Before Xi Jinping's visit to the United States, three significant events unexpectedly unfolded in Beijing! The case against Zhang Youxia suddenly took a dramatic turn (video)
[People News] On September 21, three major events erupted in Beijing!
The first and most shocking event is the sudden decision regarding the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhen! They have been expelled from the Party and the military and are now being transferred to military prosecution authorities. After being investigated since January of this year, nearly eight months later, Beijing has finally moved these two top military leaders into the judicial process.
The second event is that Xi Jinping is set to visit the U.S. Just hours before the announcement of the Zhang Youxia case, Beijing officially declared that Xi Jinping would depart for the United States on September 23. This means that the Zhang Youxia case was unexpectedly advanced just two days before Xi Jinping's departure from China.
The third event is that the date for the Fifth Plenary Session was also confirmed on the same day — from October 26 to 29. Furthermore, the expulsion of Zhang Youxia from the Party will need to be ratified at this Central Committee meeting.
This timing is indeed delicate: two days later, Xi Jinping visits the U.S.; a little over a month later, the Fifth Plenary Session; and beyond that, the 21st National Congress of the Communist Party in 2027.
At this critical moment, Beijing has suddenly advanced the Zhang Youxia case to a point that seems almost irreversible. Why is it happening now? Is there a deeper connection with the upcoming Fifth Plenary Session and the subsequent 21st National Congress?
Hello, dear viewers, welcome to "Central Party School Decoding." I am Sun Ning.
Today, we will begin by analyzing the three major events that emerged in Beijing on September 21, layer by layer.
The real critical issue in the Zhang Youxia case is the 'political problem.'
Let’s begin by examining today’s announcement.
At first glance, Zhang Youxia and other disgraced high-ranking officials appear to be quite similar: they accepted large sums of money, violated regulations by accepting gifts and cash, and used their positions to assist others in gaining promotions, among other offenses.
However, a closer look at the order of the official announcement reveals a different story. The focus is not on money, but on politics. The official statement first highlights that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli 'have become estranged from the Party and have lost their moral integrity,' and 'seriously violated political discipline and political rules.' It then includes a particularly sensitive phrase—' forming cliques'- and states that they are 'disloyal and insincere to the Party.'
The concluding summary is even more straightforward: 'Political issues and economic issues are intertwined.'
Thus, what truly warrants attention regarding Zhang Youxia today is likely not the amount of money he has embezzled, but rather the severity of his 'political issues.'
Why have the two major serious accusations suddenly 'disappeared'?
The most thought-provoking aspect of today’s announcement is the two 'disappearances.'
The first refers to a statement made by the 'Liberation Army Daily' shortly after Zhang Youxia was investigated in January this year, which characterized his actions as 'seriously trampling and undermining the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission.'
It is important to note the choice of words. It is not simply a matter of 'not being implemented,' nor is it a general 'violation,' but rather 'trampling' and 'undermining.'
What is he trampling and undermining? The responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission. The current Chairman of the Central Military Commission is Xi Jinping. Therefore, when this statement was made, it quickly became clear to the public that Zhang Youxia's issues might have extended beyond mere corruption from the outset.
This situation has directly impacted the highest power structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military and has significant implications for the authority of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. However, nearly eight months later, the formal handling of Zhang Youxia has led to the omission of this statement. What remains is the assertion: 'Disloyal and dishonest to the Party.' This phrase carries considerable weight.
Yet, 'the Party' is fundamentally an organizational concept, while the 'responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission' is much more specific. Thus, we must question: why did such a severe political characterization made at the beginning of the year not reappear during the formal proceedings? There is no clear answer at this time. However, it is important to note that the absence of documentation now does not imply that it was not stated earlier this year.
In essence, the Zhang Youxia case has been framed from the outset within a political context that transcends ordinary corruption.
The second notable omission is even more striking.
In January of this year, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing informed sources, that following Zhang Youxia's investigation, the CCP military held internal briefings for senior generals.
According to these sources, Zhang Youxia faced multiple allegations at that time, including forming a political faction and accepting substantial bribes related to personnel promotions and military procurement. However, the most shocking allegation was that he was accused of leaking critical information about China's nuclear weapons program to the United States. If this accusation is ultimately proven true, its implications would far exceed those of typical corruption.
In response to this information, the CCP later issued a denial.
