Military Mutiny and Coup Underway – Xi Jinping May Face Three Possible Outcomes

On November 1, 2024, Xi Jinping met with the newly elected Chief Executive of Macau, Ho Iat Seng, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Xi did not use the dragon chair or dragon cup, which some interpret as a sign that his power is waning and his attempt at restoring imperial rule has failed. (Video screenshot)

[People News] As reports emerge that members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and Central Committee have resumed public appearances, it indicates that the secretive Beidaihe conclave has quietly begun and quietly ended. Independent scholar Wu Zuolai, in an article published on August 15 with Taiwan’s Radio Taiwan International, wrote that the biggest focus of this year’s Beidaihe meeting is whether it will quietly mark the end of the Xi Jinping era. He believes that a “military mutiny” has already occurred, a “coup” is currently underway, and that Xi will eventually face one of three possible arrangements.

According to CCP mouthpiece Xinhua, on August 15, Chinese Premier Li Qiang attended the opening symposium for the 2025 National Ecology Day event in Beijing. This report confirmed that the top CCP leadership’s Beidaihe summer retreat had ended.

This year’s Beidaihe deliberations, according to outside speculation, would decisively affect the upcoming Fourth Plenum, which in turn will influence the 21st Party Congress. The author argues that the central question is whether this conclave would quietly conclude Xi’s era of rule.

Wu believes that the political upheaval during last year’s Third Plenum was connected to a “quasi-military mutiny.” The military, as an independent force, introduced abnormal disruptions, and rumors began to spread widely.

In August of last year, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited China. The most surprising part was that Sullivan specifically requested to meet with Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission. China–U.S. relations analysts generally believed that the Sullivan–Zhang meeting was in fact the main purpose of his visit.

Wu observes that Sullivan’s meeting with Zhang Youxia was clearly an extraordinary arrangement. Washington had realised Zhang Youxia was the key decision-maker overseeing the PLA and thus sought direct engagement.

Another unusual phenomenon has been the shift in tone within PLA propaganda. Commentaries stressing “upholding collective leadership and promoting democracy” appeared repeatedly. Slogans such as “the CMC Chairman responsibility system” and “be a good soldier of Chairman Xi” have gradually faded from the PLA Daily.

Wu argues that the PLA’s newspaper was speaking directly to the Party centre. Thus, the “mutiny”—that is, abnormal developments within military power—had already taken place. The military then became a counterweight that allowed Party elders to step in, creating a balance of political forces against Xi’s loyalists.

Wu explains why “ending the Xi era” has become a consensus across the Party, government, and military:

1. Xi dismantled the reform and opening-up era, worsening relations with the U.S. and the West, and creating unprecedentedly hostile political and economic conditions abroad.

2. Xi reversed the limited political reform process. By amending the constitution to extend his tenure, he made lifelong rule possible.

3. Xi’s massive spending on the Belt and Road Initiative and the Xiong’an New Area has thrown the national economy into crisis. Should Xi be held accountable?

So why can’t even the military tolerate Xi’s personalist dictatorship?

Xi rose to power with strong backing from “red second-generation” elites such as Liu Yuan, Liu Yazhou, and Zhang Youxia. Once he consolidated power, however, Liu Yuan was sidelined, Liu Yazhou was imprisoned, and even Zhang Youxia himself faced the risk of being purged.

Wu argues that even if Zhang Youxia were marginalised like Liu Yuan, his loyalists within the PLA would likely face a major purge. For survival, the non-Xi-loyalist factions in the military have banded together. This explains why they now invoke slogans such as “collective leadership” and “democratic centralism” to claim the moral high ground. Liu Yuan, who shares this political outlook, has leveraged his connections in the military and among Party elders to work closely with Zhang Youxia.

Wu emphasises that the political struggle remains intense. But once the military stops playing by the Party’s rules and instead “expresses opinions through the gun barrel,” a monarch without control over weapons may at any time see his crown removed.

Wu notes that after last year’s Third Plenum, some political shifts occurred in Zhongnanhai: Xi began delegating powers to Premier Li Qiang and other Standing Committee members. Since Organisation Department chief Shi Taifeng took office, personnel appointments at the provincial–ministerial level have included officials from multiple factions, rather than being monopolised by Xi’s camp.

According to Wu, most observers believe it was the intervention of the military and Party elders that led to a “silent coup.” As for Xi’s eventual fate, while uncertainty remains, Wu outlines three possible outcomes:

1. The most desired result: Xi steps down completely at the October Fourth Plenum, some Standing Committee members are replaced, and reformists take charge of the Politburo.

2. Xi stays in his post but with an internal resolution binding him not to renege; the current Standing Committee largely remains until the 21st Congress. The next Standing Committee lineup—including the General Secretary and Premier—would be jointly decided by elders and Standing Committee members, with a rule that no one may serve more than two terms.

3. Xi manages to steer the Beidaihe process to retain partial authority. After the 21st Congress, he still holds a core position and determines the composition and policies of the next leadership team.

Wu judges the second outcome the most likely. But if the military allows Xi to regain full control of the armed forces, the achievements of Party elders and the military in constraining Xi over the past year will be wiped away.

Over Xi’s decade-plus in power, China’s economy has deteriorated, and human rights have regressed. Many, therefore, believe that once Xi steps down, many of China’s problems will be resolved.

However, Stanford scholar Xu Chenggang, a senior fellow at the Centre on China’s Economy and Institutions, told RTI that China’s problems do not stem from one individual, but from the authoritarian party system he represents.

As for whether this authoritarian party could ever end, Xu noted that history offers many precedents: the Soviet Union, the Central and Eastern European communist states. Most peacefully abandoned communist rule, often driven by the awakening of elites within the system who realised that only by discarding the Party’s rule could genuine change occur.

Independent commentator Du Zheng, writing earlier in Taiwan’s Up Media, argued that the only thing that truly makes those in power tremble is a military mutiny. He revealed that in certain PLA theatre commands, some junior officers and soldiers with political awareness are waiting for an opportunity to emulate the Wuchang Uprising and rise up when the moment comes.

(First published by People News)