Are the Second, Third, and Fourth-ranking Officials of the Communist Party of China Engaged in a Power Struggle With Xi?

Dark clouds hang over Tiananmen Square in Beijing. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] On April 3, Ma Xingrui, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China and former Secretary of Xinjiang, who had been missing for over six months, was finally officially announced to have been ousted. His rise to power was closely linked to Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan, and his investigation represents a significant blow to Xi.

This situation is different from that of He Weidong, another Politburo member who was also promoted by Xi and previously served as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. He was removed from his position after Xi lost military authority, and the party's power weakened due to his illness. In contrast, Ma Xingrui was officially announced to have fallen from grace after Xi removed Zhang Youxia, the Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, and regained some of his power. This not only highlights the brutal internal conflicts within the Communist Party but also shows that even after Xi regained control, he was unable to protect his loyal supporters. While news about Xi has returned to the dominating headlines it once had a few years ago, he has not managed to escape the constraints imposed by various factions within the party and has not yet returned to a position of singular authority.

A clear indication of this is that senior officials of the Communist Party, including the second, third, and fourth-ranking figures, have refrained from using terms like 'establish' or 'maintain' in their speeches over the past month, which are part of the loyalty rhetoric associated with '2442'. Furthermore, there was a significant meeting where two individuals were not reported on.

Between mid-March and April 5, Li Qiang, the second-highest official in the Communist Party of China and Premier, engaged in several public meetings and research activities. These included a research trip to Sichuan from March 30 to April 1, presiding over the State Council executive meeting on March 27, and leading the 11th plenary session of the State Council on March 16. In these reports, while there was a reference to 'effectively unifying thoughts and actions with the spirit of Xi Jinping's important instructions and the decision-making arrangements of the Party Central Committee,' there was no mention of the standard loyalty language.

Furthermore, after Xi promoted a campaign for the entire Party to establish a correct view of political achievements, the Party group of the State Council, where Li Qiang serves, did not publicly report any learning activities. Instead, there were only reports from various departments of the Central and State organs, with some departments mentioning 'two four four two' during their learning sessions. Does this imply that Li Qiang and other senior officials of the State Council do not need to engage in learning?

Turning to the third-ranking official, Zhao Leji, Chairman of the National People's Congress. Similar to Li Qiang, the Party group of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, where Zhao Leji is a member, also did not report any activities related to learning how to establish a correct view of political achievements, with only reports from the theoretical learning centre group of the Party group of the National People's Congress.

According to the National People's Congress website, on March 19, the theoretical learning centre group of the Party group of the National People's Congress conducted its first collective learning seminar on establishing and practising a correct view of political achievements. This seminar focused on several speeches by Xi and his explanations regarding the establishment of a correct view of political achievements. Liu Qi, Secretary-General of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Secretary of the Party group, presided over the meeting and delivered a speech.

Despite reports that laud Xi's speeches as 'far-sighted, broad in vision, profound in thought, and rich in content,' and emphasize the need to 'practically unify our thoughts and actions with the scientific judgment of the situation and the decision-making deployment of the Party Central Committee with Xi at its core, and resolutely advance courageously along the direction guided by Xi, and firmly and effectively implement the decision-making deployment of the Party Central Committee,' there is a notable absence of the loyalty phrase 'two four four two' throughout the text.

This stands in stark contrast to the report on Liu Qi's study seminar held on January 15 of this year, which referenced the 'two establishments' and 'two safeguards,' asserting that 'we must more resolutely and effectively implement the major decision-making deployments of the Party Central Committee.'

In just two months, why has the Party Group of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee deliberately chosen to omit the loyalty phrases? For high-ranking officials who have long been entrenched in the Chinese Communist Party's bureaucratic culture, this is quite unusual.

Equally unusual is the lack of reports on the latest study session of the Party Group of the NPC Standing Committee. On the day before the study session on January 15, specifically on January 14, the Party Group held a meeting to discuss the spirit of Xi, presided over by Party Group Secretary Zhao Leji, who also delivered remarks at the meeting.

In his speech, Zhao Leji emphasised the need to 'more resolutely and forcefully implement the major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee, and more scientifically and effectively confine power within the framework of the system.' He also praised Xi Jinping's speech as 'high-level, profound, and thought-provoking,' and asserted that 'we must resolutely uphold the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralised and unified leadership.' Additionally, he referred to the 'two establishments' and 'two safeguards,' stressing the importance of 'ensuring that the major policies and decisions of the Party Central Committee are fully implemented in the work of the National People's Congress (NPC).' 

This means that, according to convention, the study session of the Party Group of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress should occur the day before the study session of the NPC's Party Group. However, on March 19, the latter held a meeting to discuss Xi's establishment of a correct view of political achievements, which Zhao Leji chose to overlook. Why is this the case? Could it be related to the NPC's failure to dismiss Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli despite several meetings? 

Regarding the fourth-ranking official, Wang Huning, who is the Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, he also convened a meeting to study the view of political achievements, but there were some irregularities. In the article 'Why Wang Huning and the Vice Chairmen of the CPPCC Behave Abnormally,' the author noted that on March 18, the theoretical study center group of the Party Group of the National Committee of the CPPCC held its second collective study session for 2026, focusing on Xi's discourse on establishing a correct view of political achievements, which Wang Huning presided over and spoke at. In his speech, apart from a lot of empty rhetoric and clichés, Wang Huning did not mention the 'two four four two' loyalty phrase.

During a theoretical study meeting held by the Party Group of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Wang Dongfeng, who serves as both Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the National Committee, as well as Secretary of the Party Group, explicitly referenced the 'two establishments' and 'two safeguards' in his speech. He emphasised that these concepts are crucial for 'more resolutely and forcefully implementing the major decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee.' Notably, Wang Dongfeng did not align himself with the tone set by Wang Huning.

Reports from the Chinese Communist Party's official media indicate a more pronounced state of confusion and power struggles at the upper echelons, a shift that began with the arrest of Zhang Youxia. In response to the brainwashing campaign promoted by the Party leader to establish a correct view of political achievements, neither Li Qiang nor Zhao Leji convened Party group meetings for study. However, their subordinates organised study sessions, with some mentioning loyalty language while others intentionally omitted it. Although Wang Huning organised Party group studies, he refrained from mentioning loyalty language in his statements, while several vice chairpersons of the Political Consultative Conference under him did.

This lack of synchronisation raises questions about whether it reflects significant dissatisfaction within the Politburo regarding Xi's disregard for the Party leader's authority and the irregular process in addressing the situation with Politburo member Zhang Youxia. Are there underlying grievances about Xi's apparent negation of the already established 'centralised and unified leadership of the Central Committee'? It seems that the competition among the top leadership is becoming increasingly overt. With such attitudes from the second, third, and fourth-ranking officials in the Chinese Communist Party, how can Xi expect to command the loyalty of numerous officials? Relying solely on Cai Qi's dominance in the propaganda department clearly falls short. If Xi continues to act unilaterally, what potential consequences could arise from further turmoil within the Communist Party?