This Major Divide Has Driven Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping Apart

Zhang Youxia

[People News] Within the CCP military, the hawks and the doves have long been engaged in both open and hidden struggles. Some analyses point out that Xi Jinping, chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), is hawkish by nature, while the CMC vice chairman has shifted from hawk to dove. This major divide has caused the two men to drift further apart until they went their separate ways, with Zhang Youxia becoming another force within the military. The divergence between Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia could have a significant impact on the Taiwan issue.

The CCP military adheres to the principle of “the Party commands the gun.” After Xi came to power, he raised the slogan of the “Strong Army Dream,” signalling that the PLA must be “ready for war at any time.” He carried out a major reshuffle of the military, turning seven military regions into five theatre commands. He demanded that the army “be able to fight and win wars,” while military spending increased every year.

Independent scholar and columnist Wu Zuolai pointed out in a Taiwan Radio article on September 23 that after Xi took power, he consolidated authority through a sweeping anti-corruption campaign and the establishment of the “Chairman Responsibility System” for the CMC, concentrating Party, government, and military power in his own hands. Xi has an especially hawkish orientation.

Outside analysts believe Xi’s ultimate goal in seeking re-election is the unification of Taiwan, and that the CCP is very likely to use force to take Taiwan in 2027. The reason is that 2027 marks the so-called centennial of the founding of the PLA, envisioned as a symbolic milestone for the “Chinese Dream.” The hawks are therefore excited, wanting a quick, decisive blitzkrieg to resolve the Taiwan issue.

The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war further served as a reference model for the hawks: if Russia could quickly establish a fait accompli, the same approach could be applied to the Taiwan Strait.

Wu Zuolai believes that Defence Minister Dong Jun is seen as Xi’s proxy within the military. Dong Jun has repeatedly released hardline messages on Taiwan internationally.

2024 Shangri-La Dialogue: In a speech in Singapore, he declared, “Taiwan independence separatists will bring about their own destruction,” named external forces as “salami-slicing away at the One-China principle,” and stated, “We will take resolute action when necessary.”

2025 Xiangshan Forum: In Beijing, he incorporated “Taiwan’s return' into the post-WWII international order, emphasising that history and law were “indisputable,” and said China would “defeat any external military interference at any time.”

It is noteworthy that Dong Jun, who was appointed defence minister on December 29, 2023, replacing the suddenly dismissed Li Shangfu, has still not been promoted to Central Committee membership nor made a State Councillor. Since the 1980s, it has generally been the case that the defence minister is also a State Councillor and a senior CMC member in charge of daily work. Analysts suggest this shows Dong Jun faces resistance within the military, which has been an embarrassment to Xi, who promoted him.

Other hawks have also spoken out loudly in public opinion:

Dai Xu (Air Force Senior Colonel, National Defence University professor): Long advocated for a new-type military and the “Eagle Strike Strategy,” repeatedly calling for tougher actions in the South China Sea, arguing “unification cannot be endlessly delayed.”

Wang Hongguang (former deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region, lieutenant general): Wrote in 2018 that “armed reunification could be achieved in three days.”

Luo Yuan (Deputy Director of the World Military Research Department, Academy of Military Sciences, researcher): In 2019 declared that “armed reunification has entered the countdown,” and wrote that if Taiwan does not accept “One Country, Two Systems,” the option is armed unification, after which “One Country, One System” would be implemented.

Wu Zuolai analyses that the military is not monolithic. Many commanders who grew up during the reform and opening-up era feel the pace is too fast. On the Taiwan issue, there is a deep divide within the PLA leadership. The most representative doves opposing the hawks are Liu Yazhou and Liu Yuan.

Liu Yazhou (former Political Commissar of the National Defence University): In essays such as Another Sacrifice in 1644 and Review of the Battle of Kinmen, he examined historical battles with an anti-war perspective, arguing that the costs of a Taiwan Strait war are unbearable and foreign intervention unavoidable. He advocated achieving victory through politics, united front work, and diplomacy — “to subdue the enemy without fighting.” While not directly challenging the political orthodoxy of “liberating Taiwan,” he pointed out the dangers of adventurism.

Liu Yuan (former Political Commissar of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, former Political Commissar of the General Logistics Department): In a 2013 essay reviewing how China’s modernisation was repeatedly interrupted by war, he emphasised that the current “period of strategic opportunity” must not be lost. With the U.S. and Japan trying to contain China, he argued China must “grit its teeth to run the final stretch,” treating war only as a last resort. The dove consensus is that waging war before China surpasses the U.S. in comprehensive strength would be disastrous.

It has now been confirmed by multiple sources that Liu Yazhou has been sentenced to life imprisonment.

On March 15 last year, exiled Chinese political scientist Wang Juntao disclosed to The Dajiyuan, after confirming with Liu Yazhou’s relatives, that the former National Defence University political commissar had indeed been sentenced to life.

In April, exiled legal scholar Yuan Hongbing in Australia also revealed on Kan Zhongguo’s Yuan Hongbing Hotspot program that, before the “Two Sessions,” Xi personally instructed a CCDI deputy secretary to talk to red princelings Liu Yuan and Deng Pufang, demanding they “consider the overall situation” and refrain from activities undermining “Xi as the core.”

