South Korean President Li Zaiming's Approval Rating Plummets, Pro-Communism Seen as Root Cause

On September 18, South Korean President Li Zaiming held a press conference at the Blue House, where he acknowledged that his "governance is not detailed enough and lacks communication". (Video screenshot)

[People News] During the press conference, Li Zaiming addressed several issues of public concern and apologized to the South Korean people regarding the current political situation. In light of the recent continuous decline in governance satisfaction, which has fallen to a new low of 37%, he candidly admitted that his "governance is not detailed enough and lacks communication," stressing that "the people are always right" and that he will reflect with a more humble attitude.

Recent polling data from South Korea indicates that Li Zaiming's satisfaction rating has dropped for four consecutive weeks to 37%, marking the lowest point since he took office in June 2025.

Conversely, the dissatisfaction rate (negative evaluation) has risen to 56% (with some polls, such as Realmeter, reporting as high as 63.3%), indicating that the dissatisfaction rate exceeds the satisfaction rate by 19 percentage points.

Notably, among young voters aged 18 to 29, Li Zaiming's support rate has plummeted to a low of 18.6%.

The public's reasons for rating Li Zaiming negatively can be summarized into four main areas:

Real Estate Policy: Since late July, this issue has consistently topped the negative evaluation list, with widespread dissatisfaction regarding high housing prices and housing policies.

Personnel Arrangements: The announcement of several ministerial nominations and controversial Supreme Court appointments at the end of August sparked backlash.

Economic and Livelihood Issues: Some voters feel that, given the overall economic environment, they have not experienced a genuine improvement in wealth distribution and living standards.

Regarding the ongoing decline in approval ratings, Li Zaiming (Lee Jae-myung) has attributed the issue to his own inadequacies and has expressed that he has engaged in deep reflection on the reasons behind the drop in support.

Li Zaiming has aligned several of his policies with the Chinese Communist Party.

The government led by Li Zaiming (Lee Jae-myung) of the Democratic Party of Korea emphasizes a core diplomatic approach characterized by 'pragmatism' and a focus on 'national interests.' In contrast to the previous administration of Yoon Suk-yeol, which adopted a distinctly 'pro-U.S. and pro-Japan' stance and a hardline approach towards China, Li Zaiming has enacted a significant policy shift that has drawn criticism from both the public and opposition parties as 'concessions to China' or even 'pro-Communist appeasement.'

The alignment of the Li Zaiming government with Beijing's intentions in specific policies and positions is primarily evident in the following key areas:

1. The Taiwan issue and the situation in the Taiwan Strait: Clearly adopting a 'non-interference' stance.

During his election campaign and after assuming office, Li Zaiming's most controversial remark was the well-known 'thank you theory.' He publicly stated that events in the Taiwan Strait 'are irrelevant to Korea,' asserting that Korea only needs to express 'thank you' to China and 'thank you' to Taiwan, without the necessity of becoming involved in the U.S.-China Strait dispute.

Upon taking office, he promptly altered the policy of the previous administration led by Yoon Suk-yeol.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has frequently highlighted 'peace in the Taiwan Strait' in joint statements with the US-South Korea and Japan-South Korea alliances, asserting that the Taiwan Strait issue is an international concern. However, following Lee Jae-myung's ascension to power, he has notably downplayed South Korea's official position on the Taiwan Strait situation. He has reaffirmed the principle of 'respecting one China' and has refrained from issuing strong criticisms of US actions in the grey areas of the Taiwan Strait during public diplomatic events. This approach aligns closely with the Chinese Communist Party's strategy to 'domesticate' and 'exclude' the Taiwan Strait issue.

Secondly, regarding US-South Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation: creating distance to avoid provoking Beijing.

The Chinese Communist Party has always been highly apprehensive about the emergence of a 'US-Japan-South Korea triangular military alliance,' viewing it as an 'Asian version of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).'

Lee Jae-myung has criticized the Yoon Suk-yeol government for its excessive tilt towards the US and Japan, labeling it as 'biased diplomacy.' Since taking office, he has intentionally maintained a degree of distance and flexibility concerning US-Japan-South Korea trilateral joint exercises and intelligence sharing, asserting that South Korea should not serve as a frontline spearhead in the US-China rivalry.

