Recently, CCP leader Xi Jinping's crackdown on the military has garnered significant attention from the international community. The accompanying image shows Xi Jinping (centre) attending a ceremony at Tiananmen Square in Beijing on September 30, 2018. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)
[People News] On the morning of April 8, Xi Jinping personally attended the opening ceremony of the senior officer training class at the National Defence University, where he delivered an important speech. Following this, Xinhua News Agency published a report titled 'Xi Jinping emphasises the need for ideological rectification and deepening political training at the opening ceremony of the senior officer training class for the entire military.' In his address, he urged that 'military leadership cadres, especially senior cadres, must take the lead in seriously addressing the political life within the Party.' He emphasised, 'We must understand laws and regulations, be clear about the rules, and know respect. Everyone is equal before laws and regulations; there are no exceptions in adhering to and enforcing these laws.'
On the same day, early in the morning, Xinhua released a lengthy report titled: 'Forging a Stronger Heroic Army—Chairman Xi Jinping Leads the Entire Military to Deepen Political Training with a Spirit of Self-Revolution.' The article opened with a thought-provoking question: 'How can the world's largest Marxist ruling party successfully escape the historical cycle of governance and chaos, ensuring it never changes in quality, colour, or flavour?'
The article then meaningfully pointed out: 'Before the 18th National Congress of the Party, the People's Army faced issues such as a weakening of the Party's leadership, a lack of Party building, and ineffective strict governance of the Party. If these issues are not thoroughly addressed, they will not only impact the military's combat effectiveness but also concern the crucial political principle of the Party commanding the gun.'
The article highlights the slogan 'Two Four Four Two', emphasising the necessity to 'implement the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission, firmly uphold loyalty to the core, support the core, safeguard the core, and defend the core.' It explicitly states: 'Ensure that the guns are always in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the Party.' 'The military is armed with guns, and there must never be anyone in the army who has a divided heart towards the Party, nor should there be a hiding place for corrupt elements.'
At first glance, these two press releases from Xinhua News Agency seem to be aimed at political training for the entire military and senior military officials. However, underlying the text is Xi Jinping's significant political anxiety and unease. This marks Xi Jinping's most direct and public appeal for political loyalty from the Chinese Communist Party's military, effectively acknowledging that his actual standing within the military is facing serious challenges, which is far from the absolute loyalty depicted in official propaganda.
The organisation of senior military officer training sessions and Xi's personal directive to 'deepen political training' essentially seek to mend the serious rift between institutional authority and personal authority through political pressure and ideological control. Following the detention of Zhang Youxia, the military has been slow to clarify its stance; nearly three months have passed since the incident, and there has been no official comment, with no information on the case being released. While the call for the 'responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission' may sound forceful, the trust and execution at the practical implementation level may have been completely undermined by a pervasive sense of complacency throughout the military.
During a speech to senior military officials, Xi Jinping made a particularly intriguing remark: 'Military leaders, especially senior officials, must take the lead in seriously engaging in political life within the Party, serve as examples of truthfulness, cultivate a spirit of tolerance, and foster a strong environment for candid discussions, constructive criticism, and a willingness to confront challenges.'
This statement carries a deeper implication, suggesting that within the military, especially among senior officials, no one is providing Xi Jinping with honest feedback. The true nature of events occurring in the military is not being reported to him. Those who are disloyal to Xi Jinping and any related issues are unlikely to inform him. In essence, Xi Jinping has been completely marginalised within the military. Although he is publicly recognised as the supreme leader, in reality, he has become the Chairman of the Military Commission with significantly diminished control. From his trusted allies to the opposition, from generals to soldiers, and from senior officials to junior officers, it appears that 'not a single one is loyal,' and they have all turned against Xi Jinping. Alas, how tragic!
In less than three years, the senior leadership of the Rocket Force, as well as the Army, Navy, and Air Force, has been completely purged. Even the 20th Central Military Commission, the military's highest command authority, has been nearly entirely cleared out by Xi Jinping's sweeping reforms. Of the seven-member leadership team, only Zhang Shengmin and Xi Jinping himself remain. Zhang Youxia, once seen as one of Xi Jinping's staunchest allies from the 'red second generation,' along with his ally Liu Zhenli, trusted aides He Weidong and Miao Hua, and a significant number of senior generals whom Xi had long relied upon, including Li Shangfu, have all been dismissed due to 'serious violations of discipline and law.' The language in official reports has become increasingly severe, evolving from 'collapse of faith' to 'serious trampling and destruction of the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Military Commission,' effectively branding these former confidants as counter-revolutionaries. In just a few years, the military force that Xi Jinping himself built, often referred to as the Xi family army, has been left in disarray.
