A Scene from a CCP Meeting: The Chairperson on Stage Speaks in a Droning Buzz, Perfect for Helping Me Fall Asleep. (Guang Niu/Getty Images)
[People News] In late October 2026, while Beijing's weather had just begun to feel like early winter, the political atmosphere above the city had already descended into a chilling winter. The Chinese Communist Party's Political Bureau has been issuing stern warnings, the party's publications have been releasing high-profile articles, and a series of events, including commemorations of the Long March and intensified anti-corruption campaigns, have been unfolding. These multiple political events are intricately woven together, creating a bloody path leading up to the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, which is set to convene on Monday.
The theme of the Fifth Plenary Session is clearly defined as "persistently advancing comprehensive strict governance of the Party." The series of signals released prior to the meeting indicates that this session will not adhere to the traditional agenda of announcing an economic policy framework. Instead, the core focus will be on how to reshape the power structure of the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its helm. As the security anxieties surrounding Xi Jinping's regime continue to escalate, and the political weaponisation of the anti-corruption campaign becomes more pronounced, the authorities' political direction increasingly reflects characteristics reminiscent of both Mao Zedong and Stalin.
Estimates from the China Analysis Centre of the Asia Society Policy Institute suggest that out of the 376 central committee members and alternate members elected during the 20th National Congress, only about 291 are expected to attend, resulting in an attendance rate of approximately 77.4%. This marks a decline from the 83.8% attendance rate at last year's Fourth Plenary Session and could potentially set a new record low since the post-Mao era. This figure underscores the cumulative effects of ongoing censorship, expulsions, and cases of "disappearance," reflecting significant adjustments in the power structure on the eve of the 21st National Congress.
Xi Jinping Issues Three Consecutive Iron-Fisted Warnings
From late September to late October, Xi Jinping has sent a series of strong political warnings within just over a month by presiding over Politburo meetings, publishing significant articles in party publications, and again leading Politburo meetings.
On September 21, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China convened a meeting chaired by Xi Jinping. The meeting officially set the date for the Fifth Plenary Session and confirmed that it would review the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Persistently Advancing Comprehensive Strict Governance of the Party on Several Major Issues." Traditionally, the Fifth Plenary Session focuses on economic issues; however, this meeting stressed the importance of "maintaining a firm tone without wavering" and "improving the comprehensive strict governance system of the Party." This shift in focus indicates a systematic strategy by Xi Jinping's administration regarding the power dynamics and restructuring ahead of the 21st National Congress. The phrase "strict governance of the Party" has become synonymous with Xi Jinping's centralisation of power. Furthermore, as the 21st National Congress approaches, Xi Jinping appears increasingly anxious, particularly amid widespread speculation about his declining health, which undoubtedly heightens his fear of losing power.
On October 16, the 20th issue of the magazine 'Qiushi' published a significant article by Xi Jinping titled 'Advancing Comprehensive Strict Governance of the Party with Higher Standards and More Practical Measures.' Although this article is based on a speech delivered earlier this year at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's plenary session, its high-profile publication just before the Fifth Plenary Session carries a strong message of policy declaration. The article stresses that the 'two safeguards' cannot simply be slogans; they must be manifested in concrete actions that implement the major decisions and directives of the Party Central Committee. It calls for a more scientific and effective approach to confining power within the framework of the system, tightening institutional regulations while also enhancing the capacity for enforcement. Additionally, it reaffirms that the anti-corruption campaign must maintain a high-pressure stance without faltering. By closely linking strict governance of the Party to national strategic objectives, the article effectively communicates to the entire Party that there should be no expectation of my resignation. Anyone who is disloyal to me is also disloyal to their own official position, and even to their own life and property. Strict governance of the Party is not a temporary initiative; as long as I remain in power, you must faithfully serve as subordinates and avoid any underhanded actions.
