The CCP Governs with a “Political Straitjacket”

A migrant worker silently weeps while calling his mother, saying, “I’m not coming home for the New Year this year — I didn’t make any money.” (Video screenshot)

[People News] While Chinese authorities continue to promote an upbeat narrative of “steady progress,” social media inside China tells a very different story. Short videos widely shared online show people of all ages describing job loss, collapsing incomes, shuttered shops, and crushing work hours — a stark contrast to official optimism.

Some vloggers say they have been unemployed for months and can barely afford food. Others describe housing prices plunging, wiping out savings accumulated over generations. Small business owners complain of empty storefronts and mounting losses. Delivery drivers and ride-hailing drivers speak of working more than ten hours a day for meager pay, with their health deteriorating.

None of these voices appear in official state media.

Doubts About the Growth Numbers

Former chief economist Gao Shanwen of a major state-backed securities firm said at a forum in Washington in December 2024 that China’s pandemic shock and real estate downturn had likely reduced actual growth to around 2 percent on average. He estimated that over the next three to five years, growth might reach 3–4 percent — but added pointedly that “official data will always be around 5 percent.” Soon after, he reportedly fell silent in public discourse.

International media have echoed similar skepticism, noting that China has reported growth of about 5 percent for three consecutive years despite property sector distress, deflationary pressure, and Western efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese manufacturing. One policy adviser was quoted as saying the 5 percent target has become a “political straitjacket.”

Growth as Political Legitimacy

Beijing’s long-term goal of roughly doubling GDP and per-capita income by 2035 requires annual growth of around 4.7–5 percent. According to the cited adviser, maintaining that pace has become not just an economic goal but a political benchmark tied to the legitimacy of Xi Jinping and the Communist Party.

For decades, local officials powered growth through heavy investment, with promotions tied to GDP performance. But the system is under strain. Although the central government sets growth targets, local governments shoulder about 85 percent of public spending and now face severe debt pressure. They are still expected to “manufacture” growth while struggling to stay afloat financially.

Pressure Shifts to Citizens and Businesses

Reports describe local governments resorting to aggressive fines and fees targeting individuals and private firms. Some farmers have allegedly faced large penalties for minor sales, while business owners say enforcement actions can be arbitrary and heavy-handed. In extreme cases, entrepreneurs who relocate to other provinces are reportedly pursued back to their home regions for investigation.

Such developments suggest that many official pro-growth policies have had limited effect, and efforts to pivot toward consumption-driven growth face a fundamental obstacle: weak consumer confidence. Investment can be ordered from above; consumption cannot.

As one analysis put it, for a provincial leader, launching another infrastructure project — even one of questionable value — is often easier than persuading anxious households to spend their savings on big-ticket purchases.

Targets vs. Reality

As provinces set their 2026 targets, tensions are becoming visible. Some large economies such as Guangdong have introduced a slightly more flexible 4.5–5 percent range, while others continue to adhere strictly to the “around 5 percent” directive.

An adviser summarized the difference in political incentives this way: in the United States, leaders are judged by voters concerned about their own finances; in China, officials are judged by superiors concerned about whether numerical targets are met.

For Xi, long-term milestones like 2035 may outweigh more immediate concerns such as household wealth losses or housing market stability. The 5 percent figure thus functions as a political shield — defending the narrative of the “China model,” even as the gap between administrative targets and on-the-ground economic reality grows wider.△