On March 8, 2024, military representatives attending the National People&9;s Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) arrived outside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)
[People News] In recent days, the announcement regarding the investigation of Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, has attracted significant attention both at home and abroad. Some analysts suggest that this indicates Xi Jinping still retains control over military and party power, and that earlier reports of Xi losing such power were merely exaggerated. But is this truly the case?
Firstly, if Xi genuinely holds military power, he would not need to be so cautious of Zhang Youxia, who had previously supported him during the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, nor would he be so determined to remove him from power.
Secondly, if Xi indeed possesses military and party authority, after his swift removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli—without the usual Politburo meeting to discuss it—one would expect official media, military outlets, and officials from the Politburo Standing Committee down to provincial leaders to promptly express their loyalty. However, the reality is that both official and military media have exhibited unusual behaviour; high-ranking officials are silent and unwilling to take a stance; and there is evident dissatisfaction within the military, leading to unrest.
1. Abnormalities in Official and Military Media.
The author learned from a retired director of a provincial party committee office that after the Chinese military officially announced the investigation of Zhang and Liu on the afternoon of January 24, retired senior officials were instructed to watch the evening CCTV 'News Broadcast,' suggesting that a significant announcement was forthcoming. Strangely, the evening 'News Broadcast' did not cover the investigation of Zhang and Liu. What is happening here?
On January 25, CCTV did not report on the investigations of Zhang and Liu, but it did air an excerpt from an editorial published by the PLA Daily that specifically addressed the 'anti-corruption struggle' involving Zhang and Liu. The report was largely composed of quotes from the editorial, indicating that CCTV is still avoiding a direct stance, with oversight from the Publicity Department of the Communist Party. What is happening here?
Typically, at this pivotal moment when Xi appears to have secured a victory, one would expect the official and military media of the Communist Party to rally in support of him to show loyalty. However, it is noteworthy that both the official and military media have exhibited considerable restraint, lacking any overwhelming articles in support of Xi. Following several news reports about Xi that dominated the screens on the 24th and 25th, a different perspective emerged on the 25th, and by the 26th, there were even signs of diminishing emphasis on Xi.
Specifically, on January 25, while the military network and military newspaper published an editorial criticising Zhang and Liu, they also reported on the recent issuance of the 'Regulations on the Election Work of Party Organizations in the Army' by the Central Military Commission. The report indicated that the 'Regulations' adhere to 'Xi Jinping Thought as guidance' and 'the Party Constitution as the fundamental guideline,' without the loyalty to Xi that was mentioned in the editorial.
Why do I say this? Let's examine the news reports from the time when Xi 'Yizun' held absolute power and the Central Military Commission issued regulations. A report dated March 1, 2022, stated that the General Office of the Central Military Commission had recently issued the 'Regulations on the Supervision and Enforcement of Discipline and Law by Military Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Agencies.' These 'Regulations' are guided by 'Xi Thought,' emphasising the need to 'deeply implement Xi Jinping's strong military thought and comprehensively enforce the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission.' The introduction and enforcement of these 'Regulations' are vital for executing the decisions and directives of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi regarding the reform of the military disciplinary inspection and supervision system....
Similarly, a report from March 2021 indicated that the Central Military Commission had issued the 'Work Regulations of the Political and Legal Committee of the Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (Trial),' which stated that these 'Regulations' are also guided by 'Xi Thought,' focusing on 'deeply implementing Xi Jinping's strong military thought and Xi Jinping's rule of law thought'....
If Xi has truly consolidated military power after ousting Zhang and Liu, with no one in the military daring to oppose him, we would expect the military newspaper to reflect this peak of his authority. However, the reality is quite the opposite.
On January 26, during the day, news about Xi that had originally dominated the military network headlines was temporarily replaced by the 'Military Report Seeking Roots' column, only to be overshadowed in the evening by news of Xi's phone call with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Why is this?
Furthermore, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection's announcement regarding the investigations into Zhang and Liu was previously retracted and is now obscured within the news released by the Ministry of National Defence spokesperson concerning recent military-related issues and responses to reporters' questions. Such significant news is being intentionally 'downplayed.' Why is this?
