Eyes like lightning, clearly discerning good and evil; retribution follows like a shadow. (Dajiyuan)
[People News] Due to security concerns, Xi Jinping once again deviated from tradition by not personally visiting the troops for a New Year’s greeting. Instead, on February 10, he offered his greetings via video from the Central Military Commission building. On February 14, the military newspaper featured a follow-up report on the front page titled 'Chairman Xi’s New Year Greetings to the Troops Spark Enthusiastic Reactions Across the Military—Always a Heroic Army That the Party and People Can Fully Trust.' This appears to be Xi's attempt to demonstrate that he has secured military support following the arrests of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli; however, the content of the report suggests a contrary conclusion.
After detailing Xi's greetings, the report referred to the 'vast number of officers and soldiers' in vague terms, consistently emphasizing the need to grasp the meaning of 'establishment' and to achieve 'maintenance,' stating that it is essential to 'implement the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission and transform Chairman Xi’s deep concern into a strong motivation for military strength...'
The report then addressed the reactions of the officers and soldiers to Xi's greetings, highlighting those who pledged loyalty to Xi as the 'Commander': Zhao Kehua from the Navy's Anhui ship, Shi Qixin from a military aerospace unit, Zhang Yifei from a rocket force brigade, Cao Jun from the Xi'an detachment of the Shaanxi Armed Police Corps, Yu Huangchao from the National University of Defense Technology, and Wang Jiafa from the Eastern Theater Command Joint Command Center. The first four individuals are from the four units that participated in video calls with Xi. However, the report did not specify their exact positions, nor did it clarify the extent to which they represent the officers and soldiers of their respective units.
Can the representatives of the troops whose positions are unknown genuinely reflect the entire military's loyalty to Xi? In contrast to the reports of Xi's visit to the Northern Theatre Command, accompanied by Zhang Youxia, at the end of January 2025, and the 'enthusiastic response from the entire military' following his visit to the troops in Tianjin in 2024, this year's response is undoubtedly not 'enthusiastic,' but rather 'tepid.'
The reports following Xi's visit in 2025 noted that 'the various departments of the Military Commission, its directly affiliated institutions, the Joint Command Center, various theaters, different military branches, and the armed police force all stated that the fundamental reason for these achievements is having Xi Jinping as the core of the Party Central Committee and the core of the entire Party steering the course,' guided by 'Xi Thought.'
Additionally, experts from the Academy of Military Sciences, National Defence University, and National University of Defence Technology referenced the '2442' loyalty phrase and emphasised the need to 'implement the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission.' Those expressing loyalty to Xi include certain officers and soldiers from a brigade in the Southern Theater Army, Brigade Leader Yang Chengwu of that brigade, all officers and soldiers of a brigade in the Rocket Force, officers and soldiers of a certain unit in the Air Force, and cadre Sun Mohan, officers and soldiers of the 3rd Battalion of the Tibet Autonomous Region's Shigatse Detachment of the Armed Police Force, officers and soldiers of a certain unit in the information support troops, officers and soldiers of a certain naval unit, officers and soldiers of a certain base in the Xining Joint Logistics Support Center, officers and soldiers of a certain unit in the military aerospace forces, officers and soldiers of a certain unit in the cyber space forces, and officers and soldiers of a certain unit in the Zhejiang Provincial Military District.
The expression of loyalty indeed encompasses the entire military, and when specific military branches or units express loyalty, many represent all officers and soldiers, with the individuals expressing their stance also including their positions. This suggests that even if Xi were to lose military power at that time, Zhang Youxia, who effectively holds military power, still provided Xi with the dignity he deserves on the surface.
Revisiting the reports on the military's reactions following Xi Jinping's visit to the troops in Tianjin in February 2024, we find that these reports include statements from the Joint Command Center of the Military Commission, various theater commands, different military branches, departments of the Military Commission, directly affiliated institutions and units of the Military Commission, as well as the armed police force. Expressions of loyalty have come from leaders of a certain brigade of the Navy's aviation troops, the Naval Logistics Academy, a training base of the Army, a senior engineer team led by Yuan Wei from a unit in the Central Theater Command, a brigade of the 83rd Group Army, a brigade of the Air Force's aviation troops, the commander of a missile battalion from a brigade in the Western Theater Command, a regiment of the Beijing Garrison, a brigade of the 78th Group Army, a regiment of the Xinjiang Military District, a unit of the Rocket Force, and a unit of the Strategic Support Force, among others. This expression of loyalty encompasses the entire military.
Compared to the previous two years, the military's response to Xi's visit this year can hardly be described as 'enthusiastic.' There are no statements from 'the departments of the Military Commission, directly affiliated institutions, the Joint Command Centre, various theatre commands, different military branches, and directly affiliated units.' Does this suggest that after Xi's missteps in handling Zhang and Liu, he is now facing a subtle resistance from the military? After all, Xi's standing in the military is not comparable to that of Zhang Youxia, who has spent many years building strong ties within the armed forces.
The military's tepid response to Xi's visit suggests that while he may still present a glamorous image as 'Chairman Xi,' he has not secured the loyalty of the military. If Xi continues to pursue political-military building to solidify his power and initiates a new wave of purges within the military, it could lead to further chaos, and any number of outcomes could arise in the future.
(First published by the People News) △

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