The deputy secretary then specifically briefed Liu Yuan and Deng Pufang on Liu Yazhou’s case, stating that Liu Yazhou’s political charge, secretly circulated among senior Party and military ranks, was “anti-Party and disrupting the military” — namely, attacking Xi’s “strategic decision” on Taiwan and spreading defeatist rhetoric about the Taiwan war to “shake military morale.”

According to Yuan Hongbing, Xi was clearly using the Liu Yazhou case to intimidate red princelings against resisting the “Xi core.” On the other hand, the political charge pinned on Liu Yazhou also highlights Xi’s strategic focus remaining on war in the Taiwan Strait, not economic development.

Liu Yuan, once one of the most powerful princelings, had helped Hu Jintao bring down corrupt “tigers” like Gu Junshan. He was also once Xi’s strongest ally in the military anti-corruption campaign. Yet when big military figures like Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were toppled, instead of being promoted to the CMC or becoming its Discipline Inspection secretary as many expected, Liu Yuan was sidelined to a position in the NPC Standing Committee. He has since faded from the political scene.

The most critical figure is Zhang Youxia. How did he transform from a hawk into a dove?

Wu Zuolai observed that after the Third Plenary Session last year, Zhang’s stance shifted significantly. His speeches at successive Xiangshan Forums displayed dovish tendencies:

2023 – Hardline: At the opening of the 10th Xiangshan Forum, CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia declared, “The Taiwan issue is the core of China’s core interests… We will never agree, never show mercy,” making international headlines.

2024 – Shift: At the 11th Xiangshan Forum welcome banquet, he instead emphasised the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and “cooperative security,” with official reports barely mentioning Taiwan.

2025 – Continuation: At the 12th Xiangshan Forum, he completely avoided “armed reunification” rhetoric, instead stressing “jointly safeguarding order and promoting peace and development.” Whether this shift reflects propaganda tactics or genuine resistance within CMC leadership to adventurism is uncertain, but it echoes Liu Yuan and Liu Yazhou’s “caution—avoid war” logic.

Wu Zuolai analyses that Xi’s “strong military thought” aligns closely with hawkish generals. Therefore, his military reforms and promotions have focused on loyalty and readiness for war, which clash with dovish calls for caution. Whether driven by personal or factional interests, or a belief that “hiding capabilities” best serves China’s development window, Xi’s war-preparation thinking faces major resistance in the military.

Lacking authority within the military, Xi tried to assert himself as the supreme commander by loudly promoting the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System,” distributing handbooks, and having the Political Work Department push songs like Be a Good Soldier for Chairman Xi (2017).

Wu Zuolai argues that Xi has used administrative and propaganda means, plus fast-tracking loyalists into senior posts, to test their loyalty through public statements. But with Dong Jun still unable to join the CMC and Xi’s aide Zhong Shaojun leaving his post as director of the CMC General Office, it shows hawks have not formed a solid majority and have instead been sidelined in purges. Figures like Zhang Yang “taking his own life,” Miao Hua being dismissed, and He Weidong disappearing illustrate this.

Wu Zuolai points out that since the Third Plenary Session, Xi’s protégés have been purged, while doves represented by Zhang Youxia have gradually seized real power.

Today, the army no longer sings Be a Good Soldier for Chairman Xi, and the high-profile calls to “be ready for war anytime” have faded. The PLA Daily has run essays promoting “democratic centralism,” stressing Party discipline and principles, opposing one-man rule, and even distributing a Democratic Centralism Handbook in the military — widely seen as veiled resistance to the “Chairman Responsibility System.”

Wu Zuolai argues that Zhang Youxia’s turn from hawk to dove came after the Third Plenum: he stopped advocating the Chairman Responsibility System, no longer highlighted the “two upholds” (supporting Xi as the core and his authority), and avoided Taiwan war talk. Even when citing Xi’s instructions, they were general and did not back up Xi’s special prerogatives. This was not just Zhang’s personal change but the external expression of another force in the military.

Wu concludes that both personnel shifts and rhetoric show a principled divide between hawkish warmongers and dovish cautionists. Beneath the appearance of unity, real power and discourse within the PLA are being restructured. This split not only affects CCP security and civil-military relations but will also deeply influence the trajectory of the Taiwan issue.

With China’s economy in steep decline, unemployment surging, and a population crisis threatening unrest, many analysts believe Xi may gamble everything — even knowing the risks are enormous — and launch a war on Taiwan to divert domestic contradictions.

Wu Yijun, founder of the think tank Stone Institute, recently wrote in Taiwan’s Up Media that the real risk for Taiwan lies not in whether the CCP calculates that “invading Taiwan is cost-ineffective,” but in whether Xi will “bet despite knowing it is cost-ineffective” — and whether he has the mobilisation capacity to do so.

In Xi’s political report to the 20th Party Congress, the discussion of “achieving the complete reunification of the motherland” mainly included these lines: “We will strive with the greatest sincerity and utmost effort for peaceful reunification, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures.” “Complete reunification of the motherland must and will be achieved!”

But external observers question whether, even if Xi risks everything, the concurrent purges have already crippled the military. Statistics show that among the 79 generals promoted since Xi took power, 10 have been officially dismissed or fallen, and at least 16 more are rumoured to be implicated, totalling 26 — over 30 percent. With such upheaval in the ranks, can Xi still launch “armed reunification” of Taiwan? △