The Secret Telegram from the Grassland (Part 1): Mao Zedong's 'Darkest Hour' 

Left: Mao Zedong, Right: Lin Biao (Dajiyuan composite)

[People News] Editor's Note: This article is an excerpt from 'Historical Notes', an unpublished work by renowned Chinese journalist Dai Qing, and is published exclusively by this station, with the title suggested by the editor. The text delves into the mystery surrounding the 'Secret Telegram from the Grassland' in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. 

The 'Secret Telegram from the Grassland', also referred to as the '99 Secret Telegram' or 'Grassland Secret Telegram', took place during the Red Army's 'Long March' in 1935. In the summer of that year, Mao Zedong and the Red First Front Army, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, met with the Red Fourth Front Army, led by Zhang Guotao, in Sichuan. Following their meeting, a significant disagreement arose regarding their strategic direction: Mao Zedong advocated for a northward advance towards Shaanxi and Gansu, while Zhang Guotao favored a southward movement towards the Sichuan-Kang region. 

By September, tensions between the two sides had intensified. According to the official narrative of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on September 9, 1935, Zhang Guotao secretly sent a telegram to Chen Changhao and Xu Xiangqian, the commanders of the Right Army, urging them to halt their advance north and instead lead their troops south. Upon receiving the telegram, Ye Jianying, the Chief of Staff of the Front Command, reported its contents to Mao Zedong. That evening, Mao Zedong and others held an emergency meeting, deciding to lead the Red Army's First and Third Armies to break away from Zhang Guotao's control and head north overnight. This telegram would later be known as the 'Secret Telegram from the Grassland.'

The division between Zhang Guotao and the Central Committee of the CCP marks a significant event in the early history of the party. Journalist Dai Qing, drawing on her historical knowledge and journalistic skills, examines the meeting and subsequent split between the Red First Army and the Red Fourth Army in 1935, along with the later statements from key figures such as Mao Zedong, Zhang Guotao, and Ye Jianying. The opinions expressed in this text are those of the author.

This excerpt is published in three parts, with this being the first. It addresses the question of whether the 'September 9 Secret Telegram' truly existed, detailing the power struggles that occurred within three months following the meeting of the Red First and Fourth Armies, as well as the Central Red Army's overnight movement northward in September 1935. The author also reviews Mao Zedong's various statements regarding the secret telegram incident from 1937 to 1971 and reflects on the public debate surrounding the telegram's authenticity from the late 1970s to the 1980s.

Editor’s Note: The views expressed in this text are solely those of the author. Text that is bold or underlined has been added by the original author, and the editor has made no additional changes. The original book contains annotations, but this online reprint omits them for readability; interested readers may refer to the original work.

Even today, people across the nation continue to speculate about the 99 grassland secret telegram: does it exist or not?

The story unfolds in the autumn of 1935, near Jiuzhaigou, one of China's most treacherous tourist spots... At that time, young men in their twenties were not just a group of friends well-equipped for a fun outing. The so-called Red Army was desperately fleeing from relentless enemies, searching for a place to settle and a meal to eat... Thus, for the CCP, which 'grew from hardship, ultimately became powerful, and took over China,' this period is considered the lowest point in what the government officially praises as the 'great cause'—but just how low was it? And what led to this decline?

To begin with, and to keep it concise:

The CCP, as the Chinese branch of the global proletarian revolution (the Third International led by Lenin), under the inconsistent and often misguided guidance of its financial backer, Soviet Russia, had by 1933 experienced both fragmentation and reformation. Following their financial backer's lead, they adopted the name 'Red Army' and initially captured, then established control over, and exploited Soviet base areas, including the 'Central' in Jiangxi and various other locations, which had become increasingly difficult to sustain...
By mid-1935, within the CCP's 'base areas', if we exclude the scattered small groups from Fujian and Shaanxi, the most notable remaining forces were:

The Red Fourth Front Army led by Zhang Guotao, who had escaped from Sichuan (hereafter referred to as 'Old 4' for ease of reference), and
The Red First Front Army led by Zhu De and Mao Zedong, who had escaped from Jiangxi (also known as the Central Red Army, hereafter referred to as 'Old 1'). Additionally,
The CCP had conducted numerous significant plenary sessions over the decades, which, for convenience, will be abbreviated as 6/4, referring to the Sixth Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Committee.
After enduring many life-and-death struggles, in the early summer of that year, they emotionally 'gathered' in the area that is now the habitat of giant pandas!

