Liu Yazhou and Liu Yuan Cast Aside by Xi; Zhang Youxia Parts Ways with Xi

March 11, 2023: Senior members of the CCP’s Central Military Commission line up to take the oath at the National People’s Congress. From right to left: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] Within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military, the hawks and the doves have long been engaged in both open and covert struggles. Analysts point out that Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), is hawkish by nature, while his Vice Chairman has shifted from hawk to dove. This major divergence has pushed the two further and further apart, until they finally split ways. Zhang Youxia has now evolved into another force within the military. The rift between Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia may have significant implications for the Taiwan issue.

The CCP military follows the principle of “absolute Party command.” After Xi Jinping took power, he promoted the slogan of a “Strong Military Dream” and signalled the need to be “ready for war at any time.” He carried out a major reshuffle of the military, replacing seven military regions with five theatre commands. He demanded a force that can “fight wars and win wars,” while military spending rose year after year.

Independent scholar and columnist Wu Zuolai, in a September 23 article published via Taiwan Broadcasting Station, noted that since taking office, Xi Jinping has used a fierce anti-corruption campaign and the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System” to consolidate ultimate control of the Party, government, and military in his own hands. Xi embodies a hawkish disposition.

Outside analysts believe Xi’s ultimate goal in seeking reappointment is the unification of Taiwan. There is a strong likelihood that the CCP will attempt to forcibly take Taiwan in 2027. The reason is that 2027 marks the centennial of the CCP military’s founding, which has been envisioned as a symbolic milestone for the “China Dream.” Hawks are therefore elated, advocating a swift, decisive blitzkrieg to resolve the Taiwan issue.

Furthermore, the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war was seized upon by the hawks as a reference model for “blitzkrieg”: if Russia could quickly create a fait accompli, the Taiwan Strait could replicate the scenario.

Wu Zuolai argues that Defence Minister Dong Jun is regarded as Xi Jinping’s proxy within the military. Dong Jun has repeatedly released hardline signals on Taiwan in the international arena.

2024 Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore): In his speech, he declared, “Taiwan independence separatists will inevitably destroy themselves,” accused external forces of “salami-slicing away at the One-China Principle,” and warned that “decisive action will be taken when necessary.”

2025 Xiangshan Forum (Beijing): He framed “Taiwan’s return' as part of the “post–World War II international order,” stressed its historical and legal legitimacy as “indisputable,” and vowed to “defeat external military interference at any time.”

Notably, Dong Jun, who on December 29, 2023, replaced the suddenly dismissed Li Shangfu as Defence Minister, has still not been promoted to the Central Committee, nor is he a State Councillor. Since the 1980s, the defence minister post has generally been held concurrently by a State Councillor, and usually by a senior military officer at the CMC member level or above, responsible for handling daily affairs. Some analysts believe this shows Dong Jun has encountered resistance within the military—something that greatly embarrasses Xi, who promoted him.

Other hawks in the military have spoken out loudly in public opinion arenas. Examples include:

Dai Xu (Air Force Senior Colonel, National Defence University professor): Long an advocate of a “new type military” and the “Eagle Strike Strategy,” repeatedly calling for tough action in the South China Sea, insisting that “unification cannot be delayed indefinitely.”

Wang Hongguang (former Deputy Commander of the Nanjing Military Region, Lieutenant General): In 2018, he wrote that “a military takeover [of Taiwan] could be settled in three days.”

Luo Yuan (Deputy Director of the World Military Research Department, Academy of Military Sciences, Researcher): In 2019, he argued that “the countdown to reunification by force has begun,” writing that if Taiwan does not accept “One Country, Two Systems,” forceful unification could be carried out, followed by “One Country, One System.”

Wu Zuolai points out that the military is not a monolith. Many generals who grew up during the reform-and-opening era feel that the pace is too fast. In Taiwan, there is a sizable gap within the senior ranks. The most representative doves countering the hawks are Liu Yazhou and Liu Yuan.

