Seizing Military Power: Xi Jinping Fights to Save the Party, All the Way to Its Destruction

Xi Jinping Fights to Save the Party, All the Way to Its Destruction

[People News] After the arrests of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the news shocked both China and the world. The immediate impression was that the Party leader is consolidating power by seizing control of the military. This includes earlier detentions of He Weidong and Miao Hua, and going further back, the takedowns of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. For the Party leader, military power ranks above economic and personnel authority. With control of the gun, what other power is there to worry about? Therefore, firmly grasping the gun has always been the focal point for Party leaders in their struggles to centralize authority.

In fact, at the time of the downfalls of Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, Li Shangfu, and Wei Fenghe, many lieutenant generals and full generals also fell, committed suicide, or were killed, but the CCP did not allow such information to reach the outside world. Even earlier, many officers met similar fates, often because they were entangled in high-level power struggles and then “disappeared.” Party leaders’ efforts to seize military power have a so-called “fine tradition”: from Mao Zedong wresting control from Zhang Wentian, to Deng Xiaoping sidelining Hua Guofeng, to Jiang Zemin effectively neutralizing Yang Shangkun. Each general secretary has understood this well. But under the current leadership, the struggle has reached a life-or-death, no-retreat stage. Compared with previous leaders, the current one must be even more ruthless and ungrateful, with no hesitation for personal ties or human sentiment.

In truth, before Xi took office, corruption in the PLA had already rotted to the core. During Jiang Zemin’s era, governing the Party, the military, and the country through corruption became infamous. Jiang installed CMC vice chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou during the Hu-Wen period to monitor and restrain Hu Jintao, enabling Jiang to rule from behind the scenes and avoid accountability for the persecution of Falun Gong. This planted the seeds of the CCP’s eventual demise. At the time, the military also “made a fortune quietly.” Selling official positions reportedly started at tens of millions of yuan, with openly priced ranks: millions to buy a division commander post, tens of millions for an army commander post. For example, Zhang Yang, then head of the political work department, allegedly required a sack of cash just to grant an audience, earning the nickname “Zhang Sack.”

The rot spread from the top downward. One example cited was a rocket artillery battalion under the Nanjing Military Region, where a mere captain established a company, secured huge bank loans under favorable kickback arrangements, and embezzled 300 million yuan. Leaders of the CMC General Office reportedly owned multiple luxury villas across scenic locations, and senior officers in various regions were linked to extravagant personal spending, luxury cars, and imported home décor.

Later, during the Hu-Wen era, Hu Jintao’s authority was hollowed out and directives could barely leave Zhongnanhai. Military corruption was allowed to continue unchecked. By the time Xi took power, entrenched interest groups and factional cliques had formed within the military, functioning as informal political organizations bound by corruption. To assert authority, Xi moved against Guo and Xu and later against figures such as Tian Xiusi, Fang Fenghui, and Zhang Yang. He traveled to various theater commands, issued stern lectures, cracked down on corruption, and called for political rectification to be normalized, targeting “ambitious schemers” who sought to seize Party and state power.

However, Jiang’s faction remained deeply rooted and did not take Xi seriously, given his lack of real combat experience. Meanwhile, forming cliques and engaging in corruption had become a culture within the military, a chronic disease now in its late stage. According to media statistics, Xi has removed 25 full generals whom he himself had promoted. In CCP history, aside from Mao’s era, no such large number of generals had fallen. Yet no matter how many “tigers” Xi takes down, the problem persists because double-dealers, conspirators, and the disloyal are deeply entrenched, with networks of cases extending from grassroots units to the Central Military Commission. Thus, corruption in the equipment department or scandals in the Rocket Force become unsurprising symptoms.

Xi himself likely realizes that with so many generals purged, the CMC is nearly paralyzed, the military leadership depleted, morale shaken, and the armed forces reduced to a hollow shell. Military construction projects risk becoming unfinished shells as well. Those officers and soldiers connected to purged factions face either waiting passively for their fate or rebelling in desperation. Many believe that once Xi eliminates all opposition, he will become even more autocratic, pushing China into an era of one-man rule, confronting the United States, and potentially launching war in the Taiwan Strait. Whatever the path, it may end in the CCP’s downfall. Looking back, some argue Jiang Zemin planted the mechanism for collapse, which matured under Hu and is now being executed under Xi. As an old Chinese saying goes, evil ultimately brings its own retribution.

(First published by People News) △