With a force of 80,000, Old 4's leader Zhang Guotao had qualifications within the party that need not be elaborated from the First to the Fifth Congress. By the time of the Sixth Congress in Moscow (not the temporary central committee in Shanghai), he remained a member of the Politburo; while Old 1, with only about 8,000 members, nearly a 'beggar' group, was equipped with a complete set of the central leadership from the Zunyi Conference: General Secretary, Politburo, and publications ready to call out at any time... in addition to a newly elected member of the Politburo Standing Committee: Mao Zedong.

Gun Party, Party Gun - Who Holds the Upper Hand? Status, Organization, Command Power... Who is in Control? The once dazzling 'support' has devolved into conflict after just three months of open and covert struggles following the 'meeting'.

This was the situation on September 9, 1935.

The following day, early on September 10, Marshal Xu Xiangqian recalled (45 years later):

That morning, I had just gotten out of bed when I received a report that Comrade Ye Jianying was missing, and the military maps from the command post had also disappeared. Chen Changhao and I were shocked. Shortly after, the front-line troops called to inform us that the Central Red Army had fled overnight and had set up a guard post.

In other words, the First and Third Armies, originally part of the Old 1 (Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai), along with the 'Party Central' (Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, etc.), had fled in the dead of night!

What followed was a fierce quarrel between the two factions of the Red Army, characterized by lofty rhetoric - even as they continued to refer to each other as comrades. The discussion remained focused on the purely tactical question of whether to advance north or retreat south...

Two days later, on September 12, during their hurried escape, the 'Party Central' convened an expanded Politburo meeting: they criticized Zhang Guotao for splitting the Party and the Red Army, and announced the formation of the Shaan-Gan Detachment of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, consisting of about 6,000 personnel.

Mao Zedong delivered a report with a stern and righteous tone. However, historians should take note: in his 'grand speech',

He made no mention of the anti-Japanese struggle;

He did not mention Telegram 99, which was the direct cause of the escape, at all.

At this moment, Zhang Guotao disregarded the lives of the soldiers and ordered the right flank troops led by Xu and Chen to turn back and cross the grassland again, in order to carry out his own strategy of moving south. Subsequently, on October 5, after advancing approximately 60 kilometers south to Zhuomu Diao, he established a new command center. 'Zhuomu '- is it a woodpecker? A name given by heaven—thus he likened himself to a woodpecker that feeds on tree-boring insects, expelling Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Luo Fu from the party; Yang Shangkun and Ye Jianying were 'suspended and investigated.'

It has completely fallen apart: the two strong factions, who had only united for three months. The difference now is that, compared to the time of their initial unification, both sides are now firmly holding onto their own—guns and party affiliations.

A. Mao Weiren stated

What’s happening here—comrades uniting during the toughest times, only to turn against each other within three months?

For those familiar with history, this may evoke Mao Zedong’s reflections on the darkest moments of his tumultuous life. This was in the deep autumn of 1960, when his 'old friend' Edgar Snow returned to China (this time, it was 'New China').

Snow inquired:

What was the darkest moment of your life?

Mao Zedong responded:

That was during the Long March in 1935, amid the struggle between the grassland and Zhang Guotao. At that time, the party was on the brink of a split, with the potential for an uncertain civil war looming.

Historians, take note: this time, Mao Zedong only referred to 'the darkest' and 'facing a split.' However, he did not clearly specify the main reason: the encrypted telegram from the grassland was in hand, leading to a midnight escape.

This narrative circulated widely.

However, within the Communist Party, especially among those who experienced it firsthand that year, the reality was well understood. Because prior to this, at a party meeting where the overall situation was initially determined, Mao Zedong had explicitly stated—in the early spring of 1937.

At that time, we know: Zhang Xueliang’s December 12th mutiny saved the (almost starving) Central Security; Zhang Guotao and his depleted old Fourth Army, following Zhang Hao’s strategy, had been misled into the central command under Mao Zedong’s supposed imperial edict ('international opinion'); subsequently, the 'Western Route Army' was annihilated. At this moment (March 1937), Zhang Guotao had lost the means to contend with Mao Zedong.

In light of this trend, the most perceptive among the propaganda personnel spoke first. On March 27, Kai Feng published an article titled 'What are the Differences Between the Party Central Committee and Guotao’s Line?'

Due to Guo Huai's own confusion regarding the relationship between the Party and the Red Army, his subordinates inevitably resorted to mentioning 'solving the central issue by force.' In the secret order issued by Guo Huai to Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao, there is a directive to thoroughly engage in struggle against the central leadership.

It is noteworthy that terms like 'secret order' and 'solving by force' have been used. However, which specific secret order is being referred to remains unclear.

On nearly the same day, during an expanded meeting of the Political Bureau in Yan'an, Mao Zedong spoke solemnly, directly targeting Zhang Guohai —

'As soon as Mao Er arrives, he rebels, wanting to use the gun barrel to scrutinize the central line,'

'Behind the central command, Chen Changhao led the right army southward, attempting to split and undermine the Party Central.'