Liu Yazhou (former Political Commissar of the National Defence University): In writings such as Revisiting Jia Shen and Review of the Kinmen Battle, he reflected on the Guningtou campaign with an anti-war perspective, arguing that the costs of a Taiwan Strait conflict are unbearable and that external intervention is unavoidable. He advocated a political, united front, and diplomatic means to “subdue the enemy without fighting.” While not openly challenging the political orthodoxy of “liberating Taiwan,” he directly pointed out the dangers of adventurism.

Liu Yuan (former Political Commissar of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences and the PLA General Logistics Department): In a 2013 essay reviewing how China’s modern development was repeatedly interrupted by wars, he stressed that the current “strategic opportunity period” must not be lost. With the U.S. and Japan seeking to contain China, he argued that China must “grit its teeth and run through the final stretch,” with war being only the “last resort.” The dove consensus: if China launches a war before surpassing the U.S. in comprehensive national power, the consequences will be disastrous.

At present, multiple sources have confirmed that Liu Yazhou has been sentenced to life imprisonment.

On March 15 last year, U.S.-based Chinese political scholar Wang Juntao revealed to The Epoch Times, after verification with Liu Yazhou’s relatives, that the former Political Commissar of the PLA National Defence University had indeed been sentenced to life in prison.

In April, Australia-based jurist Yuan Hongbing, on his program Yuan Hongbing Hot Topics on Kan Zhongguo (Vision Times), also disclosed that conscientious insiders within the CCP reported: before last year’s “Two Sessions,” Xi Jinping personally instructed a deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) to meet with Liu Yuan, Deng Pufang, and other prominent “red second-generation” figures, demanding that they “look at the big picture” and refrain from engaging in “non-organizational activities” detrimental to the “core of Xi.”

Subsequently, the same CCDI deputy secretary specifically briefed Liu Yuan and Deng Pufang on Liu Yazhou’s case. The internal political charge against Liu Yazhou, secretly circulated at high levels in both the Party and military, was “anti-Party and disrupting the military”—namely, attacking Xi’s “strategic decisions” on the Taiwan issue, spreading claims that a Taiwan Strait war would inevitably end in defeat, and thereby “undermining troop morale.”

Yuan Hongbing noted that Xi clearly intended to use Liu Yazhou’s case as a warning to the red aristocracy not to resist the “core of Xi.” At the same time, the political label imposed on Liu Yazhou highlighted that Xi’s regime remains focused on Taiwan war preparations rather than economic development.

Liu Yuan—who had served as Political Commissar of both the PLA Academy of Military Sciences and the General Logistics Department—is one of the top-tier “princelings.” He once helped former CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao topple military “tiger” Gu Junshan, deputy director of the PLA General Logistics Department.

Liu Yuan had also been Xi Jinping’s most powerful ally in purging military corruption. Yet, even as top CMC vice chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were brought down by anti-corruption, and many expected Liu Yuan to ascend into the CMC—perhaps even as head of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission—he mysteriously withdrew from the military-political arena, relegated to serve as deputy director of the NPC Financial and Economic Affairs Committee. Today, Liu Yuan has effectively faded from Chinese politics.

The most crucial figure is Zhang Youxia. How did he transform from hawk to dove?

According to Wu Zuolai, since last year’s Third Plenum, Zhang Youxia’s stance has shifted dramatically. His speeches at successive Xiangshan Forums reveal a dovish turn:

2023 (Hardline): At the 10th Xiangshan Forum opening ceremony, CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia declared, “The Taiwan issue is the core of China’s core interests… we will never yield, never show mercy.” His hawkish remarks made global headlines.

2024 (Shift): At the 11th Xiangshan Forum welcome banquet, he instead emphasised the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and “cooperative security,” with official reports barely mentioning Taiwan.

2025 (Continuation): At the 12th Xiangshan Forum, his keynote avoided any “forceful reunification” language, focusing instead on “jointly safeguarding order and promoting peace and development.” Whether this was a propaganda adjustment or a reflection of high-level resistance to adventurism remains uncertain, but it echoed Liu Yuan and Liu Yazhou’s logic of “caution in war—avoid war.”

