Insufficient Military Commission Members: Dong Jun Merely Accompanies Xi for a Show

The new Defence Minister, Dong Jun, may add new drama to the 46th image (prophecy) of the Tui Bei Tu. (Truth of the People provided the report.)

[People News] In the article titled "Xi Jinping Video Calls to Comfort Troops, What is There to Fear?" published on February 11, the author noted that prior to this year's Lunar New Year, Xi Jinping broke with tradition by not visiting any combat zone troops to offer his condolences. Instead, he opted for a video call from the Bayi Building in Beijing. This was the only instance in the past seven years where such an approach was taken in 2023.

Given that early 2023 marked the lifting of pandemic restrictions, during a period characterised by a surge in infections and deaths, it is not surprising that Xi, fearing infection, chose to remain in Beijing. During the video call from the Bayi Building, all military officials present, except for Xi, were wearing masks. This year, Xi's retreat into the building likely stems from fears of assassination, especially after he recently ousted the influential Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department, Liu Zhenli.

So, how does Xi's video from the Bayi Building this year differ from that of 2023?

The two videos indicate that Xi was likely in the same room within the Military Commission building for the video connection, with the arrangement of tables and chairs and the positions of accompanying personnel being largely similar. The only notable difference is that in 2023, all six members of the Military Commission—Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Miao Hua, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin—were present, seated in the two rows of tables flanking Xi, while a few lower-ranking generals were positioned behind him on his right.

This year, five out of the six members of the Military Commission have been investigated, leaving only Zhang Shengmin as the sole remaining member. If he sits alone, the most awkward situation falls squarely on Xi Jinping. To alleviate the discomfort for the officers and soldiers, the Minister of Defence, Dong Jun, who is not yet a member of the Military Commission, took a seat to Xi's right. While this arrangement may appear visually balanced, one must wonder how the officers and soldiers connected to Xi feel about the fact that he has removed five members of the Military Commission during his third term. What are the sentiments across the entire military? Is Xi sitting there feeling triumphant or overwhelmed by pressure?

In addition to the discomfort caused by the high-ranking officials accompanying him, Xi has also reinstated interactions with the troops reporting to him prior to 2024 to assert his supreme military authority, which has been covered by CCTV. However, during a CCTV news segment in January 2025, when Xi visited the Northern Theatre Command and held a video conference with relevant military units alongside senior military officials, there was no display of interaction between Xi and the troops reporting to him, nor any scenes of him offering 'cordial condolences.'

Moreover, this year's CCTV videos showcasing Xi's 'self-presentation' have increased compared to last year, giving the impression that Xi has regained his status as the top leader in the military.

One notable difference from last year is that, in addition to the usual demand for "the entire military to strengthen combat readiness and to timely and effectively address various potential emergencies," and representing the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission in extending condolences to the military, it was also stated that "the past year has been very unusual and extraordinary." Furthermore, it was noted that "the military has deeply advanced political training, effectively responded to various risks and challenges, and undergone revolutionary forging in the anti-corruption struggle," suggesting that the military faced numerous challenges over the past year, particularly in the realm of anti-corruption. This could be interpreted as Xi Jinping seeking to justify his actions regarding Zhang and Liu. 

Xi also set forth requirements for the entire military, urging them to "listen to the Party, follow the Party, and be loyal in fulfilling their duties and responsibilities." However, in 2025, after receiving a report, Xi did not provide any additional reminders, requirements, or expectations. This is clearly linked to his waning military authority. 

It is important to note that prior to the Lunar New Year in February 2024, Xi Jinping's platform for showcasing himself was with the stationed troops in Tianjin. At that time, he expressed expectations, emphasising that in the new year, "we must deeply implement the thought of strengthening the military in the new era, thoroughly apply the military strategic guidelines of the new era, and focus on successfully achieving the centenary goal of military building..." 

In 2022, during his address at the Central Theatre Command, Xi's expectations were similar but included phrases such as "welcoming the convening of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China with practical actions." 

In February 2021, Xi visited a certain division of the Air Force in Guizhou to conduct inspections and express condolences, where his requirements included "strengthening normalised epidemic prevention and control, comprehensively enhancing training and combat readiness, and solidly advancing various tasks, continuously creating a new situation in troop construction from a new starting point."

In January 2020, during his visit to the Yunnan troops to offer condolences, Xi Jinping expressed his expectation to adhere to the guidance of 'Xi Thought', implement the strong military ideology, and follow the military strategic guidelines of the new era. He emphasised the importance of 'political building of the military, reform to strengthen the military, technological advancement of the military, talent development for the military, and rule of law in the military', among other principles.

Before 2019, upon his arrival at the Beijing Garrison District, Xi's expectation was to 'ensure the construction and control of the troops from a political and ideological perspective, ensuring that the troops resolutely uphold the authority of the Party Central Committee and centralized leadership, and strictly obey the commands of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission', among other directives.

As the highest leader of the military, it is entirely normal for him to set requirements for the entire army in the new year. However, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, who had previously set requirements, changed his approach in 2025 and then returned to normal in 2026. Does this reflect a process of change in his military authority?

Looking at Xi's recent directives for the military, there are no mentions of 'deeply implementing the strong military ideology of the new era or the military strategic guidelines of the new era', nor any references to 'Xi Thought' or 'resolutely obeying the commands of the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission'. Instead, he simply instructed them to 'listen to the Party and follow the Party'. Does this suggest that Xi is aware of his limited prestige within the military, and that his actions against Zhang and Liu have led to dissatisfaction among the ranks, prompting him to adopt a more low-key approach? Thus, while Xi, who is adept at theatrics, is performing, he is also avoiding self-aggrandisement. How Xi ultimately manages the military will indeed require careful consideration.

(Original publication by the People News) △