Since the 20th National Congress, at least 15 active generals have been officially reported as having fallen or been dealt with, while over 20 generals are either missing or have lost their qualifications as representatives of the National People's Congress. In October 2025, nine generals, including He Weidong and Miao Hua, were expelled from both the Party and the military in a single sweep. By early 2026, the military's so-called 'Ten Tigers' were also targeted, with prominent figures like Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli falling one after another. This has resulted in a serious breakdown in command and a power vacuum at the upper echelons of the military, with numerous theatre and service commanders remaining vacant for extended periods. Even General Zhao Shoujun, who had been highly valued and nurtured by Xi Jinping, has stumbled. The factions that Xi Jinping cultivated within the military have been systematically uprooted. This situation is fundamentally not just about corruption; it reflects a significant fracture in political loyalty and the power structure.
On April 8, Xi Jinping addressed senior military officials, calling for a "deepening of political training" and the "implementation of ideological rectification." This is not the first instance in recent years. In April 2023, the entire military organised a training course for officers ranked major general and above to study and implement Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, with nearly a hundred senior officials participating as regular students at the National Defence University for systematic learning. In September 2023, the first batch of training courses focused on the theme of studying and implementing Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era was also conducted at the National Defence University. In June 2024, Xi Jinping convened a meeting of the Central Military Commission on political work, stressing the importance of "putting oneself in the picture" and encouraging senior officials to proactively identify and address shortcomings.
In recent years, similar training programs for senior military officials, rotation training for officers ranked major general and above, and thematic education seminars have been held multiple times, consistently focusing on themes such as "absolute loyalty," "political capability," "self-revolution," and "putting oneself in the picture." The April 8 meeting, at first glance, seems to reinforce the "political building of the military," emphasising loyalty and preparing for the 100th anniversary of the military establishment in 2027. However, considering the ongoing power struggles within Zhongnanhai, this meeting and the report from Xinhua News Agency appear more as a manifestation of anxiety and an urgent response following Xi Jinping's perceived loss of control over military power.
The situation is even more alarming as rumours regarding Ma Xingrui's downfall have suggested a disturbing trend of political betrayal against Xi Jinping, implicating local officials and military power in a potential conspiracy. Ma Xingrui, who comes from the aerospace sector and has been involved in significant projects like Shenzhou and Chang'e, later served as the governor of Guangdong and Xinjiang. He was a protégé of Xi Jinping and a key figure in his wife's political circle. In July 2025, he was unexpectedly reassigned from Xinjiang to a nominal position in Beijing, after which he vanished from public view until his official removal from power was announced on April 3. Notably, the official report did not refer to him as 'comrade,' underscoring the gravity of the situation.
International reports indicate that the issues surrounding Ma Xingrui extend beyond simple corruption; they involve serious political disloyalty. According to sources, including Australian scholar Yuan Hongbing, He Weidong disclosed after his arrest that he had established a political understanding with Ma Xingrui through Ma Xingrui's brother, Ma Xingquan. Should a subversive event occur, such as a failure in the Taiwan Strait conflict or a significant destabilisation of Xi Jinping's regime, the two were poised to form an alliance, with He Weidong providing military resources and Ma Xingrui offering political and economic support to jointly manage the situation. Additionally, rumours suggest that He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others have extended their connections beyond the military framework to engage with Ma Xingrui and even Jiang Mianheng, revealing a pronounced inclination and intent against Xi.
The veracity of these rumours is currently hard to confirm, but Ma Xingrui, a close ally of Xi Jinping, has been removed from his position halfway through the 20th National Congress. He was expected to be a crucial pillar of Xi Jinping's power structure, yet his opposition to Xi led to his downfall. This situation undoubtedly plunges Xi Jinping into a deep anxiety over his power, self-doubt, and despair regarding loyalty, which could signal the onset of a more intense military purge. However, the more purges that take place, the greater the instability, with an increasing number of dissenters, potentially leading to a complete hollowing out of the military, or a resurgence of brave individuals entering the imperial palace through the East Gate.
(First published by People News)△
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