Wu Zuolai observes that Xi Jinping’s “strong military thought” aligns closely with hawkish generals. Xi’s military reforms and promotions have consistently taken loyalty and war readiness as benchmarks. This inevitably conflicts with dovish officers advocating prudence. Whether due to personal or factional interests, or in defence of Deng-era “keeping a low profile” strategies favourable to development, Xi’s emphasis on rapid military preparation has encountered immense resistance within the PLA.

Facing this resistance—and lacking his own authority within the military—Xi sought to assert himself as the top commander. He loudly pushed the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System,” published study materials in the military, and even had the Political Work Department commission the propaganda song Be a Good Soldier of Chairman Xi (2017) for troops to sing.

Wu Zuolai argues that Xi has relied on administrative and propaganda tools, as well as rapid promotions of loyalists into senior positions, to test loyalty through public declarations. Yet evidence shows Xi’s faction has struggled to consolidate dominance: Defence Minister Dong Jun, personally elevated by Xi, still has not entered the CMC; Xi’s trusted aide Zhong Shaojun has left his post as director of the CMC General Office. Hawks have been sidelined: Zhang Yang “committed suicide,” Miao Hua was removed, and He Weidong has vanished. Former champions of the “Two Establishes” and “Two Upholds,” who fostered Xi’s personality cult, have steadily disappeared.

Wu Zuolai concludes that since last year’s Third Plenum, Xi’s loyalists have been purged from the military, while doves led by Zhang Youxia have gradually taken real control.

Today, the military no longer sings Be a Good Soldier of Chairman Xi, and the loud rhetoric of being “ready for war at all times” has gone quiet. PLA Daily has instead published a series of essays promoting “democratic centralism,” stressing Party principles and opposition to “one-man rule and patriarchal systems.” The military has even issued a Democratic Centralism Handbook, widely seen as a veiled rejection of the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”

Wu Zuolai emphasises that Zhang Youxia’s shift from hawk to dove reached a turning point after last year’s Third Plenum: in public, he no longer endorsed the CMC Chairman Responsibility System, nor did he frequently invoke the “Two Establishes” or “Two Upholds,” nor did he highlight “war preparations for Taiwan.” Even when citing Xi’s instructions, Zhang used only general phrases, avoiding endorsement of Xi’s core prerogatives. This reflects not just his personal stance, but the outward expression of another force within the military.

From both personnel changes and shifts in discourse, it is clear that a fundamental split has emerged between the hawkish “pro-war” camp and the dovish “prudence-first” camp. Beneath the surface of unity, the PLA’s real power structure and messaging are being reshaped. This parting of ways not only affects CCP security and civil-military relations but will also profoundly influence the future of the Taiwan issue.

Meanwhile, China’s sharp economic downturn, rising unemployment, and demographic crisis risk triggering social unrest. Many analysts believe Xi Jinping may gamble everything—despite enormous risks—and launch a war against Taiwan as a distraction.

Wu Yijun, founder of Jushi Think Tank, recently wrote in Up Media (Taiwan) that the real risk for Taiwan is not whether the CCP concludes that “armed invasion is unwise,” but whether Xi Jinping will “take the gamble knowing it’s unwise”—and whether he has sufficient mobilisation capacity to do so.

In Xi Jinping’s political report to the 20th Party Congress, his language on “achieving complete reunification of the motherland” included these key points: “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and efforts, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all necessary measures.” and “Complete reunification of the motherland must be achieved, and it will certainly be achieved!”

But outside observers question whether Xi can still “reunify Taiwan by force” after the devastating impact of his military purges. Of the 79 PLA generals promoted to full general under Xi, 10 have already been officially dismissed or arrested, while at least 16 more are rumoured to have fallen. In total, 26 generals—over 30%—have been purged or implicated. With such upheaval among senior officers, can Xi still launch a Taiwan war? △