[People News] After Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were absent from the opening ceremony of the CCP provincial- and ministerial-level officials study session on January 20, only four days passed before a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that the two had been placed under case-filing review and investigation, with their issues being characterized on the same day. Such rapid handling broke the CCP’s usual practice of delaying official announcements after senior officials “disappear,” and, at the start of the new year, unexpectedly shattered the political stalemate that Zhongnanhai had been struggling to maintain. Internal contradictions within the CCP have reached a point of irreconcilability and can no longer be concealed. The public exposure of internal splits signals that the CCP’s effort to preserve the Party is facing failure and is entering its final endgame.

Brutal Infighting No Longer Concealable

At the CCP’s Fourth Plenum in October 2025, the CCP military announced in advance the downfall of figures such as He Weidong and Miao Hua. However, the attempted forced power grab failed, and the Party leader did not lose any of his titles. Zhang Shengmin was elevated to vice chairman of the Central Military Commission but failed to become a Politburo member. Behind this political stalemate, a massive crisis had long been brewing.

Now, with Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli under investigation, the struggle over military power has undergone another sudden shift. This effectively confirms the confrontation over the past year or more between the “Party Central” and the Central Military Commission. This time, the Ministry of National Defense spokesperson announced the “Party Central’s” decision to investigate Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, differing from previous similar announcements.

More than three months ago, on October 17, 2025, the Ministry of National Defense spokesperson stated that, “upon approval by the Party Central and the Central Military Commission,” the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission and Supervisory Commission had “successively opened cases and investigations” into nine individuals including He Weidong, Miao Hua, and He Hongjun. They were confirmed to have “seriously violated Party discipline and to be suspected of serious duty-related crimes involving exceptionally large sums.” Accordingly, the “Party Central” decided to expel the nine from the Party, and the Central Military Commission decided to expel them from the military.

This time, however, the Ministry of National Defense spokesperson merely stated that, after deliberation by the “Party Central,” it was decided to open cases and investigations into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, with no mention of “approval by the Central Military Commission”—clearly omitting a key step. The current “Central Military Commission” consists only of Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin. If “approval by the Central Military Commission” were mentioned, it would amount to saying that Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin approved the arrest of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli—but the announcement deliberately avoided this point. The crude wording may represent a feeble attempt at concealment, or it may suggest deeper underlying circumstances.

In any case, CCP infighting has now been openly exposed, with previous layers of cover suddenly torn away. Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli may have been preparing to force another showdown ahead of the CCP’s Two Sessions, only to be struck down first. The struggle over military power has once again reached an unprecedented level of intensity. The confrontation between different forces has become irreconcilable, and the sudden use of drastic measures has fully laid bare the CCP’s life-or-death internal struggle.

Who Moved to Arrest Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli?

Recent rumors suggest that Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection may all have been behind the arrests of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. If so, this would mean that CCP internal rules have been completely broken, amounting to non-military forces forcibly intervening in military affairs.

Previous official announcements regarding investigations into He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others were described as being carried out by the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, not the CCDI. Zhang Shengmin has long been in charge of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission and should have overseen the investigations into He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others. However, this time, when the Ministry of National Defense spokesperson announced the investigation into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, there was no mention of approval by the Central Military Commission, raising doubts as to whether the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission alone is handling the case.

If personnel from the Central Guard Bureau, the Ministry of Public Security, the CCDI, or even the Ministry of State Security were involved in arresting Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, they would inevitably fear “letting the tiger return to the mountain” and would be unlikely to readily hand the two back to the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission for investigation. If Xi Jinping were to mobilize forces outside the military to launch a fierce counterattack in an attempt to reclaim control of the armed forces, it would amount to an admission that he lacks anyone within the military he can truly rely on or trust. The outcome would remain highly uncertain.

Operationally, it is extremely difficult for non-military personnel to arrest military generals. Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli would not have been without precautions, and their personal guards would not have surrendered easily. However, when attending central meetings or events, they would be separated from their own security details and enter the control of the Central Guard Bureau, leaving them with little choice. For example, on January 20, if they traveled with other senior CCP officials to the Central Party School to attend the opening ceremony of the provincial- and ministerial-level officials study session, they could have been taken into custody by non-military forces.

If Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli remain under the control of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission, then Zhang Shengmin should, as before, oversee their investigations, and the cases would still fall under internal military handling. What happens next will depend on whether Zhang Shengmin acts solely on Xi Jinping’s instructions or whether other directives come into play.

The outside world generally does not wish to see Xi Jinping or the Xi faction overturn the situation at this point. Many recent rumors appear to bear the marks of deliberate information leaks by the Xi faction, suggesting instead that the Xi camp does not truly control the overall situation and is forced to repeatedly steer narratives through overseas platforms. This leaves open another possibility: that the arrest of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli was not led by the Xi faction, but rather undertaken reluctantly by CCP elders.

If Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were preparing to force another showdown at the CCP’s Two Sessions, they would have needed to notify the Party elders in advance and declare that they would no longer compromise. In order to preserve the Party, the elders would have had no choice but to restrain the two to prevent the principle of “the Party commands the gun” from collapsing and to avert greater chaos. As a result, any temporary power alignment between Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and the elders would have dissolved. Perhaps for this reason, when the Ministry of National Defense spokesperson made the announcement, only the “Party Central” was mentioned, and not the “Central Military Commission.”

How to Clean Up the Endgame

No one expected that the political stalemate the CCP had tried to conceal would be so quickly broken by its own actions at the beginning of 2026. The communiqué of the CCDI’s Fifth Plenary Session on January 14 still spoke of maintaining “unity,” yet just ten days later the political winds abruptly shifted. The seven-member Central Military Commission was reduced to two members, and the military governance structure became an endgame—one that may evolve into an endgame for the CCP regime itself.

The political stalemate at the CCP’s Fourth Plenum in October 2025 had already sealed a deadlock, but the fierce developments just over three months later still exceeded outside expectations.

If this was a counterattack planned and executed by the Xi faction, it would represent a desperate struggle for survival. Whether it can truly reclaim control of the military, however, remains uncertain. Most of the full generals personally promoted by Xi Jinping have already been lost. Even if another group of lieutenant generals were forcibly elevated, there is no guarantee they would genuinely stand with Xi. Especially after watching their predecessors fall one by one, they would be even less likely to pledge true loyalty to anyone.

Around midnight on January 24, the PLA’s official media published an article titled People’s Liberation Army Daily Editorial: Resolutely Win the Tough, Protracted, and Overall Battle Against Military Corruption. This editorial in the PLA newspaper cited Xinhua News Agency as its source, yet it did not immediately appear on Xinhua’s homepage.

On the very day Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were officially announced as being under investigation, the article swiftly characterized the “handling of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli” as a “major achievement in the anti-corruption struggle.” It further stated that they had “seriously trampled upon and undermined the system of responsibility of the CMC chairman, seriously fueled and affected the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, and endangered the Party’s governing foundation… seriously damaged the image and authority of the CMC leadership… caused enormous damage… and produced extremely negative influence,” and demanded that all officers and soldiers “resolutely support the Party Central’s decision.”

Such wording is far more severe than that used in the cases of He Weidong and Miao Hua, and it effectively passes judgment before any investigation, appearing overly impatient. If this framing fails to gain genuine acceptance within the military, an even greater crisis may emerge. While the editorial’s language appears harsh, it actually reveals deep anxiety within Zhongnanhai and suggests a lack of clarity on how to clean up the next stage of this political endgame.

If the Xi faction’s counterattack succeeds, those targeted would likely also include CCP elders, especially figures from the Communist Youth League faction, meaning that a storm of bloodshed may only just be beginning. Even if the Xi faction did not truly lead this investigation, it may still seek to exploit the situation to overturn the balance, forcing the elders to respond. Beijing’s political turmoil will remain unavoidable, and in the end, who can “lock whose power into a cage” may become an unmanageable political endgame.

At the start of 2026, as the CCP’s fierce internal struggle rapidly becomes public, it is reasonable to expect that the CCP’s political endgame will more quickly lead to the final outcome of the red dynasty.

— The Dajiyuan
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