The Enigma of the Fourth Plenary Session: Compromise Is Only the Prelude, the Fierce Struggle Is Far From Over

Zhang Youxia counterstrikes against Xi Jinping (People News illustration)

[People News] On October 23, 2025, the autumn wind was bleak and Beijing unusually cold as the Fourth Plenary Session quietly concluded. At 4:56 p.m., Xinhua Net released the session communiqué—the only sample of information the outside world obtained in four days regarding the high-level political struggle—reflecting the complex traces of power contention.

On the surface, the communiqué emphasized conventional phrases such as “upholding the Party’s overall leadership” and “promoting high-quality development.” But upon closer examination, it is not difficult to see the hidden political maneuvers and crises within. The power struggle between Xi Jinping’s and Zhang Youxia’s factions over control of the military, Party affairs, and personnel seems to have temporarily paused, yet it is far from settled.

Attendance Sharply Reduced

The first striking point in the communiqué is the significant drop in the number of full and alternate Central Committee members attending. This is not a simple numerical fluctuation but a clear signal of the unhealthy political ecology at the top of the CCP, indicating a looming crisis. Historically, attendance at plenary sessions has been seen as a barometer of internal unity and stability.

The 20th National Congress produced 205 full Central Committee members and 171 alternate members, totaling 376. However, only 168 full members and 147 alternates actually attended this session—a total of 315—meaning 61 were absent. Such large-scale absenteeism is extremely rare in CCP history and far exceeds that of any previous session.

Why such a big gap? Though the communiqué did not say, recent personnel changes provide clues. Before the session, 18 Central Committee members had been publicly dismissed or removed: 12 expelled from the Party, four under investigation, one resigned, and one deceased. Even excluding these, 187 full members should have attended, yet only 168 did—19 extra absentees. Some may have missed the meeting for health reasons, but a more plausible explanation is that they are under scrutiny or caught up in undeclared political storms. Absence often signals escalating “problems.”

Since Xi Jinping came to power, anti-corruption has been his key weapon to consolidate authority but has also triggered fierce factional backlash. After the 20th Congress, the number of fallen officials surged, spanning the military, local governments, and ministries. The drop in attendance reflects turmoil at the top and the collapse of internal trust. With 16 percent of members missing, the situation resembles the late Soviet Union or pre-collapse Eastern Europe—a sign of a systemic crisis forming within the Party.

Abnormalities in the Replacement List

The second noteworthy point is that 11 alternate members were promoted to full Central Committee members. Not one had a military background. Normally, replacements follow the vote order from the 20th Congress, but this time, eight higher-ranking alternates were skipped—five from the military: Lt. Gen. Ding Xingnong (Deputy Political Commissar, Rocket Force), Lt. Gen. Wang Liyan (Deputy Commander, Rocket Force), Lt. Gen. Wang Kangping (Commander, Joint Logistics Support Force), Lt. Gen. Fang Yongxiang (Director, CMC General Office), and Lt. Gen. Shi Zhenglu (Commander, Northern Theater Army).

The other three skipped were local or ministerial officials: Wang Jiayi (Vice Minister of Education), Fang Hongwei (Standing Committee Member of Shaanxi Province and Party Secretary of Xi’an), and Shi Yugang (Deputy Secretary of the Yunnan CPPCC Party Group).

Their exclusion likely signals their fate is sealed—they may already be out politically or under investigation. Reports suggest Zhang Youxia’s purge within the military has affected more than a hundred generals. Fang Yongxiang, one of Xi’s “three chief stewards” in the military (alongside Zhong Shaojun and Qin Shengxiang), being skipped is particularly telling. Rumors say Zhong has been dismissed, while Fang and Qin have already shown irregularities—evidence of Zhang Youxia’s systematic blow to Xi’s military network.

The lack of military replacements hints that the purges are far from over. With over a hundred generals “waiting in line,” greater turbulence is ahead. Though the communiqué is silent, this is likely the most explosive hidden detail of the session—the struggle over military power is deepening.

Power Play in the CMC: Zhang Youxia’s Narrow Victory

The third highlight centers on adjustments in the Central Military Commission (CMC). Though vacancies among CMC members were not filled, Zhang Shengmin was promoted to CMC Vice Chairman. This unexpected outcome perfectly captures the ongoing struggle between Xi and Zhang.

Before the session, rumors swirled about a full reshuffle in the CMC, filling three vacant seats—but that did not happen. The failure to fill them reflects mutual stalemate: both sides refrained from pushing new candidates, revealing compromise and confrontation.

Zhang Shengmin, formerly Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and CMC member, now becomes Vice Chairman—formally entering the ranks of top state leaders. Coming from the political work system, Zhang Shengmin complements Zhang Youxia’s military authority, jointly consolidating control of the armed forces. Zhang Youxia’s position as CMC Vice Chairman is now even stronger.

Confirmation of Fallen Military Officials

The fourth major point is the confirmation of multiple senior officials’ disciplinary cases. Though not new, the communiqué contained curious discrepancies. On October 17, Defense Ministry spokesman Zhang Xiaogang announced that nine generals—including He Weidong, Miao Hua, He Hongjun, Wang Xiubin, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutang, Yuan Huazhi, Wang Chunning, and Zhang Fengzhong—were under investigation.

However, the communiqué replaced Wang Houbin (Navy Political Commissar) with Zhang Fengzhong (Rocket Force Political Department Director) and added five non-military officials—Tang Renjian, Jin Xiangjun, Li Shisong, Yang Fasen, and Zhu Zhishong—making 14 in total.

The oddity lies in the communiqué’s phrasing: it “confirms the Political Bureau’s prior decision to expel...” even though the October 17 announcement did not mention any Politburo meeting. This suggests two possibilities: either Zhang Youxia bypassed the Politburo—acting first and forcing later approval—or the meeting did occur in September, but Xi’s camp concealed it. Either way, Zhang Youxia’s “palace coup” tactics are evident: using disciplinary and military channels to swiftly remove rivals and present a fait accompli.

Most of those purged came from Xi’s old 31st Group Army faction. He Weidong, former Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, and Miao Hua, Director of the CMC Political Work Department—both close Xi allies—fell, signaling the collapse of his core military bloc.

The Power Struggle Continues

The session concluded with Xi Jinping retaining his three top posts. Terms like “core leadership of Xi,” “Two Upholds,” and “CMC responsibility system” show that he remains temporarily secure. Yet this is a fragile compromise: the anti-Xi faction—represented by Zhang Youxia and Party elders—and Xi’s own camp each took a step back to preserve the Party. The elders feared that excessive purges could trigger collapse; Zhang, though holding military power, dared not fully confront Xi; and Xi, while keeping control of Party and state affairs, is regrouping.

But the struggle is far from over. Xi will not tolerate losing control of the military and may attempt a comeback through personnel changes before the 21st Party Congress. If Zhang Youxia and the elders fail to act decisively, they may face retribution. The infighting will persist—military purges may intensify, local governments may be reshuffled, and economic and foreign policy may become new battlegrounds.

With public discontent rising and internal and external crises deepening, whether the Party survives or not, the CCP’s downfall seems inevitable.

(First published by People News) △