File photo of Zhang Youxia (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)
[People News] According to reports by mainland official media Xinhua News Agency, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Central Committee was held on January 12. Xi Jinping and the other six members of the Standing Committee all attended, and Xi also delivered a speech. Because corruption within the CCP is entirely a systemic problem and the CCP becomes more corrupt the more it claims to fight corruption, the anti-corruption content of the plenary session itself was not particularly noteworthy. What is worth examining is the content of Xi’s speech and the official media reporting, which once again revealed the true status of Xi and Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
The first paragraph of the report summarizes the core points of Xi’s speech. Xi emphasized that it is necessary to “uphold and strengthen the Party’s overall leadership,” and to “more resolutely and forcefully implement the major decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee.” Only after that did he address how to “lock power into the cage of institutions” and “advance the anti-corruption struggle.”
However, in the report on the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCDI convened on January 6, 2025, the opening paragraph highlighted Xi’s emphasis on high-pressure anti-corruption. Likewise, in the report on the Third Plenary Session of the CCDI on January 8, 2024, the opening paragraph also emphasized anti-corruption. In other words, at this year’s CCDI plenary session, Xi highlighted “Party leadership” and the “Party Central Committee,” which had not been emphasized in previous plenary sessions.
After setting the tone at the outset, Xi repeatedly mentioned the “Party Central Committee” in this year’s speech. For example, when discussing the achievements of anti-corruption work in 2025, he said that the CCDI “strongly safeguarded the implementation of the major decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee, and solidly carried out in-depth study and education on thoroughly implementing the spirit of the Central Eight Provisions.”
When discussing the requirements for 2026, he emphasized that the CCDI must “implement the major decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee, which is the fundamental requirement for upholding the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralized and unified leadership,” must “make good use of inspection results and strengthen supervision of rectification to ensure that the major decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee are implemented,” and that “all regions and departments should, in light of actual conditions, conscientiously explore effective methods and pathways for implementing the major decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee.”
When speaking of “self-revolution focusing on governing power and destiny,” he said that after the 18th National Congress of the CCP, “the Party Central Committee opened the situation by formulating and implementing the Central Eight Provisions,” and that the CCP has “successfully blazed a so-called anti-corruption path under the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.”
Including the opening paragraph, excerpts of Xi Jinping’s speech mentioned “the Party Central Committee” eight times and “the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee” twice. This is extremely rare in reports of previous plenary sessions.
For example, in the report on the Fourth Plenary Session in 2025, Xi mentioned “the Party Central Committee” four times and “the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee” once; in the report on the Third Plenary Session in 2024, Xi mentioned “the Party Central Committee” three times and “the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee” once.
Emphasizing “the Party Central Committee” and “the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee” is the general direction determined after the CCP’s Fourth Plenary Session, and is what all senior officials and official media have been saying and reporting. Before this, a most obvious example was the report on the meeting of the CCP Central Politburo Standing Committee held on January 8, where the fact that “the Party Central Committee” holds a higher position than Xi was no longer concealed. This CCDI plenary session report once again confirms Xi’s position within the CCP leadership: he is no longer the “one supreme leader,” must follow a “collective leadership” model, and must obey directives from the “Party Central Committee,” which stands above Xi.
In addition, there are other signs indicating the weakening of Xi’s power:
First, this year’s report did not mention the “seven haves” regarding ignoring the CCP’s political discipline and political rules, which Xi Jinping pointed out at the second plenary session of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee. In previous CCDI plenary sessions, this was always mentioned. Could it be that some of those formulations, such as “recklessly discussing the central authorities,” are no longer appropriate?
Second, in this year’s and last year’s reports, Xi’s speech did not mention “Xi Thought” or the loyalty slogans of “two establishes, four consciousnesses, four confidences, and two safeguards,” whereas “two establishes, four consciousnesses, four confidences, and two safeguards” appeared only in CCDI Secretary Li Xi’s summary. In Xi’s 2024 speech, however, such expressions did appear, at a time when Xi had not yet encountered trouble.
Third, Xi’s close associate and former Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui once again did not attend the meeting, confirming that rumors of his imminent “downfall” are not groundless.
While the CCP is conveying signals of the weakening of Xi Jinping’s status to the outside world through official media, it is also telling the outside world the true status of Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, who is rumored to hold real power over the military.
At the end of the official media report, when listing attendees, the order is as follows: members of the CCP Central Politburo, secretaries of the Central Secretariat, vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, relevant leaders of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, state councilors, the president of the Supreme People’s Court, the procurator-general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, relevant leaders of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and members of the Central Military Commission attended the meeting. What differs from previous plenary sessions is that “vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission” were listed separately.
This is the second time official media has shown such an “anomaly.” The first time was at the Central Economic Work Conference held in Beijing on December 10–11 last year, when Xinhua’s report also for the first time listed “vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission” separately.
Does the “vice chairman of the Central Military Commission” here refer to Zhang Youxia, or to Zhang Shengmin, who has just been promoted to vice chairman of the Central Military Commission but is not a Politburo member?
If it refers to Zhang Youxia, this is obviously intentional, because Zhang Youxia himself is already a Politburo member, and there would be no need to list him separately by his identity as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Yet despite knowing this, he was still listed separately. If Zhang Youxia did not indeed hold real power over the military, such a situation clearly would not have occurred.
If it refers to Zhang Shengmin, this would mean that he may be added as a Politburo member at the next CCP Central Committee plenary session. Because he has assisted Zhang Youxia within the military in taking down several of Xi’s close military associates, his promotion also reflects the solidity of Zhang Youxia’s position within the military.
Amid internal troubles and external pressures, in what direction will the changes at the top of the CCP go?
(People News exclusive first publication) △
News magazine bootstrap themes!
I like this themes, fast loading and look profesional
Thank you Carlos!
You're welcome!
Please support me with give positive rating!
Yes Sure!