Xi Jinping Was Publicly Embarrassed by Kim Jong-un, Marking Beijing as the Clear Loser.

Kim Jong-un departed from Beijing to return to his country on the evening of the 4th. (Video screenshot)

[People News] From June 8 to 9, 2026, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping made his first visit to North Korea in nearly seven years, meeting with Kim Jong-un. This visit was described by the Chinese side as his first overseas trip of the year, coinciding with the 65th anniversary of the signing of the "China-North Korea Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty." Kim Jong-un welcomed him with the highest honours, including airport receptions, grand ceremonies, a review of the honour guard, and large portraits of Xi Jinping displayed throughout Pyongyang.

During their discussions, Xi Jinping outlined four key points for enhancing China-North Korea relations: maintaining high-level exchanges to foster political mutual trust, promoting practical cooperation for the benefit of the people, strengthening friendship to connect the hearts of the people, and enriching strategic cooperation with fairness and justice. The Chinese Communist Party has politically elevated the significance of Xi Jinping's visit, claiming it aims to solidify the "blood and fire" friendship between China and North Korea.

However, fundamentally, in this diplomatic contest, the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping may ultimately backfire. The CCP is trying to restore its influence over North Korea, but in the current geopolitical landscape, it faces numerous challenges. Not only is it difficult to effectively draw Pyongyang back into its orbit, but it also risks offending Russia and losing leverage in its relations with the United States.

In the 1950s, Mao Zedong deployed a million troops to assist North Korea in its invasion of South Korea, and the so-called relationship of blood and fire was built upon the sacrifices of Chinese soldiers. However, as we entered the 21st century, particularly under Kim Jong-un's leadership, this relationship has shifted from a rigid ideological alignment to a highly pragmatic one. After Xi Jinping assumed power, Kim Jong-un eliminated his brother Kim Jong-nam, who had been supported by the Chinese Communist Party, and executed his uncle Kim Chang-suk, which can be interpreted as a gesture towards Xi Jinping. Between 2018 and 2019, the Chinese Communist Party and Kim Jong-un engaged in numerous meetings and intensive interactions. However, following the outbreak of the pandemic, North Korea sealed its borders, leading to incidents where Chinese travellers were shot, resulting in a cooling of high-level exchanges between the two sides. In 2025, Kim Jong-un attended the September 3 military parade with his daughter, signalling a warming trend in the normalisation of relations between China and North Korea.

Yet, the reality is stark; North Korea is no longer a strategic buffer zone that the Chinese Communist Party can unilaterally control. In recent years, Pyongyang has successfully broken its economic isolation and gained military technical support by supplying a significant amount of weapons and troop assistance to the battlefield in Ukraine. Reports suggest that North Korea's military aid to Russia is valued at billions of dollars, providing it with much-needed technical and economic relief. Satellite imagery indicates that the nighttime lights in Pyongyang are brighter than before, with new buildings emerging and GDP showing signs of growth.

The recent handshake between Putin and Kim Jong-un has greatly enhanced Kim's confidence in his interactions with Xi Jinping. North Korea is no longer just a submissive supplicant or an overlooked little brother. On May 6, 2026, significant changes were introduced in North Korea's new constitution, which eliminated political terms from the eras of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, such as 'national reunification' and 'the complete victory of socialism.' It also introduced the 'theory of two hostile countries.' For the first time, the new constitution clearly designates Kim Jong-un as the head of state and grants him command over the nuclear-armed forces. The new provisions define North Korean territory as the northern region bordering China and Russia, as well as the southern region bordering South Korea, including the territorial waters and airspace established by these borders.

This new constitution legally and institutionally reinforces Kim Jong-un's political status and power, sending a clear message to the Chinese Communist Party that North Korea is no longer a communist little brother that must defer to Beijing's authority. Instead, it is a rational and pragmatic nation with absolute sovereignty, self-directed power, and nuclear deterrent capabilities. North Korea is no longer required to act according to Beijing's preferences. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping are increasingly anxious, as their so-called economic assistance to North Korea is unlikely to achieve their political coercion objectives. The geopolitical situation in East Asia has not stabilised; rather, it has become more turbulent and challenging to manage.

Xi Jinping was compelled to lower his status and made his first overseas trip to North Korea this year. His primary goal was to mend relations with North Korea through generous financial aid and diplomatic engagement, thereby reaffirming Beijing's influence and preventing North Korea from decoupling from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and fully aligning with Russia. This approach also aims to mitigate the political risks associated with North Korea bypassing Beijing to negotiate directly with the United States. As Xi observed the crises faced by his smaller allies in the region, such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran, he could not help but feel anxious about the potential for North Korea to create further issues.

