Zhang Youxia's fall
[People News] On February 1, 2026, the CCP’s military newspaper PLA Daily once again published an article titled “Continuously Deepening Political Rectification and Advancing the Rectification of Conduct and Anti-Corruption in Depth”, criticising Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. What is extremely unusual is that this commentator article criticising Zhang Youxia actually quoted political slogans from Hu Jintao, highlighting that the Zhang Youxia incident has triggered extraordinary turmoil and power struggles within the Party.
This was the third article attacking Zhang Youxia, following a critical editorial on January 25 and a commentator's article on January 31. Like the previous ones, it was written under the byline of a PLA Daily commentator. Interestingly, compared with the previous day’s article “Strengthening Confidence in the Certain Victory of Anti-Corruption and Army-Building,” the tone was deliberately lowered. It was much less aggressive than the earlier editorial “Resolutely Winning the Tough and Protracted Overall Battle Against Corruption in the Military.”
The article was published under the banner of “political rectification.” In the PLA context, “political rectification” refers to internal political purge campaigns within the Party’s armed forces — a method of enforcing Party control over the gun and conducting ideological cleansing and power struggles, similar to the Yan’an Rectification Movement and past Party rectification campaigns.
The label “political rectification” sounds imposing and intimidating. Yet strangely, the entire article mentions Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli only once. It lacks the exaggerated, ferocious language of the first two attacks, such as “seriously trampling and undermining the system of responsibility of the CMC chairman” and “they will forever be nailed to the pillar of historical shame.”
Even more noteworthy is that expressions of loyalty to Xi Jinping were greatly reduced. Xi’s name appears only once, with none of the standard slogans like the “two establishments” and “two safeguards,” nor any mention of “implementing the chairman responsibility system.” The phrase that reappeared in the previous article — “resolutely obey Chairman Xi’s command, be responsible to Chairman Xi, and reassure Chairman Xi” — vanished again without a trace.
Most striking and explosive is the article’s statement: “At present, the international situation, national conditions, Party conditions, and military conditions are undergoing complex and profound changes. The Party faces the long-term existence of the ‘four major tests’ and the ‘four dangers.’”
What are these “four major tests” and “four dangers,” and who first proposed them? They were first clearly articulated by Hu Jintao in his July 1, 2011, speech at the ceremony marking the CCP’s 90th anniversary.
The “four major tests” are: “the test of governance, the test of reform and opening up, the test of the market economy, and the test of the external environment — all long-term, complex, and severe.” The “four dangers” are: “the danger of mental slackness, the danger of insufficient ability, the danger of alienation from the masses, and the danger of passive corruption, all posed more sharply before the entire Party.” These formulations were written into the report of the 18th Party Congress in 2012.
At that time, Hu Jintao fully retired, transferring Party, government, and military power to Xi Jinping, and helped Xi eliminate Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, clearing the way for Xi’s rule. No one expected Xi to turn out to be a political ingrate: at the 20th Party Congress, he wiped out the Communist Youth League faction and even had Hu Jintao publicly escorted out of the venue. Xi, who illegally seeks lifelong rule, revived Mao Zedong’s class-struggle line, launched purges within the Party, made officials live in constant fear, suppressed private enterprise economically, promoted state advance and private retreat, pursued “wolf-warrior diplomacy” internationally, and pushed nuclear-hegemony narratives. In just ten years, he exhausted forty years of reform-and-opening dividends; foreign capital fled, the economy declined, and both civilians and officials fell into misery, while military morale collapsed.
When the military newspaper mentions the so-called “test of reform and opening up,” the “test of the market economy,” the “danger of insufficient ability,” and the “danger of alienation from the masses,” is it really criticizing Zhang Youxia, or is it exposing Xi Jinping instead? On the surface, it is attacking Zhang Youxia, but underneath it is mocking Xi Jinping’s poor governance and lack of competence — implying that he is incapable of accomplishing anything and only good at causing damage. It subtly ridicules Xi Jinping for going against historical trends, stifling the market economy, and hindering reform and opening up.
The military newspaper is using Hu Jintao’s political legacy and slogans to covertly rebuke Xi Jinping’s reckless actions. This is hardly an attack on Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli at all — it is practically a “charge at the tower” (open defiance). Why does the military newspaper dare to do this? In the first two articles attacking Zhang, it repeatedly used the phrase “shedding feathers and being reborn.” Although this phrase was coined by Xi Jinping himself during the 2018 military reform, as the newspaper of the Central Military Commission, it cannot possibly be unaware that Xi Jinping once used the pen name “Bai Yu” (“White Feather”), nor can it be ignorant of the folk prophecies in Tui Bei Tu and Iron Plate Divination that speak of the end of Xi Jinping’s fate.
The question, then, is this: the subtle, Spring-and-Autumn-style (oblique and allegorical) writing used by the military newspaper, and the complex signals emitted by these commentator articles, actually represent the attitude of the military itself. The CCP’s military newspaper is under dual leadership: on the one hand, it is subject to the leadership and censorship of Cai Qi’s propaganda system; on the other hand, it serves as the mouthpiece of the military leadership and of the armed forces as a whole, representing the military’s stance and its directional opinions.
From the standpoint of official narrative, the military newspaper has no choice but to cooperate with Xi Jinping and Cai Qi in producing formulaic, bureaucratic propaganda, because on the surface Xi Jinping is still the legitimate leader of the Party, the state, and the army. However, judging from the content and writing style of the three articles attacking Zhang Youxia, they reflect the fact that within the military system there is currently extremely strong opposition to Zhang Youxia’s arrest. Widespread resistance should already be the consensus within the armed forces.
At present, the “golden 72 hours” since the official announcement of Zhang Youxia’s arrest have long passed — in fact, more than a week has gone by — yet within the military system, there is still a stance of silent resistance toward Xi Jinping. Silence is gold; silence is taking sides; silence is itself a form of struggle. How, then, can Xi Jinping and Cai Qi rest easy in their beds?!
Former PLA Navy lieutenant colonel Yao Cheng revealed on his YouTube channel that in many parts of the country — including Henan, Shandong, and Anhui — there have indeed been movements of organised military personnel and vehicles for exercises. Yao judged these to be targeted, real-time drills conducted by operational brigades of various group armies within their own garrison areas. Such “drills,” he explained, involve hypothetical enemies and objectives. This situation is abnormal and indicates that the military is indeed making unusual moves and striking certain postures. What will happen next remains unclear; the situation is currently complex and difficult to predict.
The Australia-based self-media channel True Perspective disclosed in its program that, according to insiders within the PLA, the military has determined Zhang Youxia’s place of detention through technical means but has not attempted a rescue. One of the reasons is that Zhang Youxia himself does not want to be rescued.
If this information is true, it is indeed highly significant and thought-provoking. Xi Jinping’s sudden move against the Central Military Commission, arresting Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, appears on the surface to have seized the initiative and gained the upper hand in the Xi–Zhang power struggle. In reality, however, it was a disastrous miscalculation and is likely to end in failure. Xi Jinping is now riding a tiger and cannot dismount; he is trapped between advance and retreat and must be filled with regret. If Xi Jinping persists and carries out large-scale purges in the military, slaughtering Zhang Youxia’s faction, it could lead to civil war. If, on the other hand, Xi retreats and allows Zhang Youxia a “soft landing,” it would mean that this coup struggle has ended in Xi Jinping’s defeat, and his entire power structure would collapse in an instant.
That Zhang Youxia himself does not wish to be rescued may itself represent an alternative “Plan B”: going along with the situation and then striking back later. As for where the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping will go from here, no one can yet say. The real drama may only just be beginning.
(First published by People News) △
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