Secondly, high-ranking officials are silent, and no one is stepping up to support Xi.
Following the announcement regarding the investigations into Zhang and Liu, no high-ranking officials, including members of the Politburo Standing Committee, have publicly expressed support for Xi (Xi Jinping) on this issue. However, some officials have reiterated their loyalty to him.
For example, from January 22 to 24, Zhao Leji, the third-ranking official in the Communist Party, stated during his inspection in Hubei that it is essential to adhere to 'Xi Thought' to unify thoughts, wills, and actions, while also referencing the 'two establishments' and 'two safeguards'.
On January 26, Premier Li Qiang chaired a symposium with leaders from various democratic parties, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and representatives of non-party individuals to gather feedback on the 'Government Work Report' and the draft of the '14th Five-Year Plan'. He mentioned 'the Central Committee of the Communist Party with Xi Jinping at its core' twice, without any additional expressions of loyalty.
On the same day, a national meeting of social work ministers was convened, attended by Cai Qi, a member of the Central Secretariat, who spoke at the meeting. He referenced 'Xi Thought' and 'two four four two', clearly indicating his support for Xi. Reports suggest that Cai Qi is one of Xi's trusted aides who played a significant role in the investigations of Zhang and Liu.
Also on this day, Vice President Han Zheng met with the Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Taha, and only mentioned 'Chairman Xi' once. Among the remaining high-ranking military officials, the only one left, Zhang Shengmin, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has not publicly shown support for Xi.
Aside from Xi's close allies, high-ranking officials in the Communist Party have refrained from the usual public displays of support and have not mentioned 'centralised unified leadership', appearing more as if they are observing the situation. Why is this? On one hand, it may stem from dissatisfaction with Xi's challenge to the rules established by the Fourth Plenary Session, and on the other hand, there is concern about potential retribution from Xi.
3. Discontent within the military, with reports of military leaders refusing to express support.
Reports from abroad suggest that military generals were taken aback by the news of Zhang Youxia's arrest, as they did not expect such a seasoned military leader to be taken down so "easily." The Chinese Communist Party's military is now in disarray, with officers at the regiment level and above submitting resignation and transfer requests. There is uncertainty about when this turmoil might affect them personally, causing organisational departments to be overwhelmed and only able to "pass the issue up the chain."
Additionally, Xi Jinping has called on the commanders of various group armies to show their support, but most commanders have chosen to remain silent, unwilling to be the first to oppose Zhang Youxia. Reports also suggest that "Xi has no real authority in the military; he is seen as too despicable." There are indications that a significant event may be on the horizon.
Moreover, I have received information indicating that several generals, including Wang Xianglong, the deputy political commissar of the Beijing Garrison, as well as commanders and deputy commanders of the Air Force, have either been dismissed or arrested, leaving very few generals remaining in the military.
According to firsthand information from Tang Boqiao, a pro-democracy activist based in the United States, the situation surrounding the Zhang Youxia case is still unresolved. Both sides are currently debating the legality of the arrest. Zhang's family and some of his subordinates have publicly voiced their dissatisfaction, calling for corrections. The authorities have paused any further actions. For the first time, Xi's absolute authority is facing a challenge, and the likelihood of a misfire is increasing.
Lastly, many people in the public are supporting Zhang and are hoping for military intervention.
Despite strict internet controls in mainland China, many netizens are using metaphors on social media to express their interest in this power struggle, supporting "General Zhang" and encouraging the men in the military to stand up courageously.
The reactions from various quarters indicate that after Xi apprehended Zhang, he failed to garner the support he sought. This clearly demonstrates that Xi's authority has diminished, and he has lost the trust of the party, the military, and the populace. If Xi continues to engage in widespread violence, what might the consequences be?
(First published by People News) △
News magazine bootstrap themes!
I like this themes, fast loading and look profesional
Thank you Carlos!
You're welcome!
Please support me with give positive rating!
Yes Sure!