Is Xi s  military Insider  Zhong Shaojun Under Secret Investigation

Dark clouds hang over Tiananmen Square in Beijing. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] The ongoing purges within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military continue to unfold. Given the highly opaque nature of CCP politics, particularly regarding military purges, it is now only possible to deduce which senior generals have been removed based on limited clues and some overseas disclosures.

As an observer of CCP current affairs, I have been closely monitoring the situation of Zhong Shaojun, the 'military insider' who has been with Xi Jinping the longest. Based on my observations and assessments, it appears that Zhong Shaojun is currently under secret investigation by the military discipline inspection commission.

I. The 'military insider' with the longest tenure with Xi

Zhong Shaojun, 57, was born in Kaihua County, Zhejiang Province. After graduating from Zhejiang University, he began his career in the Zhejiang Provincial Committee. In 2002, when Xi Jinping was transferred from Fujian to become the Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee without a secretary, the committee appointed 34-year-old Zhong Shaojun to serve as Xi's secretary. It is reported that Zhong possesses high emotional intelligence and is skilled at serving leaders, which has earned him Xi's trust. Zhong Shaojun is the only member of Xi's 'Zhejiang New Army' that Xi brought from Zhejiang to Shanghai and then to Beijing.

From 2002 to 2024, Zhong Shaojun served as Xi's close secretary for 22 years, covering Xi's entire trajectory from a 'regional official' to the 'crown prince' of the CCP, and ultimately to being 'the one in charge.'

In March 2007, when Xi was appointed Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee, Zhong Shaojun was also transferred to serve as the Deputy Director of the Shanghai Municipal Committee Office. In October 2007, during the 17th National Congress of the CCP, Xi was 'elected' as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Secretary of the Central Secretariat, and Zhong Shaojun followed Xi to Beijing, continuing to serve as his secretary while also taking on the role of head of the political group in the Research Office of the Central Office.

In November 2012, during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping was "elected" as the General Secretary of the Central Committee and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In June 2013, Zhong Shaojun was reassigned to serve as the Deputy Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission and the Director of the Office of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. By August 2017, he had been appointed as the Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission and continued to serve as the Director of the Office of the Chairman. Additionally, he held concurrent positions as the Director of the Office of Reform and Organisation of the Central Military Commission, the Director of the Office of the Leading Group for Deepening National Defence and Military Reform, and a member of the Military Election Committee.

Despite never having served as a soldier, Zhong Shaojun was awarded the rank of Colonel by Xi in 2013; he was promoted to Major General in 2016 and to Lieutenant General in 2019.

The General Office of the Central Military Commission serves as the nerve centre of the Communist Party's military power, directly linked to the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. It communicates with military and political leaders across various departments, military branches, military regions, and military academies. The office is responsible for the daily circulation of official documents and the handling of affairs for the Central Military Commission, coordinating the work of different military regions, branches, academies, and departments. It also undertakes significant matters assigned by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and manages the daily administrative affairs and important meetings of the Commission, highlighting its critical importance.

Having served in the General Office of the Central Military Commission for 11 years, Zhong Shaojun is regarded as Xi's most trusted "military secretary." He has been deeply involved in major confidential issues such as military anti-corruption, military reform, and personnel changes during Xi's first and second terms, holding a unique status of "one person below, above millions of soldiers" within the military.

As a result, Zhong Shaojun may become a key target for senior military leaders within the Communist Party who are seeking to transfer benefits for promotion.

II. Quietly Removed from the Central Military Commission Core

In April 2024, Zhong Shaojun was discreetly reassigned from Xi Jinping's side to become the political commissar of the National Defence University. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never publicly disclosed this change in Zhong's position.

On August 19, 2025, the Singapore Ministry of Defence announced on Facebook that its Permanent Secretary, Chan Heng Kee, visited Beijing from August 18 to 19. During this visit, he met with several officials, including the CCP's Minister of Defence, Dong Jun, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, Xu Qiling, President of the Military Science Academy, Yang Xuejun, and Zhong Shaojun, the political commissar of the National Defence University. Photos from these meetings were also shared. It was only at this point that the outside world confirmed Zhong Shaojun's reassignment to the National Defence University.