Ye Jianying revealed a secret order to us, forcing us to head north alone. The telegram stated: 'Go south, thoroughly develop the internal party struggle.' Had we been even slightly careless at that time, it could have led to conflict.

The terms 'secret order' and 'thoroughly develop the internal party struggle,' along with the chief of staff's act of 'stealing the secret order to show us,' had already been articulated by the leader.

At the Yan'an meeting, the key figures involved—Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Chen Changhao—were absent. Zhang Guotao immediately countered:

'If this escalates to framing the commander-in-chief and using force against revolutionary comrades, such actions would be counter-revolutionary.'

Regrettably, at that moment, the old Fourth's military strength had nearly been entirely depleted. Mao Zedong's conclusion was pronounced:

The failure of the Western Route Army signifies the ultimate collapse of Zhang Guotao's strategy.

Given the circumstances, Zhang Guotao was left with only one option: 'to accept education and seek redemption.' Following organizational arrangements, he assumed a position such as 'Vice Chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government.' The next year, he escaped Yan'an under the guise of paying respects at Huangling.

This was followed by eight years of the Anti-Japanese War and four years of civil war... the nation endured immense suffering and profound tragedies.

Later, as the red sun rose steadily, Mao Zedong made a decisive statement regarding the pivotal turning point in the party's revolution: the secret telegram from the grassland led the central committee north, and no one dared to speak out recklessly—until 1960, when Snow visited and inquired about the darkest moments mentioned earlier.

In front of international friends, Mao Zedong somewhat opened up, vaguely recalling his escape from death 25 years earlier.

This was in 1960! Under the 'Three Red Banners,' across the land of China, man-made disasters were spreading. In normal years, hundreds, thousands, and even millions of innocent people starved to death under the grand slogans of the 'Three Red Banners' and the pursuit of surpassing Britain and catching up with the United States... Was this not the most painful reality for him?

Two more years went by. It seems he could no longer bear it... The ruling Communist Party convened a rare meeting of 7,000 frontline cadres to 'vent their grievances.' Mao Zedong, unusually gentle and low-key (was he seeking to bend to gain?), while Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, on the surface tacitly aligned with him, were actually holding a meeting in the West Building without him present, 'not revealing their true intentions'...

Alright, everyone, just wait. As the autumn wind begins to blow, Mao Zedong unexpectedly takes a jab: he raises the issue of class struggle once more, pulling China back into turmoil. During the Eighth Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee in September of that year, although he did not explicitly mention the secret telegram of 99, the great savior suddenly praised Ye Jianying during this dark hour. This is the same Ye Jianying who, in 1948, was sent away to run a school (North China Military and Political University) at a crucial moment when he could have seized power from Chiang Kai-shek; he was also the same Ye Jianying who, in the early 1950s, was brought back from Guangzhou and Wuhan to Beijing as a 'local official' left idle.

Comrade Ye Jianying has produced a work that is quite sharp; the main point is clear. I have often criticized you for not being sharp in your speech, but this time it is indeed sharp. I will give you two phrases: 'Zhuge was always cautious in his life, and Lü Duan was not muddled in major matters.'

'Work'? 'Not muddled'? What exactly does Mao Zedong mean here—was the military training and military science that Ye was overseeing at that time so significant during a period of complete peace? This is a critical moment in internal strife; why bring up such trivial matters?

Subsequently, on various occasions, the phrases 'only cautious' and 'not muddled' were reiterated by the leader. The situation then evolved; this significant phrase 'not muddled in major matters' inevitably became associated with the secret telegram on the grasslands, according to the intuition of the Red Dynasty officials who were adept at 'listening to the sounds of obedience.'

By the end of 1965, Ye was once again brought out and reinstated: the great man waved his hand, and the 'Cultural Revolution of the Proletariat' was set to be launched comprehensively from the top down! It didn't take long for the revolutionary heroes to grow impatient—leading to the 'February Countercurrent' of 1967!

What to do? For Mao Zedong, one side represented an old comrade, while the other side consisted of his Red Guard generals. In this 'countercurrent', Mao felt it was essential to stabilize the old military leaders and began to recall the secret telegrams from the grassland in 1999.

That summer, 32 years after the midnight escape from the grassland, Mao Zedong remarked to Yang Chengwu:

Comrade Jianying made significant contributions at a critical moment. He saved the Party, saved the Red Army, and saved us.

It seems he forgot that Ye was also a member of the 'February countercurrent' and even slammed the table in anger, breaking his little finger bone in the process.