On October 23, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China convened another meeting, chaired by Xi Jinping. The meeting reviewed the 'Comprehensive Report on the Situation of the Seventh Round of Inspections by the 20th Central Committee.' It particularly emphasised that central and state agencies are the frontline in upholding the 'Two Upholds' and must enhance their political accountability in fulfilling their responsibilities. The meeting called for continued deepening of reform efforts, strengthening the prevention and control of risks at their source, and better coordinating development with security. It also stressed the importance of building strong leadership teams, strictly implementing political responsibilities for party governance, maintaining a high-pressure stance against corruption, and consistently upholding a strict approach throughout. In simpler terms, what concerns me, Xi Jinping, the most is you people working right under my nose in the heart of the imperial city; don’t think I’m oblivious. You have the most insiders here, presenting one face while hiding another behind the scenes; be cautious, as I might just put you on a list.
These three signals are interconnected, all involving Xi Jinping personally taking charge—setting the agenda, establishing the tone, drawing red lines and issuing warnings, unifying thoughts through theoretical propaganda, and ultimately using inspections and rectifications to demonstrate strength. The underlying logic is clear: this rectification is not an end, but rather a new beginning, and it is far from over.
Hu Chunhua appears to have gone off the radar; is Xi Jinping eliminating the Youth League faction?
While the Political Bureau meeting has been consistently vocal, Xi Jinping has revived the historical narrative surrounding the Zunyi Conference. On October 22, a conference was held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army's Long March. Xi Jinping attended and delivered a speech, emphasising the importance of advancing strict governance of the Party, being willing to fight, and maintaining the Party's absolute leadership over the military. He highlighted the decisive role of the Zunyi Conference in establishing Mao Zedong's leadership within the Party Central Committee and the Red Army, drawing a historical comparison with the 'two establishments' and 'two safeguards.' Seven members of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, along with national-level officials in Beijing, made a collective appearance, showcasing a high level of formality and unity. This was intended to create a political atmosphere for the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee, leveraging the spirit of the Long March while reinforcing the historical legitimacy and long-term authority of the core leadership.
In a striking contrast to his frail and limping appearance during foreign visits, as well as the aftereffects of a stroke, Xi Jinping was seen in footage walking briskly and confidently to the podium, seemingly unaware of his surroundings and leaving the six Standing Committee members several meters behind. The national-level officials nearby applauded continuously, yet Xi did not acknowledge them. Netizens remarked that Xi walked as if he were indifferent to his kin, displaying a cold and unfeeling demeanour. The stark difference in Xi Jinping's physical condition between his appearances abroad and in Beijing has left many puzzled; how could such a contrast exist? It is likely that in the capital, he is tapping into the dark energy of the Communist Party's oppressive atmosphere, temporarily gaining a surge of malevolent power.
A detail from the conference footage quickly attracted attention: Hu Chunhua, Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), was absent from his designated spot on the podium. According to the ranking of CPPCC vice chairpersons, Hu should have been seated before Shen Yueyue and Wang Yong, but CCTV footage showed that only the latter two were present in that area. There have been no recent official reports indicating that Hu Chunhua has travelled outside Beijing for research or foreign visits, and the CPPCC website still lists him as vice chairman. This absence has led to rumours of 'disappearance' and 'the whole family missing' circulating among overseas media and observers, particularly after Du Wen, a former insider from the Inner Mongolia system who once worked under Hu Chunhua, disclosed that Hu Chunhua has indeed been confirmed missing.
As one of the potential successors designated by Hu Jintao during the Hu-Wen era, Hu Chunhua was once the most prominent political star of the Communist Youth League faction before the 19th National Congress. His political career exemplified the traditions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prior to the Xi Jinping era, characterised by collective leadership and power transition models. However, at the 20th National Congress, he witnessed Hu Jintao being escorted away, and at the relatively young age of 59, he not only missed out on a position on the Standing Committee but also withdrew from the Politburo, taking on the role of Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. This situation can be seen less as a soft landing and more as a form of political exile and marginalization. For Xi Jinping, who is known for his severe paranoia, marginalisation does not eliminate risks unless one physically disappears or is imprisoned politically. Hu Chunhua's very presence serves as a historical reminder of an alternative mode of power dynamics, representing a template for the logic behind the CCP's 'designated successor' system. Additionally, the timely emergence of overseas opinions advocating for Hu Chunhua's political comeback has further unsettled Xi Jinping. While it may seem that Hu Chunhua has not faced a real crisis this time, the signs of public opinion indicate that he has not alleviated the associated risks at all.
