Zhang Youxia and Li Qiang Again Show Abnormal Signs

Zhang Youxia (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images) 

[People News] The CCP’s September 3rd military parade has concluded. During the event, aside from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin’s casual chat about organ transplants that sparked widespread attention, the appearance of Zhang Youxia—the CCP’s only current Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission—standing in the front row on Tiananmen Gate alongside state-level leaders to watch the parade, has fueled outside speculation that his status has indeed risen. Rumors that after the Third Plenum in July last year Zhang, with the backing of CCP elders, gained control over the military are clearly not groundless. Xi’s surface-level prestige cannot conceal the desolation of his lost power.

According to CCP state media, on September 10 in Beijing, a ceremony was held to award titles to the astronauts of Shenzhou 18 and Shenzhou 19. Zhang Youxia “on behalf of Chairman Xi Jinping and the Central Military Commission, extended warm congratulations to the six astronauts receiving honors,” conveyed greetings to all personnel on the space front, and presented them with medals and certificates. The report did not mention any of Zhang’s remarks—highly unusual. Was it because his speech lacked words of loyalty to Xi, raising fears of fresh interpretation?

In 2024, also on September 10, a similar ceremony was held in Beijing to award titles to the astronauts of Shenzhou 16 and Shenzhou 17. The state media reports were nearly identical and likewise omitted any reference to Zhang’s speech. At such a public event, Zhang’s behavior was clearly abnormal. Having been steeped in the CCP bureaucracy for decades, and having presided over such award ceremonies before, how could Zhang not know the importance of ritualistic official phrasing?

Official records show that the Aerospace Meritorious Medal is awarded to astronauts by the CCP. The medal is decided jointly by the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission, and comes in three classes. For the first three occasions, the medal was personally awarded by the CCP General Secretary and CMC Chairman; from the fourth to the tenth, it was presented by a Vice Chairman of the CMC.

On September 25, 2023, the CCP held a grand ceremony for astronauts of Shenzhou 12 through Shenzhou 15. In January 2017, a ceremony honored Shenzhou 11 astronauts. In August 2013, another honored the Shenzhou 10 crew. All three ceremonies occurred after Xi came to power and were presided over by then–CMC Vice Chairmen He Weidong and Xu Qiliang.

At the 2023 ceremony, He Weidong first emphasized the need to “resolutely implement the decisions of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Xi on building a space power, keep firmly in mind the mission and trust… and contribute wisdom and strength to realizing the Chinese Dream and the dream of a strong military.” He then highlighted Xi’s care and attention to the space program: personally inspecting launch sites, speaking with astronauts from Earth to space, warmly meeting with research and testing representatives, and repeatedly sending congratulatory telegrams.

At the 2017 ceremony, Xu Qiliang stressed that “from the height of safeguarding the core and following in step, we must always keep in mind the trust to build a space power and a global science and technology power.” He said that since the space laboratory missions began, Xi had “personally congratulated the successful launch of Shenzhou 11, personally spoken with the astronauts, warmly met them and relevant representatives, and delivered important remarks”—all reflecting Xi’s “determination to advance the space enterprise” and his “deep care and earnest expectations” for space personnel.

Likewise, at the August 20, 2013, ceremony for Shenzhou 10, Xu Qiliang stressed “resolutely implementing the major decisions and instructions of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Xi, and continuously opening new chapters in manned space development.” He added that Xi and other top leaders had met astronauts and project staff, “fully demonstrating their great importance to the manned space enterprise, their encouragement to the astronauts, and their care for space personnel.”

From Xu Qiliang to He Weidong, both never failed to heap praise on Xi and pledge loyalty in such settings. But when it comes to Zhang Youxia, the situation has completely changed. For two consecutive years, he has not mentioned Xi’s concern for space, nor uttered words of loyalty. To so blatantly disregard the CMC Chairman—what does this imply? Is Xi truly in command of the military?

Every detail signals that the CCP top ranks are in fact sending messages to the outside world: pay attention to who is really in charge; don’t be fooled by surface-level theatrics.

Recently, aside from Zhang Youxia’s abnormal conduct at the awards ceremonies, Premier Li Qiang has also shown anomalies. On September 9, major CCP state media published the news that “Xi Jinping replied in a letter to encourage representatives of national special-post teachers.” On the eve of the CCP’s Teachers’ Day, it is routine for the Party leader to stage such gestures.

But in this report, not only was Xi’s letter content mentioned, it also included Li Qiang’s instructions on the work of special-post teachers, along with the content of his instructions, and even featured his name in the headline. To the author’s recollection, at least in the past five years, reports about Xi’s letters to various groups have always been standalone pieces, never combined with other leaders.

This year, however, Li Qiang was “inserted” into the coverage of Xi’s letter and even issued directives. Does this indicate that on this topic Li Qiang actually holds the real power, while Xi’s role is nearly ornamental?

Another noteworthy detail: in past years, Xi Jinping would always “on behalf of the Party Central Committee” extend holiday greetings to teachers nationwide. Yet this year’s report on Xi’s letter to the special-post teachers omitted the phrase “on behalf of the Party Central Committee.” Does this mean Xi can no longer represent the “Party Central Committee”?

All these signs point to one thing: Xi’s status within the CCP—both in the Party and in the military—has indeed changed. How much longer can the regime conceal it?