On January 29, during a routine press conference held by the Ministry of National Defense of the Communist Party of China, a reporter directly asked about the reports from The Wall Street Journal. The Ministry's response was: 'Refer to the information officially released and do not engage in baseless speculation.' The Wall Street Journal's report at that time did not merely cite online rumors; it claimed that the information came from sources familiar with a closed-door briefing involving high-ranking military officials.
This raises a critical question: How did the content of such a sensitive internal military briefing leak overseas? Was it an internal leak? Did different factions release information externally? Or was there a deliberate attempt to use overseas media to preemptively convey a certain political characterization of Zhang Youxia?
By September 21, when Zhang Youxia was officially addressed, Beijing did not include 'leaking nuclear weapon secrets to the United States' in the formal notification. Interestingly, just two days later, Xi Jinping was set to visit the United States.
This situation is quite delicate. If Beijing were to formally acknowledge that a current vice chairman of the Central Military Commission had leaked China's most sensitive nuclear weapon information to the United States, the Zhang Youxia case would no longer be merely an internal Communist Party matter; it would instantly escalate into an extremely sensitive national security issue between China and the United States.
How did the United States acquire this intelligence? Who had contact with Zhang Youxia? What exactly was leaked? What significant flaws exist in the confidentiality system protecting the Communist Party's highest military secrets? These questions are bound to emerge. Therefore, what is truly worth questioning now may not only be 'Did Zhang Youxia leak nuclear weapon secrets?' but also two other critical inquiries: Why was this accusation initially made public? And why did Beijing opt not to pursue it by the time of the final decision, particularly on the eve of Xi Jinping's visit to the United States?
If, at the beginning of the year, it served as a political deterrent, shaped public opinion, and even tarnished Zhang Youxia's reputation, then the fact that Beijing did not include this in its final report may be more significant than the truth behind the rumors of 'nuclear weapon leaks'.
Why did Xi Jinping suddenly take action before his visit to the United States?
Now, let's analyze why it was specifically on September 21st.
On that day at 3 PM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party of China officially announced that Xi Jinping would visit the United States from September 23rd to 25th. This means that in just two days, Xi Jinping would be leaving China. Therefore, from a timing perspective, Beijing achieved at least one thing: it confirmed the current official narrative regarding the Zhang Youxia case before Xi Jinping's trip to the United States.
Additionally, there was another context that made this timing even more sensitive.
From September 12th to 13th, Xi Jinping attended the BRICS summit in New Delhi, India. During the meeting, an unusual moment occurred: while Indian Prime Minister Modi was speaking, he suddenly paused and asked Xi Jinping, 'Is it okay?'—essentially checking if he was alright—and he repeated the question twice. Furthermore, Xi Jinping did not attend the leaders' dinner hosted by Modi that evening. These moments together quickly fueled speculation abroad regarding Xi Jinping's health.
Following this, rumors began to circulate online that Xi Jinping had 'fainted' or 'suffered a stroke' in India and was sent to 301 Hospital upon his return to Beijing, among other reports.
From a political standpoint, whenever the health of the top leader becomes a topic of discussion, the stability of power inevitably draws increased scrutiny. At this critical juncture, Xi Jinping (習近平) is preparing to leave Beijing for a visit to the United States.
At the same time, the case of Zhang Youxia has advanced to the point of expulsion from both the party and the military, as well as referral to military prosecution. Is there a direct link between these developments?
Several timing factors have converged, making September 21 particularly sensitive.
The Fifth Plenary Session: The Final Step in the Zhang Youxia Case
September 21 also marks another significant date: the Fifth Plenary Session.
On that same day, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee confirmed that the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee will take place in Beijing from October 26 to 29. The disciplinary actions against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli explicitly state that the expulsion from the party will be "recognized at the plenary session of the Central Committee." This aligns the entire timeline.
On September 21, the Political Bureau decided to expel Zhang Youxia from the party;
On September 23, Xi Jinping visits the U.S.;
From October 26 to 29, the Fifth Plenary Session will occur;
Subsequently, the Central Committee will formally recognize the punishment of Zhang Youxia.
Thus, from the perspective of the internal procedures of the Communist Party of China, we have indeed reached a critical juncture where the Zhang Youxia case must be advanced. If it is to align with the already scheduled Fifth Plenary Session for formal recognition, the Political Bureau must first make a decision regarding the punishment.
Therefore, the decision made on September 21 carries both political sensitivity and a specific procedural context. However, the question remains: Is the Fifth Plenary Session solely focused on the recognition of Zhang Youxia?
What is likely to be of greater interest moving forward is how the high-ranking officials of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military will reorganize themselves following Zhang Youxia's downfall.
