Misjudging the Chinese Communist Party: How the West Can Counter Beijing’s Economic Retaliation

How the West Can Counter Beijing’s Economic Retaliation

[People News] Over the past several decades, Western officials have generally held the belief that “trade with China is itself a human rights policy.” In 1994, President Clinton “delinked” China’s human rights record from Most Favored Nation trade status. The core logic was to use “engagement and trade” to promote Beijing’s long-term human rights and political reform, rather than using sanctions to apply pressure.

I. The Misjudgment of the Era: Trade Did Not Bring Democracy

However, this view has now been proven a complete failure. The facts are exactly the opposite:

• Financier of surveillance: Trade not only failed to weaken authoritarian centralization, but instead provided Xi Jinping with enormous financial resources to build the world’s most advanced surveillance system and stability-maintenance apparatus.

• Weaponization of the market: Beijing realized that other countries depend on the Chinese market, and in turn used that dependence to threaten and force the international community into silence on human rights issues.

II. Beijing’s Economic Retaliation and the Global Pattern of Censorship

Beijing punishes criticism of its human rights record by precisely targeting the economic interests of specific countries:

• Norway and salmon: After Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Beijing halted imports of Norwegian salmon for years.

• The Meng Wanzhou incident: After Canada detained Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou at the request of the United States for extradition, Beijing immediately blocked Canadian agricultural products and detained two Canadian citizens as hostages.

• Australia and the COVID origin investigation: When Australia called for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19, Beijing imposed high tariffs on Australian wine, coal, and barley. What Beijing especially fears is outside discussion of its concealment in early 2020 of the fact of “human-to-human transmission,” as well as suspicions about whether the virus leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

• Corporate spillover censorship: From the NBA to PVH Group, any company touching on issues such as Hong Kong democracy or forced labor in Xinjiang faces the threat of market blockades or being placed on the “unreliable entities list.” This pressure has even led multinational tech companies such as Meta to cooperate globally with Hong Kong authorities’ censorship demands.

III. Fragile Legitimacy and the Need for External Recognition

Although Beijing appears on the surface to be strong and dismissive of criticism, Ross’s analysis points out that Beijing is in fact extremely sensitive to its international reputation, and this stems from the fragility of its governing legitimacy:

• False satisfaction: The Chinese Communist Party claims that the Chinese people are satisfied with authoritarian rule and therefore do not need elections. But this claim is built on economic progress and social stability. As the real estate bubble bursts, the population ages, and economic growth slows, this legitimacy is being shaken.

• Using “others’ trust” to foster “self-confidence”: Lacking an electoral mandate, Beijing instead seeks recognition from the international community, using it to suggest to domestic citizens: “Even though you did not choose us, the countries of the world all accept our rule.”

• The threat of Hong Kong and Taiwan: The mass protests in Hong Kong in 2019 and the continued existence of democracy in Taiwan completely exposed the lie that “Chinese people are not suited for democracy.” This is also the main reason Beijing is willing at any cost to destroy Hong Kong’s freedom and continue threatening Taiwan.

IV. The Human Rights Struggle Within the United Nations System

Beijing has invested enormous effort in the United Nations in an attempt to shift human rights mechanisms from “accountability” to “dialogue.” It has also used debt traps, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, to buy off developing countries and reduce international pressure over its human rights record.

• High-level compromise and institutional dilemma: Ross harshly criticized current UN officials. Former High Commissioner Bachelet did release a report accusing Xinjiang of “crimes against humanity,” but it was published only at the very end of her term, making it difficult for her to push forward follow-up accountability measures.

• The roles of Guterres and Türk: UN Secretary-General Guterres has been accused of helping Beijing stage a “theatrical” Xinjiang visit during the Winter Olympics, while current High Commissioner Türk has been criticized for relying too heavily on “dialogue” with Beijing and avoiding public criticism of the Chinese government’s human rights policies. This approach is seen as helping Beijing evade international pressure.

• Changes in the international defensive line: Although the 2022 vote concerning the Xinjiang report failed, the clear increase in supporting votes and the divergence in attitudes among Muslim countries show that Beijing can no longer completely control the situation.

V. The Return of Economic Counterpressure: Starting with Forced Labor in Xinjiang

As the emptiness of the “engagement policy” has become clear, countries led by the United States have begun using legal and trade tools to apply economic pressure in order to influence China’s human rights policies.

• The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act: This law reverses the burden of proof, requiring companies to prove that their Xinjiang supply chains do not involve forced labor. Because Chinese supply chains are highly opaque, companies are often unable to provide sufficient proof, and as a result many choose to withdraw from Xinjiang, dealing a heavy blow to local industries such as cotton and polysilicon (used in solar components).

• The argument of unfair competition: Officials such as Marco Rubio regard forced labor as a form of “unfair competition,” which aligns with the current logic of protectionist tariffs. If the United States and the European Union can reach a consensus, the economic pressure imposed on Beijing will increase significantly.

VI. Conclusion: The Long-Term Value of Sustained International Pressure

Ross believes that Beijing’s fear of international labeling and stigmatization provides the most critical breakthrough point for the human rights movement.

1. The power of collective security: Once countries realize that Beijing cannot retaliate against everyone at once, the power of collective action will multiply.

2. Creating space at home: Although external pressure cannot immediately change the Chinese Communist Party regime, it can raise the cost of repression and provide limited but important space for social movements and protest actions inside China, such as the White Paper Movement.

3. Long-term strategic thinking: The goal of human rights advocacy is not to change Beijing’s policies immediately, but to continually affect Beijing’s cost-benefit calculation regarding repression. As long as the international community maintains high pressure, Beijing’s model of rule will not be able to preserve forever the illusion of “stability.”

(This is a simplified translation of a ChinaFile article from China in the World titled “China’s Vulnerability to International Pressure Over Human Rights Behavior.”)

(First published by People News)
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