The image shows a warning cone in Tiananmen Square. (Feng Li / Getty Images) Dajiyuan
[People News] In the past two days, mainland Chinese media have been prominently reporting on one matter, saying that “General Secretary Xi welcomes and invites Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Cheng Liwen to lead a delegation for a visit.” As early as the end of March, Xinhua reported that Song Tao, director of the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Office, stated that KMT Chairman Cheng Liwen had repeatedly expressed a desire to visit the mainland… The CCP and General Secretary Xi welcome and invite Cheng Liwen to lead a KMT delegation to Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Beijing from April 7 to 12 for visits and exchanges…
Former senior Hong Kong media figure Yan Chun-gou mocked this phrasing in a Facebook post, saying that Xi Jinping “welcomes and invites” Cheng Liwen is grammatically illogical and contradictory. “Welcoming” implies the other party wants to come and you respond accordingly, while “inviting” means you take the initiative to ask them to visit—two mutually conflicting expressions.
Beijing may be trying to convey that Cheng Liwen first strongly wanted to come, and then Xi Jinping said, “Fine, then come.” The implication is that the KMT is proactively seeking to draw closer to the CCP. Moreover, when referring to the KMT, the CCP always adds the word “China” in front, implying that the KMT will eventually become one of the CCP’s “eight democratic parties” under its united front system.
In fact, since its founding, the KMT has been the Kuomintang of the Republic of China, whose abbreviation is simply “China.” After the CCP seized the mainland from the KMT in 1949, it adopted the name “People’s Republic of China” to mimic the “Republic” of the ROC. Because this name contains the word “Communist,” its standard abbreviation should be “Communist China.” Since then, the CCP has deliberately blurred the distinction between “Communist China” and “China” as part of a cognitive warfare strategy.
As for the KMT side, many media outlets say that since Cheng Liwen unexpectedly rose to win the party chairmanship at the end of 2025, her strong statements on cross-strait relations and arms purchases have led to perceptions of being “pro-China (CCP) and anti-U.S.”
Cheng Liwen Plans to Visit Beijing
According to media reports, visiting Beijing as the leader of the largest party in the legislature was one of Cheng’s goals from the outset of her tenure. Media have cited some of her reasons for wanting to visit Beijing, which are seen as controversial: such as “in the past, the KMT’s call to retake the mainland was called unification, and now the CCP’s call to ‘liberate Taiwan’ is also called unification”; or “Taiwan should not bet on either China or the U.S., but seek a win-win outcome for both sides and for China and the U.S.”; or opposing Taiwan independence; or stating that she would not meet President Lai Ching-te before going to Beijing.
Some analysts believe that Cheng may have forgotten that the KMT’s call to retake the mainland was to recover lost territory, whereas the CCP is an imported Marxist-Leninist force, a foreign entity wearing a Chinese facade. Its so-called “liberation of Taiwan” aims to replace the Taiwanese people’s identity with that of this foreign ideology. No Taiwanese political leader has actually called for “Taiwan independence,” because the Republic of China itself is already a sovereign state that predates the PRC.
From the CCP’s perspective, its most urgent need is to have the KMT do more to promote “unification,” creating conditions for united front work, shaping public opinion in Taiwan to accept “one country, two systems” as a path to peace, and fostering division or confusion within Taiwan’s political sphere—the more chaos, the better—thus weakening anti-unification forces. The CCP would strongly support such a KMT in winning the next presidential election.
In essence, this represents the CCP’s attempt at a third “possession” of the KMT.
In fact, from the time the Comintern’s Far Eastern branch was implanted in China to the CCP’s seizure of power, what occurred was not truly a “civil war” between the KMT and the CCP. Rather, it should be called a war in which the KMT resisted communist aggression, since the Communist Party was a foreign import.
So how did this foreign force first succeed in “possessing” the KMT?
In January 1923, Sun Yat-sen met with Soviet representative Adolph Joffe in Shanghai to formally discuss cooperation with the Communists. Their joint declaration stated that the Soviets would withdraw from Outer Mongolia, recognise China’s sovereignty there, refrain from promoting communist revolution in China, and acknowledge that communism was unsuitable for China.
