Sichuan Official Huang Ruixue Dies Suddenly, Raising “Death Position” Concerns

Sichuan Province Vice Governor Huang Ruixue. (Source: Video from X platform)

[People News] In recent years, a strange phenomenon has emerged within the Chinese Communist Party's anti-corruption campaign, marked by a series of unusual deaths among high-ranking officials.

According to reports from Sichuan's official media, 'Chuan Guan News', Huang Ruixue, who was appointed as the province's vice governor and deputy secretary of the Provincial Political and Legal Committee in July of last year, passed away on the evening of July 15 due to a sudden illness, at the age of 54. However, rumors circulating on Chinese social media suggest that Huang Ruixue may have taken his own life.

Huang Ruixue was transferred to Gansu in June 2022, where he served as the secretary and director of the Provincial Public Security Department, as well as deputy secretary of the Provincial Political and Legal Committee. In January of the following year, he became the vice governor of Gansu Province, continuing in his roles as secretary and director of the Provincial Public Security Department and deputy secretary of the Provincial Political and Legal Committee.

In early July 2025, Huang Ruixue was appointed as a member of the Party Group of the Sichuan Provincial Government, secretary of the Public Security Department, and inspector (concurrently), as well as deputy secretary of the Provincial Political and Legal Committee. By the end of July that same year, he took office as vice governor of Sichuan Province and director of the Sichuan Provincial Public Security Department.

The official statement claims that Huang Ruixue 'unfortunately passed away' after rescue efforts failed due to a sudden illness. However, there are widespread rumors on overseas X platforms suggesting that he committed suicide.

An X account named 'Vincent' posted, 'Sichuan Province Vice Governor and Director of the Provincial Public Security Department Huang Ruixue died by hanging in his office last night after returning to Chengdu from a national symposium for public security department directors.'

Netizens commented: 'If this is true, the protected big shots need to take care of his family.' 'First there was Ye Hanbing, now there is Huang Ruixue.'

Hong Kong media outlet Ming Pao reported that the official obituary referred to the term 'unfortunate passing,' which typically indicates an abnormal death. For example, recent official obituaries for Chongqing Municipal Committee Deputy Secretary Ren Xuefeng, Tianjin Mayor Liao Guoxun, General Administration of Customs Director Yu Jianhua, and Chongqing Vice Mayor and Public Security Director Zhang Anjiang all used this phrase.

Zhang Anjiang, the Vice Mayor and Public Security Director of Chongqing, was officially reported to have died from illness in May this year. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China announced on June 26 that his representative qualifications would naturally terminate, but it was unusual that there was no customary expression of mourning for his death. There are circulating rumors suggesting that Zhang Anjiang committed suicide by jumping from a building.

The Political and Legal Committee and Public Security positions are considered high-risk.

Within the Communist Party of China system, the local provincial-level role of 'Deputy Governor and Head of the Public Security Department' is seen as a critical area of power, yet it is also one of the most politically perilous 'high-risk positions.'

By conducting big data cross-comparisons using periodic reports from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, tracking from independent overseas think tanks, and accessible information from local official circles, we can assemble two highly shocking and precise structural diagrams:

1. Estimated data on officials from the Political and Legal Committee and the judicial system who have 'fallen from power.'

The Communist Party's 'Political and Legal Committee' is the core authority overseeing the Public Security, Procuratorate, Courts, Justice Bureau, and National Security Bureau. Between 2000 and 2012, during the Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao era, officials from the Political and Legal Committee enjoyed near-total immunity due to the aforementioned 'blood debts and interest alliances,' resulting in very few officials falling from power. The significant wave of officials losing their positions began after the 18th National Congress in 2012.

At the provincial and ministerial levels, it is estimated that around 70 to 90 'big tigers'—referring to high-ranking officials such as secretaries or deputy secretaries of the Political and Legal Affairs Committees from the central government down to various provinces—have been removed from their positions.

Among these, Zhou Yongkang, a state-level official and former secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, stands out as the highest-ranking official to have been ousted in the history of the political and legal system.

Provincial committee members who also serve as secretaries of the Political and Legal Affairs Committees are particularly affected. Notable examples include Su Hongzhang, the former secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Committee; Wang Like, the former secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Committee; Gan Rongkun, the former secretary of the Henan Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Committee; and Zhang Yue, the former secretary of the Hebei Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Committee, who is often referred to as the 'King of Political and Legal Affairs in Hebei.' Over the past two decades, more than half of the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions among the 31 in the country have seen their former or current 'provincial Political and Legal Affairs Committee secretaries' fall from power.

In some provinces, both the secretaries and deputy secretaries of the Political and Legal Affairs Committees have experienced a series of predecessors being ousted consecutively. For example, Huang Ruixue's predecessors, Ye Hanbing and Deng Yong, both fell from power.