Thus, Hu Chunhua's 'disappearance' essentially represents the final purge or warning of Xi Jinping's long-term power strategy against the remnants of the political spectrum. The remnants of the Youth League faction, local interest networks, and even former high-ranking officials who retain some social visibility and potential political activity after retirement have all been categorised under 'discussing the central authority without authorisation' for preventive measures. Xi Jinping's discomfort regarding Hu Chunhua is not based on his current influence, but rather on a wariness of the political possibilities he embodies. Despite losing the lustre of a political star, as long as this symbol persists, there remains the potential for reinterpretation, re-mobilisation, and the generation of public opinion impacts and political perceptions. To cut the grass, one must eliminate the roots.
Xi Jinping's speech commemorating the 90th anniversary of the Long March, coupled with Hu Chunhua's absence, creates another political closed loop for understanding Xi Jinping's power dynamics. Through the historical narrative of the Zunyi Conference, Xi Jinping sanctifies and extends his core status, while Hu Chunhua's absence, reminiscent of a discarded crown prince, signals the authorities' resolve to eradicate any potential power challenges, even if they are just rumours, without showing any leniency. The long-termism of power, intertwined with the CCP's gangland politics, necessitates historical rituals to provide legitimacy, as well as continuous purges to sustain fear and political compliance within the bureaucracy.
With Huang Qifan and Xia Linmao both falling from power in quick succession, the atmosphere in Beijing has turned grim, with attendance at the Fifth Plenary Session reaching a new low.
Around October 13, Huang Qifan, the former mayor of Chongqing, was announced to be under investigation for serious disciplinary violations. Known as the 'political weeble,' he remained active as an economist nearly a decade after leaving office but ultimately failed to 'land safely.' Almost concurrently, Xia Linmao, a member of the Beijing Municipal Standing Committee, Executive Vice Mayor, and a candidate member of the 20th Central Committee, was also dismissed. These simultaneous actions in Chongqing and Beijing, along with the earlier dismissals or investigations of several Central Committee members and candidate members, have resulted in a continuous decline in the actual number of sitting members of the Central Committee.
According to an analysis report from the U.S.-Asia Society, among the 205 Central Committee members and 171 candidate members elected during the 20th National Congress, a significant number have already been expelled, are under investigation, or are 'missing' (including military personnel). Considering individual cases of dismissal and death, it is anticipated that around 161 Central Committee members and 130 candidate members will attend the Fifth Plenary Session, totalling 291 individuals, which corresponds to an attendance rate of approximately 77.4%. Should any individuals under investigation be formally expelled before or during the meeting, the number of candidate member replacements could set a record for a single plenary session since the post-Mao Zedong era. Last year's attendance rate of 83.8% at the Fourth Plenary Session was already viewed as a historical low, and a further decline this year would make the 'integrity of the Central Committee' a crucial indicator for external observers assessing the concentration of power.
The decline in attendance can be attributed to the combined effects of stringent anti-corruption measures, intensified political struggles, and the re-concentration of power. The Politburo meetings have repeatedly stressed the importance of 'maintaining a high-pressure stance against corruption,' 'taking decisive action and implementing real changes,' and 'consistently upholding a strict tone.' As a result, the atmosphere within Beijing's political circles has become increasingly strange and oppressive. It is expected that the process of reviewing the draft 'Decision' at the Fifth Plenary Session will serve as a litmus test for loyalty to Xi Jinping's political agenda.
Nevertheless, human plans are ultimately no match for the will of the heavens. Xi Jinping's long-term strategy for consolidating power is likely to result in prolonged political purges and economic decline. From another perspective, could this not also be seen as a divine way of bringing an end to the Chinese Communist Party?
(First published by People News) △
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