The Zhang Youxia Incident Continues to Escalate, the Chaos in Zhongnanhai Becomes Harder to Conceal

The Zhang Youxia Incident Continues to Escalate, the Chaos in Zhongnanhai Becomes Harder to Conceal

[People News] It has been nearly half a month since the official announcement of Zhang Youxia’s arrest. The CCP military and officialdom remain eerily silent, with no one publicly expressing support for Xi Jinping. At the end of January and the beginning of February, the PLA Daily published four consecutive commentator articles criticizing Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. Observers noticed that the tone of these four rare consecutive denunciations gradually softened, and soon afterward Party media once again sank into a state of lifeless calm.

On February 4, 2026, the 20th session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress was held. Normally, such a meeting would be held at the end of the following month. The sudden insertion of a one-day session led outsiders to speculate that Xi Jinping intended to urgently “repair” the procedures surrounding the arrests of Zhang and Liu. It was thought the meeting might remove Zhang Youxia from his post as Vice Chairman of the state Central Military Commission and Liu Zhenli from his post as a state CMC member, and also revoke both men’s status as National People’s Congress deputies, thus retroactively legitimizing the Zhang–Liu case. However, the official announcement on February 5 showed that the meeting did not involve either Zhang or Liu.

China’s Law on Deputies to the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses states that deputies cannot be arrested, criminally detained, or prosecuted during their term without permission, and that the power of approval lies with the NPC Presidium. But CCP internal rules such as the Regulations on the Supervision and Discipline Enforcement Work of Party Discipline Inspection Organs and the Regulations on the Work of the CCP Discipline Inspection Commission stipulate that the authority to open a disciplinary case depends primarily on Party membership, cadre management authority, and disciplinary violations, not on NPC deputy status. To open a Party investigation into a Politburo member, a Politburo meeting is sufficient. Since Zhang and Liu are CMC members, important CMC approval would also be required. Xi Jinping’s actions in these two respects were irregular and suspected of being akin to a coup. However, once the discipline inspection commission files a case, it enters a detention-and-investigation stage. Without a final conclusion and formal arrest, it remains procedurally normal for Zhang and Liu to retain their NPC deputy status and state CMC posts.

Yet judging from the logic of Xi Jinping’s surprise arrests of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli without following legal procedures—especially given the current extreme turmoil and passivity in CCP politics caused by the incident—Xi’s usual style would have been to press ahead aggressively, push the matter through completely, and use the NPC to strip Zhang and Liu of their deputy status and related posts in one sweep, thus making the case ironclad and then publicly presenting solid evidence of corruption to silence dissent.

But the facts were unexpected. The February 4 NPC Standing Committee meeting only revoked the deputy status of three executives from the military-industrial sector and made no public mention of Zhang or Liu. One possible reason is that Zhao Leji may have refused Xi’s request on procedural grounds. Zhao and Xi have long been at odds, and Zhao may have seized the opportunity to embarrass Xi.

Another possibility is that Xi Jinping deliberately slowed and downplayed the handling of the Zhang–Liu case, activating risk-control and crisis-management plans. At key points of tension with various factions, especially the military, he may have feinted, maintaining tight internal control while appearing relaxed externally—retreating in order to advance, defending in order to attack. Privately, Xi may promote younger officers within the military, as Peng Liyuan reportedly has good relations with younger officers. Xi might also reshuffle senior commanders across major military regions to break up Zhang Youxia’s remaining influence, using a mix of pressure, inducements, division, and co-optation. These are all developments that observers should closely watch. Once the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli are concluded and finalized, Xi could then thoroughly purge Zhang’s remaining allies.

A third scenario is that, under pressure from within the Party, outside forces, and the military, Xi Jinping has reached some degree of compromise with anti-Xi factions, handling Zhang and Liu’s cases lightly—exempting them from criminal responsibility, imposing only Party disciplinary measures, restricting their personal freedom, and ultimately allowing a “soft landing.”

Of these three possibilities, the first seems less likely, as Zhao Leji may not have the strength to directly challenge Xi. Corruption is pervasive among officials, and Xi could at any time produce damaging material on Zhao—something officials deeply fear. The third scenario also seems unlikely, as it would require Party elders and anti-Xi factions to possess strong enough power and demonstrate unwavering resolve. Zhang and Liu themselves might also have to symbolically concede, because no matter what, at present Xi holds the knife and they are the fish.

The second scenario appears more plausible. Observers should not underestimate Xi Jinping’s ruthlessness and cunning, especially Cai Qi’s harshness and scheming. This scenario better aligns with the ultimate political interests and ambitions of Xi’s faction and with Xi’s style of power struggles and methods of dealing with opponents.

After Xi Jinping reportedly suffered a stroke and lost power at the Third Plenum in July 2024, he once pretended to consider stepping down, visiting Liuchixiang in Anhui to create the illusion of relinquishing power. Overseas online discussions even compared this to Wang Qishan’s visit there before his own retreat. But Xi’s ambition, calculation, and ruthlessness far exceed Wang Qishan’s. In May 2025, rumors spread that Xi used forces loyal to former CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang to attempt a coup against Zhang Youxia but was thwarted, and that Xu later died under suspicious circumstances. If true, this would at least show Xi’s ability to endure patiently and organize a counterattack. If Zhang Youxia experienced such a coup attempt, he should have been more vigilant and might have acted decisively to arrest Xi. But perhaps for the sake of the Party, or due to disagreements among elders, he missed the opportunity, allowing Xi to counterattack and reverse the situation. Three days before the Fourth Plenum, Zhang Youxia suddenly announced the removal of nine generals including He Weidong and Miao Hua, effectively pressuring Xi. Yet at the Fourth Plenum, Xi retained all his Party, state, and military positions, indicating that anti-Xi efforts were still hesitant, planting the seeds of later trouble.

Judging from the eerie silence in CCP politics and the military after Xi’s sudden arrest of Zhang and Liu, the frequent appearance of military vehicles in various regions, and the shock reactions at home and abroad, online and self-media discussions about a power struggle between Xi and Zhang are not mere rumors but reflect a real and hidden reality.

In summary, the failure of the February 4 session of the 14th NPC Standing Committee to strip Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli of their state CMC posts and NPC deputy status is not due to simple procedural timing or routine organizational resistance. It represents a moment within the political storm triggered by their arrests, where various forces are contending and entangled. Xi Jinping has had to slow down and make concessions in order to reach a temporary and transitional political balance. Variables still remain, but for anti-Xi factions, the chance of turning the tide is diminishing. The passage of time is unfavorable to both Xi’s camp and his opponents. As Sun Tzu wrote, speed and surprise are essential in warfare. But anti-Xi forces have not seized the initiative and remain on the defensive, hoping for change through delay, which only makes the situation more unfavorable.

(First published by People News)