Simultaneously, Lee Jae-myung is actively working to restore intensive high-level meetings and strategic dialogues with Beijing, with plans to visit Beijing in early 2026, aiming to mend the South Korea-China relationship that has been strained due to the THAAD incident and the grievances accumulated during the Yoon Suk-yeol administration.

Thirdly, in terms of Korean Peninsula policy: re-establishing reliance on Beijing's role as a 'mediator.'

The Democratic Party has traditionally advocated for a progressive and moderate (Sunshine) policy towards North Korea, and Lee Jae-myung's condition for restarting dialogue with the North is to garner support from Beijing.

To align with Beijing's claims regarding the Korean Peninsula, Li Zaiming advocates for a 'dual-track system' that combines defensive deterrence with economic incentives to ease confrontation. In exchange for the Chinese Communist Party's help in 'pulling the brakes' or facilitating dialogue with Pyongyang, the Li Zaiming administration has adopted relatively low-key and mild verbal responses to certain provocations from China and North Korea at the United Nations and other international forums, avoiding the direct confrontations seen during the Yoon Suk-yeol administration.

Fourth, opposing 'comprehensive decoupling' and promoting the upgrade of the Korea-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

In recent years, the U.S. has actively sought to involve South Korea in the 'CHIP 4 (Chip Quad Alliance)' and various semiconductor export controls targeting China, while the Chinese Communist Party has strongly opposed 'de-risking' and disruptions to the supply chain.

Since taking office, Li Zaiming has advocated for a 'moderate separation of economy and politics,' repeatedly stressing that Beijing is South Korea's largest trading partner and that the Chinese market cannot be sacrificed for political ideals.

During his visit to China, the Li Zaiming government actively engaged in discussions to advance the negotiations for the second phase of the Korea-China FTA, which includes the service and investment sectors, and signed several agreements on economic and technological cooperation. This approach largely supports Beijing's strategy to counter the U.S. 'economic blockade.'

Fifth, controlling domestic social sentiment and public opinion: suppressing 'anti-China sentiment' and cultural controversies.

In recent years, anti-China sentiment among the South Korean public, particularly among the youth, has been notably high, but the Li Zaiming government has adopted a clear stance of suppression regarding this issue.

Li Zaiming has consistently warned domestic politicians and the media against inciting anti-foreign or anti-China sentiments, arguing that such attitudes could severely harm South Korea's economic interests and national security. In cases of cultural disputes between South Korea and China—such as the online conflicts over the ownership of kimchi and hanbok—or maritime border tensions, the government prefers to manage these issues discreetly at a working level, rather than allowing public opinion to escalate into diplomatic confrontations.

In summary, the Li Zaiming administration's policy towards China can be characterized as a "softening strategy disguised as a pursuit of practical benefits." While he has not completely abandoned the security treaty with the United States, his actions—such as distancing from the Taiwan issue, diluting military cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, and reshaping economic ties with China—have aligned closely with Beijing's expectation that South Korea should "remain neutral and not serve as a pawn for the U.S. in the great power rivalry between the U.S. and China." However, this strategic illusion quickly unraveled in the face of reality, contributing significantly to the sharp decline in his domestic approval ratings.

Aligning closely with the Communist Party is tantamount to digging one’s own grave.

History has shown that the market size controlled by the Chinese Communist Party can be withdrawn at any moment or used as leverage for political coercion. Efforts to rescue the domestic economy by appeasing the Communist Party not only failed to revive the previous "explosive buying spree," but also alienated long-standing allies of the free market due to perceived posturing.

In the context of widespread aversion among the South Korean public—especially the younger generation—towards the authoritarian regime of the Communist Party, the government's heavy-handed suppression of anti-China sentiments and frequent overtures to Beijing have placed it in direct opposition to its own electorate, who have responded with punitive votes and declining approval ratings.

The resilient responses of Australia and Lithuania after experiencing economic coercion, the complete shift in public opinion in South Korea following the THAAD incident, and the swift backlash against any political figure who receives a 'like' from Beijing or is labeled pro-China—all of these instances repeatedly confirm a harsh reality: the 'friendship' offered by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not an asset, but rather a highly toxic political liability. Those who choose to compromise with the Communist Party are essentially digging their own political graves.

(Originally published in People News)
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