The CCP has recognised that this is an asymmetric diplomatic game, with both China and North Korea holding hidden agendas and exhibiting clear strategic differences. The CCP requires a stable buffer zone and geopolitical control, relying on North Korea to act as a manageable communist ally and pawn. Conversely, North Korea seeks to redefine its position in international politics and aims to secure support from multiple major powers to maximise its survival and geopolitical interests. Kim Jong-un, having received a foreign education, is likely more skilled at navigating complex diplomatic waters than Xi Jinping, who is perceived as less experienced. Consequently, this visit to Beijing may ultimately prove fruitless, as Kim Jong-un's lavish reception has given him leverage to negotiate economic concessions from Beijing, while the strategic subservience that Xi desires from North Korea is not a priority for Kim Jong-un.

Xi Jinping's four-point proposal may appear comprehensive at first glance, but it is ultimately devoid of substance. The notion that high-level exchanges are 'leading' is merely a political slogan. The idea of 'benefiting the people' is ironically misleading. The phrase 'connecting hearts and minds' serves only as propaganda. The call for 'fairness and justice' in opposing hegemony is more of a shared narrative that fails to mask the divergent interests of both parties. Historically, similar declarations have led to a revival in China-North Korea trade, yet it has not reached the level of 'mutual pursuit.' The symbolic significance of this visit far outweighs its practical outcomes; beneath Xi Jinping's strategic patience lies a sense of strategic anxiety, revealing the limitations of China's policy towards North Korea.

On June 9, the party media outlet People's Daily reported on Xi Jinping's discussions with Kim Jong-un, highlighting 'the traditional friendship between China and North Korea,' as well as strategic communication and cooperation. However, the report notably omitted any mention of 'nuclear,' 'denuclearisation,' or the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, Xinhua's coverage was vague and did not address the critical issue of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and expansion.

The objectives achieved during Xi Jinping's recent visit fall short of the outcomes from his 2019 trip to North Korea. According to a Xinhua report on June 20, 2019, it was explicitly stated that Xi Jinping 'positively evaluated North Korea's efforts to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula and to promote denuclearisation.' This time, while Xi Jinping emphasised the importance of peace and stability on the peninsula, Kim Jong-un has never relinquished nuclear deterrence as a cornerstone of his regime's survival. Previously, China supported sanctions against North Korea at the United Nations, but now it finds itself in a position where it must publicly extend goodwill, highlighting the Communist Party's and Xi Jinping's own limitations and frustrations.

Xi Jinping has faced a setback; in front of Kim Jong-un, he did not dare to assert a clear direction. The Chinese Communist Party has long touted Xi Jinping's ability to 'lead the international order.' Seven years ago, he could still claim to 'promote the denuclearisation of the peninsula,' but now he can only evade reality, feign ignorance, and gloss over the situation. A communist superpower is being manipulated by a small nation; this is a difficult situation to endure.

More importantly, the involvement of Russia has placed the Chinese Communist Party in a vulnerable position. The relationship between Russia and North Korea has deepened since Putin's visit to North Korea in 2024, encompassing mutual assistance treaties, military cooperation, and the construction of new roads and bridges. These ties not only provide alternative support for North Korea but also directly challenge the traditional dominance of the Chinese Communist Party in Northeast Asia. Russia is acquiring battlefield supplies through North Korea, while China is concerned about instability in its own backyard. Xi Jinping's visit came shortly after Putin's visit to China, which on the surface appeared to be about trilateral coordination, but in reality, Beijing is attempting to strategically engage and win over Pyongyang. This could easily be interpreted by Moscow as a diplomatic misstep, a sign of distrust, or competition, which could damage the strategic mutual trust between China and Russia.

Kim Jong-un is a savvy pragmatist. The foremost priority for his regime's survival is to avoid dependence on a single major power. Kim Jong-un is likely to seize this opportunity to demand more economic assistance, relaxed sanctions, and border cooperation projects from Beijing. If Xi Jinping agrees, it would mean supporting North Korea's interests on both fronts; if he fails to meet these demands, the cordial relationship between China and North Korea could deteriorate, a scenario that Xi Jinping cannot afford.

In the ongoing US-China rivalry, North Korea is more likely to be seen as a 'troublemaker' rather than a dependable partner. During the Trump administration, there was a precedent for dialogue between North Korea and the US, and Kim Jong-un may continue to engage in a multilateral balancing act. However, Xi Jinping's role as a mediator is unlikely to yield effective results, with little to show for his efforts. Ultimately, the narrative of 'a family bond' between China and North Korea serves the propaganda and political interests of both sides, failing to conceal their fundamental differences. According to the logic of the Chinese Communist Party, there are no useless friends, only enduring interests.

In this diplomatic contest between Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-un is likely to emerge as the short-term winner, gaining attention, economic leverage, and diverse support. In contrast, Xi Jinping's efforts are met with strategic setbacks, a tarnished image, and economic repercussions. Russia, acting as an opportunist, may continue to expand its influence. Meanwhile, Beijing is clearly the loser in this scenario.

(First published by the People News) △