At the bureau level, the estimated number of 'middle tigers'—referring to secretaries of the Political and Legal Affairs Committees at the municipal, state, and league levels—who have been removed from their positions is around 1,200 to 1,500.

According to a report from the National Defense Security Research Institute - National Defense Security Biweekly, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (Zhongjiwei) initiated a nationwide campaign for the "education and rectification of the political and legal teams" in 2021. During this campaign, a staggering 12,571 officials from the political and legal system across the country were placed under investigation. If we look at the period from 2000 to 2026, the number of political and legal committee secretaries, deputy secretaries, and office directors in various prefecture-level cities (such as those in Sichuan, Liaoning, and Guangdong) who have been removed from their positions due to connections with criminal organizations acting as "protective umbrellas" or for engaging in the buying and selling of official positions has surpassed a thousand.

For county-level and grassroots political and legal committee officials, estimates suggest that the number exceeds 20,000 to 30,000.

China has nearly 3,000 county-level administrative regions, each with its own political and legal committee. In the ongoing anti-corruption efforts and crackdowns on organized crime, the frequency of grassroots political and legal committee officials (such as county political and legal committee secretaries and comprehensive governance office directors) being removed from their positions is alarmingly high, with data from the grassroots level showing a nearly "collapse-style" distribution.

2. High Frequency of "Death Due to Illness/Unexpected Death"

In comparison to those who have been removed from their positions, the statistics regarding political and legal committee officials who have "died due to illness" or experienced "sudden death" are equally shocking. Within the Chinese Communist Party system, officials from the political and legal committee, public security, and discipline inspection systems have consistently ranked at the top for "abnormal death rates" and "sudden illness death rates" in recent years.

This phenomenon has led to a "collective death wave" following the full reopening at the end of 2022.

Within the political and legal system (including retired officials), it is estimated that several thousand senior officials passed away between the end of 2022 and 2024. This estimate is based on the numerous obituaries published by major political and legal universities, provincial and municipal law societies, courts, procuratorates, and political and legal committees across China after the country fully lifted its pandemic control measures at the end of 2022. Although the official narrative consistently omits any mention of the COVID-19 virus, attributing all deaths to 'ineffective medical treatment for illness,' the frequency of obituaries during this two-year period was several times higher than the previous norm, even reaching ten times, with many of the deceased being in their early 60s to just over 70 years old, shortly after retirement.

'Suicide due to fear of punishment' is often disguised as 'death due to illness.'

Since 2012, it is estimated that at least several hundred officials at the department level and above within the political and legal system have died under 'mysterious circumstances or by suicide.'

Many political and legal committee secretaries, often implicated in deep corruption or the enforcement of harsh persecution policies, tend to experience various bizarre 'deaths due to illness' when facing the discipline inspection commission or the threat of being 'silenced' in factional struggles.

For instance, sudden heart attacks or strokes in the office: many officials have reportedly suffered 'cardiac arrest' in their offices or homes just before or after being summoned for questioning.

Additionally, numerous officials have fallen from buildings or committed suicide due to 'depression.' This was particularly evident during the peak of the anti-corruption campaign from 2014 to 2018, when several local political and legal committee secretaries (including grassroots officials in Guangdong Province, Jilin Province, etc.) were reported to have 'accidentally fallen from heights due to severe depression' or 'committed suicide at home.' The official obituaries typically concluded with a discreet 'unfortunate death due to illness' or did not hold memorial services at all.

For instance, Liu Qiang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, was taken away for investigation by the Discipline Inspection Commission in November 2017. During the subsequent rectification period, several officials within the Liaoning political and legal system who had connections with him were reported to have 'fallen from buildings due to depression' at their homes or offices, effectively cutting off any leads.

Zheng Xiaosong, the director of the Liaison Office of the Central People's Government in Macao (whose work is closely tied to national security and political-legal coordination), tragically fell to his death from his residence in Macao on the evening of October 20, 2018. The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council of China quickly issued a statement within 24 hours, attributing his death to 'depression'.

Hao Chongfu, the deputy secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Jilin Municipal Committee and director of the '610 Office' in Jilin City, fell to his death from a high-rise building around 2021 during a nationwide investigation and educational rectification of the political and legal team. An internal report indicated that he had long suffered from severe depression. An independent investigation conducted overseas revealed that Hao Chongfu had been in charge of the local '610 Office' for an extended period, directly issuing numerous illegal labor education and arrest orders against faith-based groups, thus accumulating significant blood debts.

Feng Jian, a member of the Standing Committee of the Meizhou Municipal Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission in Guangdong Province, was found dead after falling from his residence in downtown Meizhou in early 2020. The official investigation concluded that he 'had suffered from depression prior to his death, ruling out homicide.' However, the timing of his fall coincided with the arrival of the Guangdong Provincial Discipline Inspection Commission's inspection team in Meizhou, just before a major crackdown on the local political and legal stability system's 'protective umbrella'.