In 1924, the Whampoa Military Academy was established. Under Soviet influence, Sun agreed to allow CCP members to join the KMT as individuals. From January 20 to 30, 1924, Sun convened the KMT’s First National Congress in Guangzhou, adopting the policy of “allying with Russia and accommodating the Communists.” Many CCP members took important posts within the KMT, enabling the CCP’s first successful infiltration.
Sun Yat-sen died on March 12, 1925, at age 59. At that time, the CCP had fewer than 3,000 members, but by 1928 it had grown to 30,000. During the Northern Expedition (1926–1927), the CCP launched three armed uprisings in Shanghai and organised peasant movements in Hunan, competing with the KMT for control. This culminated in the KMT’s April 12, 1927, purge of Communists.
On the morning of March 12, 1925, Sun Yat-sen passed away at the age of 59. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) joined the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1925, it had fewer than 3,000 members, but by 1928 it had surged to 30,000. During the Northern Expedition from July 1926 to March 1927, the CCP took advantage of the KMT’s campaign to launch three armed uprisings in Shanghai, carrying out internal sabotage against the KMT and undermining the Northern Expedition. The Hunan peasant uprisings also developed during this period. In 1927, Mao Zedong used the advance of the Northern Expedition army to rapidly organise peasant associations, carry out rural movements, and compete with the KMT for “leadership and territory,” directly leading to the KMT’s April 12, 1927, purge of the Communists.
On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army orchestrated the shocking 'September 18 Incident.' Amid this national crisis, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized the opportunity presented by the Nationalist Army's resistance against the Japanese forces. From November 7 to 20, 1931, they established the so-called 'Chinese Soviet Republic,' effectively creating 'two Chinas' and promoting the idea of a 'National China.' Additionally, they issued a 'Constitution' that called for 'all ethnic minorities and people from various regions within China to secede from China and establish independent nations' (Article 14). This was a clear act of national division and, in effect, directly aided Japan's invasion of China.
This marked the success of the first “possession,” achieving the effects of strengthening itself, damaging China, and weakening the KMT.
The second time occurred after the KMT recognised the CCP’s schemes and dangers and launched five encirclement campaigns against it. In January 1934, after the CCP’s failure in the fifth counter-encirclement campaign, the Red Army began the “Long March” as a great escape. It fled to northern Shaanxi, far from the front lines of resistance against Japan, yet continued to claim externally that it was fighting the Japanese. A year later, the Red Army had shrunk from more than 80,000 troops to about 6,000.
On December 12, 1936, through deceptive tactics, the CCP successfully induced Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to use military force to compel Chiang Kai-shek to cooperate with the CCP. In this way, the CCP achieved its second “possession” of the KMT.
On July 7, 1937, the Japanese military instigated an incident, marking the beginning of a full-scale invasion of China. The Kuomintang army launched a comprehensive resistance against this aggression.
During the eight years of war, the CCP took advantage of the KMT’s frontline fighting. While receiving funding and supplies from the Nationalist government, it expanded its own forces in the rear areas far from the front, carrying out land reform and recruitment. The Communist forces grew from about 50,000 before the war to approximately 1.3 million. The Soviet Union, fearing that a successful Japanese invasion would undermine its control over China, pressured the CCP to participate in resistance; the CCP reluctantly engaged in operations such as the Hundred Regiments Offensive and the Pingxingguan battles behind enemy lines. Meanwhile, the KMT’s strength was heavily depleted during the war, leading to a major shift in the military balance between the two sides.
This was the true process of the CCP’s second “possession” of China.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been attempting a third infiltration for over 20 years.
In fact, the CCP's third infiltration of the Kuomintang (KMT) began more than two decades ago. Since 2005, the CCP has held continuous meetings with KMT leaders, including Lien Chan, Wu Po-hsiung, Zhu Lilun, and Hung Hsiu-chu, all of whom have visited Beijing. This engagement continued until November 2016, when KMT Chair Hung Hsiu-chu met with Xi Jinping in Beijing.
Following Zheng Liwen's election as KMT Chair, Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message, recognising the long-standing political foundation shared by both parties in adhering to the '1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence' to promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation. He expressed hope that both parties would maintain this common political foundation, unite the broad Taiwanese compatriots, and strengthen the ambition of being Chinese, thereby 'advancing national unification.'
