​​​​​​​Why Was Xi Jinping’s “House Servant” Jing Junhai Arrested?

Those in high positions are merely playing supporting roles. (Illustration by People News)

[People News] In the fog of high-level Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics, news always explodes like thunder. On November 11, 2025, sudden reports emerged that former Jilin Provincial Party Secretary Jing Junhai was under investigation. Overseas media and independent commentators quickly followed up, saying he had been “taken away” or “arrested.”

This man—once regarded as a trusted follower of Xi Jinping and a representative of the so-called “Shaanxi faction”—rose rapidly in his political career, yet at age 63 was forced into retirement from frontline positions, and is now swept into a political storm. Although the reason for his arrest has not been officially confirmed, combining his background and past events reveals a small part of the iceberg beneath CCP power struggles: Is this the normalization of anti-corruption campaigns, a casualty of factional infighting, or the backlash of excessive “loyalty”?

Jing Junhai’s political career originally resembled a typical technocrat’s path. Born in December 1960 in Baishui County, Shaanxi Province, he graduated early on from the semiconductor materials and devices program at Xi’an University of Electronic Science and Technology, earning a master’s degree in engineering. In 1982 he stayed at the university to teach, and only in 1992 did he officially enter politics. Starting in Xi’an High-tech Zone, he gradually rose to vice governor of Shaanxi Province, member of the provincial standing committee, and head of the propaganda department. His roots in Shaanxi were deep, and he was labeled by outsiders as part of the “Northwest faction.” But in 2012, just before Xi Jinping came to power, he encountered a key turning point. In May of that year, newly appointed propaganda chief Jing Junhai oversaw the large-scale expansion of Xi Zhongxun’s mausoleum.

Xi Zhongxun’s memorial site is located in Fuping County, Shaanxi. Originally Xi Zhongxun’s former residence, it underwent reconstruction starting in 2005 but remained small, only about 15 mu. It was not until 2012 that the project suddenly escalated: the former residence was expanded into a “mausoleum” occupying more than 40,000 mu, comparable in scale to the Mausoleum of the First Qin Emperor, and even mocked by overseas media as “the largest tomb in world history.” The project consumed enormous funds, involving land acquisition, landscaping, and memorial facilities, and stirred public dissatisfaction—thousands of acres of farmland were expropriated, and disputes over farmers’ compensation were frequent. Jing oversaw propaganda work personally, cleverly packaging the project as “red tourism” and “revolutionary education,” avoiding sensitive words like “mausoleum” and instead naming it the “Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial Hall.”

The project was completed in September 2015, exactly when Xi Jinping was consolidating power. Jing Junhai rose accordingly, becoming deputy head of the CCP Central Propaganda Department and deputy Party secretary of Beijing, eventually serving as Party secretary of Jilin Province in 2020. Outsiders directly pointed out that this was his “pledge of submission” to Xi—an act of service that helped him leap into the role of a propaganda general within the “Xi family army.”

Yet Jing Junhai’s “loyalty” did not proceed smoothly. Rumors circulated online that in 2021, during then-premier Li Keqiang’s inspection tour of Jilin, Jing openly contradicted him. According to overseas media reports, during Li’s visits to Songyuan and Changchun, Li emphasized “vigorously advancing reform and opening, cultivating and expanding market entities, and promoting all-round revitalization of the Northeast.” But Jing, while accompanying him, reportedly disagreed with some economic policies, even “venting anger on Xi’s behalf.” Although there is no official record, this rumor spread widely overseas and was interpreted as Jing seizing the opportunity to show loyalty by implicitly opposing the reform-oriented “Tuanpai” faction associated with Li Keqiang.

Despite the alleged confrontation, Jing’s political career did not suffer; instead he was further promoted, governing Jilin for eight years. During his tenure, Jilin’s economy showed some improvement (such as a recovery in the automobile industry), but also faced environmental and debt scandals. The rumor highlights the tension within CCP factional politics: propaganda officials often walk a fine line between “maintaining stability” and “promoting reform,” and Jing’s choices clearly leaned toward the former.

The turning point came on June 28, 2024. At age 63, Jing was suddenly removed from his post as Jilin Party secretary and given a vague “new appointment elsewhere.” After Huang Qiang (former deputy Party secretary of Sichuan) succeeded him, the political climate in Jilin shifted slightly, with gestures toward a “pro-people” image, such as participating in the Chagan Lake winter fishing event. It was not until September 13 that Jing’s new role was finally confirmed: deputy director of the National People’s Congress Education, Science, Culture and Health Committee—a typical “second-line idle position,” far beneath expectations.

Previously, overseas analysts had speculated that he might join the Propaganda Department or State Council, and even rumors claimed that he had “merited credit for confronting Li Keqiang” and would be appointed state councilor. But reality was far different: from frontline provincial leadership to an idle committee role, stepping into “retirement” early despite being relatively young, triggering speculation—was it a health issue? Or a sign of an impending purge?

Now, the November 2025 news of his “arrest” adds fuel to the fire. Overseas YouTube channels and commentators broke the story that Jing had been placed under “shuanggui” by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in Beijing, suspected of corruption, power-money deals, and even entanglement with old Shaanxi cases. Correspondingly, other members of the “Xi family army,” such as Rocket Force political commissar Wang Jiasheng and Qin Shutang, also displayed abnormalities, including demotions or property confiscations.

Analysts point out that this may be linked to anti-corruption operations ahead of the CCP’s 21st National Congress. Although Xi emphasizes “self-revolution,” internal resentment is rising, and the old stains of the Shaanxi “dye vat” (such as financial black holes in the mausoleum project) may be resurfacing. Some even link this to the “cutting off the hemline” theory: precise strikes targeting Xi’s close followers to balance factions.

Jing Junhai’s downfall reflects the absurdity and cruelty of CCP politics. On the one hand, he was a model of “house-slave”-style loyalty: building a mausoleum to curry favor, confronting others to show allegiance—all stepping stones to climb upward. On the other hand, such “loyalty” was often built on wasted resources and public suffering—the 40,000-mu mausoleum resulted in land loss and hardship for Shaanxi farmers.

If his arrest is real, his charges may involve more than corruption—they may also include the double-edged sword of “political loyalty.” At the peak of centralized power, clinging too tightly to one man can make one an easy target. In Zhongnanhai’s game of power, betrayal and purges never disappear; Jing Junhai is simply another chess piece. In the future, more members of the “Shaanxi faction” may awaken: loyalty has its price, and excess can be perilous.

The truth awaits official clarification, but in this silent struggle, only outside observers can glimpse the full picture.

(Source: Author’s X Account)△