party's high-level officials have reached a consensus to continue adhering to the 'centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee,' and Xi has had to compromise, meaning that while he remains the core leader, he can no longer act unilaterally.

In simple terms, the Communist Party's policy towards North Korea may not be solely determined by Xi; members of the Politburo may also have a voice in the matter.

So, what might the conveyed messages entail? We can only speculate. During his meeting with Xi, Park Tae-sung mentioned that Kim Jong-un requested to 'develop the relationship between North Korea and China into the strongest strategic relationship,' while Xi Jinping stated the need to 'strengthen strategic cooperation.'

In June, during Xi's visit to North Korea, he and Kim Jong-un agreed to fully restore Sino-North Korean relations, advancing their bilateral relationship into a new stage of 'strategic partnership.' They also indicated that they would use the comprehensive reopening of border ports as an opportunity to significantly enhance bilateral economic exchanges and hinted at the potential for advancing military cooperation.

Strategic relations, or 'strategic partnerships,' typically refer to the long-term and stable cooperation frameworks established between two or more countries across various domains, including politics and economics. For instance, in June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed the 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty' in Pyongyang, which officially took effect in December of the same year. The treaty's core is the 'mutual defense' clause outlined in Article 4: if any contracting party is subjected to an armed attack, the other party is obligated to provide military and other forms of assistance.

Strategic cooperation, or 'strategic cooperative partnerships,' signifies a deeper level of interaction. This concept encompasses not only general cooperation but also collaboration in critical areas such as military and security, as well as joint positioning, coordination of stances, and actions in international affairs. The relationship established between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Russia is referred to as the 'New Era Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership.'

Is Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea and Park Tae-sung's communication on behalf of Kim Jong-un indicative of a move towards developing a 'strategic cooperative partnership'? According to the 'Sino-North Korean Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty,' if either party is invaded, the other is required to intervene. This treaty is currently the only military defense-oriented alliance agreement signed by the CCP that remains in effect. The 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty' between Russia and North Korea also includes similar provisions. Are Xi and Kim seeking to further solidify the mutual assistance relationship among China, Russia, and North Korea?

Do senior officials in Zhongnanhai support Xi's position? Is Wang Huning's visit connected to this issue? Is the message being conveyed one of continued advancement or of maintaining the status quo? Clues may soon emerge from related reports.

This article is adapted from the Dajiyuan website △