Communist Brothers’ Infighting Like Raising Venomous Insects—Each Calculating to Become the Boss

September 2025, Xi Jinping, Putin, and Kim Jong-un gathered in Beijing for the military parade. On the surface, their relationship appears close, but the outside world generally believes that China, Russia, and North Korea are not truly allies. (People’s Daily News illustration)

【People News】The CCP recently used the anniversary of the end of World War II to spend 36 billion RMB hosting a large-scale military parade in Beijing, ostentatiously showcasing its close friendship with North Korea and Russia. However, the outside world believes their relationship has not reached the level of true political or military alliance.

Chinese jurist Yuan Hongbing, who lives in Australia, once revealed that the CCP and Xi Jinping’s ambition is to expand communist internationalism globally and to change the existing international order.

The Wall Street Journal reported on September 8 that even if the CCP maintains ties with Moscow and Pyongyang, it cannot impose its will on the richest and most populous Eurasian continent.

The report said Tang Xiaoyang, director of the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, stated that China (the CCP) is very cautious about cooperation with Russia and North Korea. They are not part of the same camp. China (the CCP) has a completely different view on war and security issues than Russia and North Korea. He pointed out that China has not fought a war for more than 40 years, and what it wants now is border stability.

Wu Xinbo, director of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, said: “China and Russia both don’t want to get involved in each other’s major conflicts. If we have a major conflict with the United States over the Taiwan issue, I don’t think Russia would lend a hand.” He described China-Russia relations as, “We are good friends and good partners, but that’s all. We will never become allies.”

However, some Western diplomats and China watchers said the “expectation gap” between Beijing and some of its secondary partner states is visibly narrowing.

Zhao Tong, a researcher at the China think tank of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the CCP is increasingly unwilling to be seen as part of the so-called “axis of turmoil.” Driven by intensifying U.S.-China competition, what the CCP hopes to demonstrate is that, unlike U.S. estranged allies, China (the CCP) has greater ability to unite allies: “At a time when U.S. international credibility is damaged, China (the CCP) sees an opportunity to showcase its leadership position.”

Wang Dong, professor at the School of International Studies at Peking University, said China and Russia have very strong consensus on how the new international order should function, and both believe U.S. hegemony is ending.

In addition, current affairs commentator Deng Yuwen published an article on Deutsche Welle’s Chinese website pointing out that Beijing’s invitation for Kim Jong-un to attend the parade, and Kim Jong-un’s willingness to attend, both involve calculation.

Deng Yuwen said that Beijing inviting Kim Jong-un to Beijing was first out of precaution against the current geopolitical reality. Against whom? Against Moscow. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia-North Korea relations have significantly warmed. If Russia and North Korea are allowed to deepen cooperation, the CCP’s dominant position on the Korean Peninsula issue would be weakened. Beijing had to take measures to re-attract Kim Jong-un, to show the outside world that China-North Korea relations are still the basic axis of the peninsula order, rather than a Russia-North Korea duet. Secondly, the CCP worries that this year or next year there might be another “Kim-Trump summit.” By letting Kim Jong-un appear at the Beijing parade, the goal was to push China-North Korea relations to the forefront, sending Washington a clear signal: without Beijing, there is no solution to the Korean Peninsula issue.

From Pyongyang’s perspective, Kim Jong-un’s willingness to come to Beijing was also out of practical need. Most directly, it was the need for regime legitimacy and international image. For a long time, North Korea has been subject to international sanctions over nuclear and human rights issues, almost isolated from the international community. Kim Jong-un’s diplomatic activities have been few, mostly limited to bilateral interactions with China and Russia. The September 3rd parade provided him with an excellent stage—not only could he appear alongside Xi Jinping, but also stand on Tiananmen Gate with Putin and other foreign dignitaries. Such images symbolize “recognition” internationally and are extremely mobilizing propaganda material domestically. Through such a public appearance, he could prove to the military and the elite group that he remains an important figure in great power politics, and that North Korea is not isolated and helpless. In addition, Kim Jong-un’s attendance at Beijing’s parade was both a gesture of goodwill to Beijing and a way to ensure that the CCP would not alienate Pyongyang due to the Russia-North Korea rapprochement. For him, this was a “political pledge of loyalty” in exchange for Beijing’s more lasting support in food, energy, and the economy.

A netizen “Qin Yue” on the People’s Daily News website posted: “In the past, before the socialist camp collapsed, there was not a single country within the camp that didn’t engage in internal strife. Now, with only a few communist totalitarian countries left—China, Vietnam, and North Korea—the infighting continues endlessly. That’s how a dictatorship and autocracy system works—everyone wants to be the boss, each has their own calculations. There is no community of shared interests, only the maximization of individual power. It’s like raising venomous insects (gu): it’s a life-and-death struggle, slaughtering each other, and in the end only the biggest one remains, with all the others becoming cannon fodder.” △