Why Are Chinese Students in the U.S. Not Welcoming Xi Jinping?

The Chinese Communist Party uses American college campuses to control students who exercise freedom of speech at universities. (Dajiyuan, Getty Images)

[People News] During Xi Jinping's visit to the U.S., two sharply contrasting scenes unfolded on the streets of Washington: on one side, the high-profile red carpet and state banquet at the White House, and on the other, a continuous wave of protests. Among the pro-China supporters who publicly appeared during this welcoming event, a notable detail emerged: the vast majority were middle-aged and elderly expatriates, while young people, particularly Chinese students studying in the U.S., were almost entirely absent.

In previous visits by Chinese Communist Party leaders or significant events, overseas students often constituted the core of the 'pink' camp, uniformly waving flags, chanting slogans, and even confronting protesters. However, this time was distinctly different. Approximately 200 supporters gathered outside the hotel, many arriving by bus from locations such as New York, and they were generally older; similarly, the participants in the conflict outside Andrews Base were predominantly middle-aged and elderly. While some young plainclothes individuals did appear, dressed uniformly with masks and baseball caps and holding black umbrellas, they primarily served a monitoring role and were likely undercover agents of the Chinese Communist Party who have been embedded in the U.S. for years. This time, many of them were mobilized, acting as the main force behind the non-public welcoming of Xi Jinping.

The shift in the age structure of this welcoming group is not coincidental, and the reasons can be analyzed from four main perspectives.

Firstly, the United States is tightening its policy towards China, leading to a significant rise in fear among the public. In recent years, the U.S. has noticeably intensified its crackdown on the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) transnational repression and intelligence operations. The FBI has repeatedly issued public warnings regarding the CCP's infiltration and harassment activities within the U.S., with cases involving secret police and prosecutions of dissidents being revealed one after another. If Chinese students in the U.S. publicly engage in high-profile welcoming events for Xi Jinping (Xi Jinping), they risk being photographed and identified. Once labeled as actively cooperating with the CCP's overseas mobilization, their future applications for Optional Practical Training (OPT), green cards, and even academic collaborations could be adversely affected. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence agencies are increasingly focusing on the student population. Instead of risking exposure by waving the five-star flag in front of cameras, it may be wiser to adopt a low-profile approach or even abstain from participation. This reluctance to appear in public highlights the weakening control the CCP has over Chinese students in the U.S. amid the current tense Sino-U.S. relations and a high-pressure domestic political climate.

Secondly, the number of Chinese students in the U.S. has changed. In recent years, factors such as tightened visa policies, intensified Sino-U.S. technological competition, increased scrutiny in certain fields, and domestic economic and employment expectations have contributed to a slowdown in the growth of students studying in the U.S., with some areas even experiencing a return flow. The post-pandemic surge in studying abroad has not fully returned to previous highs, and an increasing number of Chinese families and parents are weighing political risks against educational benefits. As the overall number of students decreases, the pool of easily mobilized young individuals naturally shrinks. Additionally, the CCP's overseas Chinese affairs system is more adept at mobilizing long-established overseas Chinese rather than the transient student population, resulting in an ageing welcome committee that reflects a reluctant reality.

Thirdly, and on a deeper level, a considerable number of young people within the Communist Party of China (CPC) have started to awaken. Over the last decade, the CPC has made substantial investments in ideological propaganda, but its impact has noticeably waned among the younger generation abroad. They have lived through pandemic lockdowns, economic declines, job pressures, and a contraction of free speech, and they have accessed more authentic information by bypassing the Great Firewall. For many, supporting the CPC is no longer seen as a natural duty or the optimal choice, but rather as a last resort that entails personal sacrifices. In the eyes of many young people, Xi Jinping is perceived as an incompetent tyrant focused solely on personality cults, power struggles, and suppressing public opinion; some students who might have remained neutral have shifted to indifference or even hostility. While they may not openly join protest movements, they are also unlikely to actively participate in welcoming events for a small financial incentive. Silence, in this context, is a form of expression.

Fourthly, the risk-reward balance is heavily skewed. For older expatriates, engaging in welcoming activities might enhance their community standing, provide access to expatriate resources, or ease their return home; however, for international students, the benefits are minimal while the risks are substantial. If they are recorded by domestic or international surveillance systems, they could face questioning upon their return; remaining in the United States might also impact their future opportunities. More importantly, many young people are beginning to adopt a long-term perspective on their identities. They prioritize personal futures, academic freedom, and quality of life over merely serving as a political backdrop for a leader's visit. When patriotism is reduced to the obligation of making public declarations and confronting dissenters, an increasing number of individuals are opting to withdraw from this performance.

Certainly, not all international students in the U.S. oppose the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), nor is there a shortage of those willing to show support. However, the public, large-scale, and youthful mobilization has become increasingly difficult to replicate. The student 'pink' that the CCP's overseas united front system once relied on is now shrinking due to real-world pressures and changing circumstances. In response, the CCP has turned to more covert methods, such as plainclothes surveillance and mobilizing older expatriate groups. This shift highlights a significant issue: when a regime must depend on masks, baseball caps, and black umbrellas to maintain its visibility on the streets of the free world, while the actual youth demographic opts to stay away, its influence overseas has greatly diminished compared to the past.

During Xi Jinping's visit to the U.S., the change in the age demographics of the welcoming crowd reflects not only a decline in the CCP's overseas mobilization capabilities but also a widening gap between the younger generation and the official narrative of the CCP. While the CCP can continue to use buses to transport older expatriates and send plainclothes agents to monitor protesters, it is becoming increasingly challenging to encourage young people living on American campuses to willingly come forward and cheer for it. This silence may convey more about the situation than the slogans of protest.

(First published by the People News) △