An individual familiar with KMT affairs noted that Zheng Liwen is more willing than her predecessors to explicitly support 'opposing Taiwan independence and recognising both sides as part of the Chinese nation,' which has become crucial for gaining trust from the other side and restarting dialogue. This perspective has faced criticism for undermining national dignity.
Former senior media figure Yan Chungu remarked that Zheng Liwen's rise has provided the CCP with its only hope. Consequently, the CCP can only focus on 'cultivating' her, ensuring that when the KMT mainstream distances itself further from the CCP, there is a contingency plan in place.
The Kuomintang (Guomindang) is once again seeking to establish a 'friendly' relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The timing of this meeting is particularly noteworthy, as Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing in mid-May. As the CCP recalibrates its relationship with the United States, Beijing has opted to first enhance cross-strait relations, which may serve to create a smaller, stable variable in a larger strategic context. So, what is the true purpose of this 'Zheng-Xi' meeting? What concrete and positive outcomes can we expect? Is it a breakthrough in cross-strait relations, or a betrayal of Taiwan?
Can the CCP's third attempt at engagement succeed?
Naturally, the CCP has once again resorted to its familiar rhetoric, claiming that this meeting is 'beneficial for Taiwan's development,' while reiterating the political foundation of the '1992 Consensus' and its opposition to Taiwan independence. Song Wendi, a Taiwan expert at the Atlantic Council's Global China Centre, believes that Zheng Liwen's visit will send a clear signal to Beijing that there is still a significant faction of 'pro-China doves' within Taiwan.
Zheng Liwen has publicly declared that the Kuomintang intends to become an active peace builder moving forward, with her first priority being to secure a goodwill response from Beijing regarding peace.
However, many Taiwanese citizens are sceptical about how to achieve peace in the face of CCP provocations. Should they acquiesce to the CCP's demands or launch a counteroffensive against the mainland? There is a widespread lack of trust in political interactions across the Strait.
Specifically, three key issues arise: First, will the Xi-Zheng meeting lead to any relaxation in cross-strait diplomacy, exchanges, or other policy areas? Second, can the Xi-Zheng meeting take place without crossing legal and institutional red lines? Third, can the meeting be conducted within Beijing's narrative framework while still allowing Taiwan to maintain its own space?
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator Zhuang Ruixiong stated that no one opposes normal exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, but these exchanges must be based on equality and dignity. He warned that if Taiwan's position is not clearly communicated to the other side, it could lead to suspicions that Taiwan is merely whitewashing for the CCP.
In response to criticisms about her stance, Zheng Liwen took a firm position, using her characteristic loud voice to assert, 'I am very pragmatic; I am the one who lays the foundation for peace and builds bridges.'
When addressing the issue of sovereignty positioning, she spoke cautiously, humorously questioning, 'Does everyone think I am completely unaware of Taiwan's and the Kuomintang's interests?'
Analysts suggest that Zheng Liwen may not fully grasp the nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). She might not realise that it is a non-human organisation that originated as a bandit group with ambitions of global dominance. Furthermore, she may not understand that the CCP is a paper tiger that bullies the weak while fearing the strong. If Zheng Liwen believes that Taiwan should create a platform for the CCP to 'demonstrate its peaceful intentions,' and that 'there is still a win-win possibility between the CCP, the United States, and across the Strait,' this represents a significant misjudgment, akin to trying to take skin from a tiger.
Media figure Zhan Lingyu highlighted on April 2 that Zheng Liwen has made numerous statements in the past, such as calling for all Taiwanese people to loudly declare, 'I am Chinese,' and referring to the mainland as 'family,' which closely aligns with the official narrative of China. This narrative indeed poses a risk of the Kuomintang being successfully influenced by the CCP, which is something the CCP would certainly welcome.
The Chinese Communist Party might tell the chairman of the Kuomintang, 'If unification takes place, we will appoint you as the vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; you should work harder.' However, if unification truly occurs and the Kuomintang chairman actually becomes the vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, will there be any positive outcomes? It can be stated with complete certainty that there will not be. Why is that? Looking back at historical figures such as Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao, who were leaders of the party-state and played significant roles in the CCP's military victories over the Kuomintang, what became of them? More recently, consider figures like Ling Jihua, Su Rong, He Weidong, and Zhang Youxia, who also contributed to Xi Jinping's consolidation of power within the CCP; what was their fate?
(First published in People News)
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