Evil deeds are met with heavenly retribution.

The Political and Legal Affairs Committee system, which holds significant power over public security, prosecution, and the judiciary, is often met with strong public backlash when its officials engage in abuse of power, arbitrary actions, or corruption and brutality.

In traditional Chinese culture and folk beliefs, officials who commit numerous wrongdoings are ultimately punished or face misfortune, a phenomenon widely regarded as 'heavenly retribution' for good and evil. This concept of cause and effect is typically reflected in several aspects: the traditional view of causality holds that 'good and evil are rewarded,' with the belief that one's actions are observed by heaven. If those in power fail to cultivate virtue and exploit the common people, they will inevitably attract heavenly punishment.

Officials within the CCP's Political and Legal Affairs Committee often occupy the core of power, and without proper oversight, they are susceptible to issues such as corruption, favoritism, and lawlessness. This is a primary reason for the public's resentment and the retribution faced by these officials. Furthermore, in cases of unusual deaths among officials, the public frequently links these incidents to their numerous wrongdoings, viewing them as clear evidence of retribution. The '610 Office' and the specific roles of officials in the Political and Legal Affairs Committee involve the persecution of rights defenders, religious persecution, and the targeting of Falun Gong practitioners. Many high-ranking officials within the political and legal system have faced legal consequences due to their downfall, and these cases are seen by the public as tangible retribution. In the CCP's political landscape, positions associated with the '610 Office' are often referred to as 'death positions' due to the frequent incidents involving these officials.

Blood on their hands and 'tacit approval of corruption'

In July 1999, Jiang Zemin, against the majority opinion of other Politburo members, insisted on launching a comprehensive crackdown on Falun Gong. To circumvent normal legal and administrative procedures, Jiang Zemin established the notorious '610 Office.'

The '610 Office' and the subsequent Political and Legal Affairs Committee system employed state machinery to monitor, brainwash, torture, and even harvest the organs of Falun Gong practitioners. Jiang Zemin ordered a close integration of the '610 Office' with the 'Political and Legal Affairs Committee,' which oversees public security, prosecution, and the judiciary. The '610 Office' became a super institution that operated above the constitution and all laws. Jiang Zemin allocated astronomical financial resources to this system (later referred to as 'stability maintenance funds,' which at one point even surpassed military spending on national defense).

However, the suppression policy faced considerable resistance at the grassroots level and within the legal community, as officials were acutely aware that it was illegal and contrary to natural justice. To keep this machine running at full throttle, Jiang Zemin offered a quid pro quo of 'tolerating corruption' and 'quietly profiting.' As long as officials were willing to act as enforcers on the front lines and bear the blood debts of implementing persecution policies, Jiang Zemin provided them with absolute political protection, regardless of their greed, extortion, bribery, or personal decadence.

Consequently, after Jiang Zemin stepped down from the power center, numerous public security bureau chiefs and political and legal committee secretaries, including Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, and Li Dongsheng (who previously served as the director of the '610 Office'), were dismissed in provinces such as Liaoning and Sichuan. All of them were, without exception, key figures who closely adhered to Jiang Zemin's directives and actively participated in the persecution during that era.

3. The Political Meat Grinder of Black Eating Black

When we examine the 'number of fallen officials' alongside the 'number of inexplicable deaths due to illness', a chilling systemic conclusion emerges: since 2000, the Chinese Communist Party's Political and Legal Affairs Commission has evolved into a 'political meat grinder where black eats black'.

The actions of the '610 Office' and officials from the Political and Legal Affairs Commission primarily involve bullying the public, particularly through the persecution of various religious believers, including practitioners of Falun Gong. In traditional culture, officials or enforcers who persecute righteous beliefs are believed to face divine retribution. Consequently, since 2000, the number of police officers and public security personnel who have died unexpectedly or from illness is staggering.

Physical examination data from police and public security personnel across different regions indicate that grassroots police officers commonly suffer from multiple chronic illnesses. Frequent health issues include long-term insomnia, mental fatigue, cardiovascular diseases (such as hypertension), gastrointestinal disorders (like ulcers and gastroesophageal reflux), and musculoskeletal injuries (such as cervical spondylosis and lumbar disc herniation).

Officials who, during the eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, followed Zhou Yongkang's approach of aggressively accumulating wealth and actively participating in the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and other righteous believers have now become targets for purging in the Xi Jinping era. In the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, thousands of officials from the political and legal system and public security have been sent to Qincheng Prison or local detention centers, with nearly all of them being targets of the 'International Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong', and most have blood debts linked to Falun Gong practitioners.

While many officials have not yet been imprisoned, the secrets they possess make them vulnerable to being targeted by hostile forces, placing them in a high-risk category.

This explains why, in the past two decades, the Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission and officials from the '610 Office', despite holding considerable local power, have turned into what can be described as a 'death position' within the system, owing to an alarmingly high rate of incidents.

(First published by People News) △