Military Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Training Course No Longer Mentions "Xi Thought"

The Second-Generation Red Nobility Stages a Coup, Xi is Panicked. (People News Report Illustration)

[People News] On November 11, the PLA Daily and the CCP’s military website reported on the conclusion of the 7th and 8th sessions of basic training for the entire military’s disciplinary inspection and supervision teams. The report reveals that this training took place in late October in Beijing and involved 160 participants, including newly appointed heads of disciplinary inspection and supervision bureaus (offices) from army-level units, new deputy secretaries of the discipline inspection commission from units with restructured roles, and disciplinary supervision officials from some departments of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and subordinate units of the war zones.

The report includes an interview with a leader from the CMC’s Discipline Inspection and Supervision Bureau of Political Work, who stated that the training should "thoroughly integrate the key ideas of Chairman Xi on the Party’s self-revolution, especially the spirit of his important speech at the CMC Political Work Conference… and firmly focus on studying and implementing Chairman Xi’s critical decisions and instructions while advancing the military's anti-corruption campaign."

Compared to reports on the 5th and 6th sessions of basic training for the military’s disciplinary inspection and supervision cadres from March to April 2023, there is a notable absence of a key term: "Xi Thought." Last year’s report stated that the training "focused on learning and implementing Xi Jinping’s New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as the main thread throughout, with an emphasis on fully grasping Chairman Xi's critical discourse on strictly governing the Party and military."

Moreover, in the report on the June 12-19 training course for new secretaries of the military discipline inspection committee, "Xi Thought" was also explicitly mentioned.

Only a few months later, "Xi Thought" has disappeared from military disciplinary inspection and supervision training, signaling another unusual move within the CCP.

In fact, Xi Jinping's "New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" (commonly referred to as "Xi Thought") lacks novelty and is largely a mixture of various ideas. Xi introduced this concept in his report at the opening of the 19th National Congress in October 2017, referring to a series of his speeches and new strategies in governance. The 19th Congress also amended the Party Constitution to include "Xi Thought" alongside Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the "Three Represents," and the Scientific Outlook on Development, establishing it as the CCP’s guiding doctrine. In 2018, China’s National People’s Congress further amended the Constitution to include "Xi Thought."

Of previous CCP leaders, only Mao developed a unique "thought." The introduction of "Xi Thought" reflects Xi's ambition to surpass Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao and place himself on par with Mao. With Xi’s consolidation of power and his efforts to establish himself as the "sole leader," references to "Xi Thought" in state media have grown more frequent, even surpassing other guiding principles. Xi himself has often given high praise to his "thought."

However, since rumors surfaced in July about possible issues with Xi’s position, references to "Xi Thought" have noticeably diminished. The July 18 communiqué from the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, while affirming the work of the Central Politburo, did not mention "Xi Thought." Instead, the document only referred to "the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core" in its conclusion, a stark departure from previous documents that consistently highlighted Xi’s role.

Following the plenary session, high-ranking officials in central institutions echoed the Party's policies without explicitly mentioning "Xi Thought." Although some still referred to Xi Thought, the tone was less emphatic, and many did not mention it at all.

Notably, in October, the trend became more apparent. On October 28, a report from a Central Politburo meeting omitted "Xi Thought" and the phrase "establishing and safeguarding." On October 29, during a special seminar for leading provincial and ministerial cadres on the spirit of the Third Plenary Session, Xi Jinping did not mention "Xi Thought" in his speech, nor did Li Qiang, who chaired the meeting. On October 30, a report on the CMC’s new "Implementation Outline for Prosperous Development and Strong Military Culture" also omitted "Xi Thought."

The peculiar moves by the CCP over the past few months, especially the disappearance of "Xi Thought" in major meetings and on important occasions, suggest that Xi may be facing challenges within the military and the Party. Although news about Xi continues to dominate the media, his inability to enforce obligatory references to "Xi Thought" suggests potential health or power-related issues, supporting the rumors that his influence is waning.

In terms of military anti-corruption efforts, it’s apparent that the recently concluded mid-level training for the military’s disciplinary inspection and supervision is a continuation of the high-level training from June. However, the tone has softened. The June 30 report stated that the training aimed to "raise political awareness," "strengthen fighting capabilities," and "win the tough, protracted battle against corruption." The message was clear that trained inspection officials were expected to pursue corrupt high-ranking officers, especially those politically disloyal.

Prior to this report, on October 27, Chinese authorities announced that two former Defense Ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, were under investigation, and rumors circulated about Major General Geng Liaoyuan’s alleged suicide. Zhao Lanjian, a former mainland journalist, claimed on the platform X that Geng’s suicide was part of a broader purge of dark elements in the military. He noted that investigative teams sent by the CMC to military and defense enterprises had reportedly led to disappearances and deaths of prominent figures.

In mid-June, Xi personally led Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, and other CMC members to Yan’an, where they held a CMC Political Work Conference, emphasizing loyalty and urging senior cadres to engage in profound self-reflection and rectify issues to ensure political unity within the military.

Although Xi seemed intent on conducting a major purge in the military, the subsequent rumors about his sidelining and the growing signs of his diminished authority suggest that his influence may be slipping, with CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia possibly taking over control of the military. This could explain the softer tone on anti-corruption efforts despite their continuation.

The recent training report states: "The current situation in the fight against corruption remains severe and complex. Corruption must not be allowed to resurface, and leniency cannot be granted." In contrast, the June report stated that "the fight against corruption has achieved an overwhelming victory but remains fiercely contested." This difference in tone is notable.

Interestingly, the training report quotes Xi’s words on anti-corruption: "There can be no retreat, no relaxation, and no mercy," but it does not directly attribute the quote to Xi. The question is, who is the target of this "no mercy"? In the murky current CCP political landscape, who lacks "mercy" toward whom?

There are recent reports that CMC Political Work Department Director Miao Hua has been taken down for corruption. Miao Hua, believed to be a close ally of Xi Jinping, is from Fujian. Was his fall a result of this "no mercy"? Was this Zhang Youxia’s decision, or Xi Jinping’s? Judging by the CCP’s unusual moves over the past three months, it seems more likely to be the former.

Some may question why "Xi Thought" appeared in recent news such as Xi’s order on the "Military Equipment Protection Regulations," the release of "Opinions on Improving the Management of Mobile Party Members," and Xi’s congratulatory letter for the 100th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen University.

This could be a deliberate move by the CCP leadership in response to overseas speculation, keeping certain formalities in non-crucial areas. However, the absence of "Xi Thought" in major documents like the plenary session communique, Politburo meetings, and key military and disciplinary functions may better reflect the internal upheaval within the CCP.

This article is reproduced from Dajiyuan.