In 1969, the Ninth Congress was held. Fifteen years earlier (1953), the top-level struggle that began over whether to pursue socialism or new democracy had its first opponent, Liu Shaoqi, completely defeated. Unexpectedly, after the 'great victory', at the Ninth Plenary Session in 1970, his two closest aides, Lin Biao and Chen Boda, who were once a military and a literary figure, surprisingly showed signs of dissent: they no longer wished to continue the revolution and instead wanted to focus on economic development (!)

Did this make the great man reflect on his darkest hour?

By the end of August 1971—just before September 13—Mao Zedong made a trip to Changsha and once again brought up the 'Grassland Secret Telegram': 36 years have passed, yet the great savior's mind still vividly recalls so many details from those early years. This time, he directly revealed the time, place, and characters involved in the Grassland Secret Telegram:

Zhang Guotao was causing a split and sent a telegram to Chen Changhao and Xu Xiangqian, stating that they must resolutely move south, or they would face complete resolution. At that time, Comrade Ye Jianying was the chief of staff, and he first showed me this telegram, not giving it to Chen Changhao or Xu Xiangqian. We had already left; otherwise, we would have been captured. Ye Jianying played a crucial role at this critical moment, so you should respect him. At that time, our strategy was correct; if the army had not gone to the northwest, where there was still some base, how could it have reached the North China and Northeast regions? How could so many bases have been established during the Anti-Japanese War?

Who was he targeting with this—Lin Biao, who had ulterior motives and wanted to stir up trouble? The true course of history shows that in less than half a month, in September 1971, there was a disastrous defeat! A few years later, in September 1976, there was the 'October Capture'!

Mao Zedong, still wise and great? For decades, have his assertions at these critical historical junctures remained so unshakeable? Among them, the repeatedly mentioned Grassland Secret Telegram, does it exist or not?

It has been 40 years, and what resonates in the historical tide is just this statement from Mao Zedong.

Those who lived through it may recall that the capture in 1976 was indeed 'a great relief to the people.' But what came next? Was Mao Zedong a man or a god? What he said... what he did...? 

Across the vast expanse of China, an unavoidable storm of truth-seeking and reality-seeking cognition was unleashed. After 40 years in power, it must be acknowledged that the catastrophic mistakes he made were numerous. The great achievements and esteemed status of Mao Zedong inevitably began to tremble at their foundations: 

1937 Luochuan Conference 
1950 Korean War 
1953 Socialism/New Democracy? 
1957 Three Red Banners? A conspiracy? 
1962 Class Struggle? 
1966 Cultural Revolution? 
Leader of the Third World? 
… 
This also includes the 1935 secret telegram from the grasslands that allowed him and the 'Central Committee' to escape death. 

The fortunate surviving veterans (true or false?) eagerly rubbed their hands together. The designated successor had to invoke the 'Two Whatevers'... Yet, piece by piece, the subjects and common people of China were awakening, stumbling out of the worship of emperors. 

Is this acceptable? Is the world no longer... In this context, a series of articles were officially released: the great leader must be protected! Regardless of how the struggle unfolds, the one standing on the side of 'absolute correctness' must always be him. Consequently, in 1977, the People's Daily published Xu Xiangqian's 'Always Adhere to the Principle of the Party Commanding the Gun'; in 1979, the Military Report published Lü Liping's 'Severe Moment'... and so forth.

The fascinating aspect of history is that it coincides with the unforgettable preparatory meeting on November 3, 1978, which the Chinese people will always remember. Shortly after, China entered the only period under the one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party where people could express themselves to some extent—the 1980s—the dawn of ideological liberation began to emerge!

Does the "99 Grassland Secret Telegram" exist or not? If you claim it does, then present it—when, at what moment, and through which communication?

In the wave of reform and opening up, those who experienced the original old/4 began to voice their opinions regarding Mao Zedong's descriptions and conclusions about the "99 Grassland Secret Telegram." At that time, communication personnel from both the left and right factions (Song Kanfu, Wang Zigang, etc.) stepped forward and, from the perspective of encrypted communication technology, shared their accounts based on military regulations and their own experiences:

This telegram, which fully revealed the internal party struggle, was neither sent nor received by Xu and Chen.

Following this, academia, commentators, and major research institutions all became involved. The mystery of the Grassland Secret Telegram spread widely... The rebuttals from the old/4 faction were strong and compelling. The Grassland Secret Telegram became a focal point of intense inquiry. However, they also had things they were hesitant to mention (or dared not ask):

If it does not exist, then... what was it that the great leader personally transcribed on a cigarette box on the afternoon of September 9, 1935, at Mao Zedong's residence?

A few words of information led to such a significant movement; it cannot be without reason, right? So, what is the truth? (To be continued)

(Translated from Radio Free Asia)△