How will the reshuffle unfold from the Fifth Plenary Session to the 21st National Congress?
The major focus after the Fifth Plenary Session is actually the CCP's 21st National Congress scheduled for 2027.
Zhang Youxia was not only the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission but also a member of the Politburo and the Central Committee. On September 21, the Politburo decided to expel him from the Party, and the subsequent ratification by the Fifth Plenary Session signifies that Zhang Youxia has completely exited the CCP's highest echelons of power.
As we approach the 2027 21st National Congress, with a new Politburo and Central Military Commission set to be reshuffled, the question arises: who will fill the political void left by Zhang Youxia? This issue extends beyond military personnel matters; it is a crucial part of the overall power dynamics at the 21st National Congress.
Additionally, Zhang Youxia's case has been officially labeled as 'forming cliques' and 'being disloyal and insincere to the Party.' Who else is part of this 'clique'? Following Zhang Youxia's fall, will his so-called 'clique' also face further purges?
Since 2024, there have been persistent rumors abroad regarding a power struggle between the anti-Xi faction represented by Zhang Youxia and the Xi faction, along with claims that Zhang Youxia garnered support from certain military factions and even party elders.
Thus, from now until the 21st National Congress, we should closely monitor two key issues: who else might be implicated by Zhang Youxia's 'clique'? After the purges, who will be elevated to the next Politburo and Central Military Commission?
These personnel changes could provide insights into how the CCP's highest power structure will be reconfigured ahead of the 21st National Congress.
We have discussed a lot so far, from the two sudden 'disappearing' major accusations, to Xi Jinping's visit to the United States, and then to the Fifth Plenary Session and the upcoming 21st Congress in 2027.
However, one crucial question remains: After Zhang Youxia is 'sealed off', has this power storm truly come to an end?
When will the internal power struggles of the Chinese Communist Party finally cease?
Let’s revisit the initial question one last time.
Why is it necessary to advance the Zhang Youxia case to a point that is nearly irreversible at this moment? More precisely, it can be said that Beijing is attempting to limit Zhang Youxia's potential to re-emerge as a political variable as much as possible.
But does sealing off Zhang Youxia himself mean that the issue is resolved? Not necessarily.
There is another important distinction to make.
Whether Zhang Youxia is a political rival of Xi Jinping is one question; whether he represents an alternative path for China's political system is an entirely different matter.
Even if we assume that Zhang Youxia has indeed opposed Xi Jinping or even tried to challenge him, there is no public evidence indicating that he advocates for a change in the one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party. If only the highest leader changes while the entire political system remains intact, then the only change may be the individual occupying the highest position.
Moreover, the Zhang Youxia case reveals a paradox within this power structure. In a system that places a high premium on political loyalty, the louder the dissenting voices become, the more likely the top leadership is to view these voices as a threat to their own authority.
As a result, the purges are becoming increasingly severe, with demands for loyalty rising to unprecedented levels. In the short term, this certainly creates a significant deterrent effect. If even the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission can be removed, other generals will naturally exercise greater caution.
However, power politics has another dimension. While fear can enforce obedience, it does not necessarily cultivate genuine loyalty. When an individual once regarded as a key military ally of Xi Jinping is ultimately branded as 'disloyal and dishonest to the Party,' will this not instill an even greater sense of insecurity among others at the core of power?
Moreover, if there are already divergent interests, factions, and even dissenting voices within the military and the Party, a major purge may silence these voices temporarily, but it does not imply that they have vanished entirely.
In two days, Xi Jinping will visit the United States. A month later, the Fifth Plenary Session will convene. Following that, the 21st National Congress is scheduled for 2027.
Will there be further incidents in the future? Who else is implicated in the 'cliques and factions'? Will the personnel changes following the Fifth Plenary Session reveal the power dynamics leading up to the 21st National Congress? Who will be appointed to the new Politburo? Who will join the new Central Military Commission?
Zhang Youxia's boot has indeed touched the ground. However, the upheaval within the highest echelons of the Communist Party is far from reaching a definitive conclusion.
That concludes today's program. What are your thoughts on the sudden progress of the Zhang Youxia case on September 21? Do you think the main concern should be the extensive corruption, or the recurring 'political issues' mentioned in the reports? We invite everyone to share your opinions in the comments section. Thank you for watching, and we look forward to seeing you in the next episode.
△
News magazine bootstrap themes!
I like this themes, fast loading and look profesional
Thank you Carlos!
You're welcome!
Please support me with give positive rating!
Yes Sure!