As Xi's closest military aide, why was Zhong Shaojun suddenly moved away from Xi in April 2024? Is this an instance of 'cleansing the court'? Why has there been no coverage in CCP media regarding 'Political Commissar Zhong Shaojun of the National Defence University' during the more than a year since his reassignment? Could it be that he is considered a 'problematic official'?

Anyone with a basic understanding of the CCP's political landscape, particularly regarding high-level military personnel changes, would likely pose these questions.

III. Quietly Dismissed from the Position of Political Commissar of the National Defence University

On August 30, 2025, Cai Shenkun, a commentator living in the United States, disclosed in a self-media program that Zhong Shaojun had been dismissed from his role as political commissar of the National Defence University.

From October 20 to 23, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP convened in Beijing. Zhong Shaojun attended this meeting as a member of the central committee.

Just two days after the conclusion of the Fourth Plenary Session, the official website of the Chinese Embassy in North Korea announced that on the evening of October 25, the embassy hosted a reception to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Chinese military's deployment to North Korea. The event was attended by a delegation of over 140 individuals from the Chinese military, led by Xia Zhihe, the Political Commissar of the National Defence University, who is currently visiting North Korea.

This announcement reveals that Zhong Shaojun has been removed from his position as Political Commissar of the National Defence University, with Xia Zhihe succeeding him.

The timing of Xia Zhihe's visit to North Korea, reported just after the Fourth Plenary Session, suggests that he may have taken over the role of Political Commissar before the session. This implies that Zhong Shaojun could have been dismissed prior to the Fourth Plenary Session.

At 57 years old, Zhong Shaojun, as a Political Commissar at the deputy theatre command level and a Central Committee member, could have served until the retirement age of 65. However, he has been quietly removed from his position. What could be the reason for this?

Following Zhong Shaojun's dismissal, the Chinese authorities did not assign him to any nominal role in the National People's Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; instead, he appears to be in a state of 'disappearance.' What could be the reason for this?

IV. Reasons for Transfer and Removal from Office

As Xi’s closest confidant within the military, Zhong Shaojun was quietly transferred away from Xi’s side and then quietly removed from his post as political commissar of the National Defence University. Both actions are highly unusual and abnormal, and inevitably arouse suspicion.

I believe that Zhong Shaojun’s quiet removal from Xi’s side was very likely due to his involvement in corruption within the military, and that his quiet dismissal from office may have occurred because his corruption problems had reached a point where they could no longer be concealed, prompting an investigation by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission. His corruption may involve the following three aspects:

First, possible involvement in major cases such as the Rocket Force scandal.

In 2023, a major corruption case erupted within the CCP’s Rocket Force and quickly spread to senior generals in the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Development Department, the Joint Staff Department, the Strategic Support Force, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army.

Those implicated included: Li Shangfu, member of the 20th Central Military Commission, State Councilor, and Minister of National Defense, former director of the Equipment Development Department; Wei Fenghe, member of the 19th Central Military Commission, State Councilor, Minister of National Defense, and the first commander of the Rocket Force; Zhou Yanning, the second Rocket Force commander; and Li Yuchao, the third Rocket Force commander.

In June 2013, Zhong Shaojun was appointed deputy director of the Central Military Commission General Office and director of the CMC Chairman’s Office. At that time, the director of the CMC General Office was Qin Shengxiang, who had assumed the post before Xi became CMC chairman. Qin was arranged by Jia Ting’an, Jiang Zemin’s “top military secretary,” and could not be considered Xi’s confidant. After Zhong was transferred to the CMC General Office, he became Xi’s foremost confidant within the military.

In August 2017, Zhong Shaojun succeeded Qin Shengxiang as director of the CMC General Office, director of the CMC Reform and Organisational Structure Office, and director of the Office of the CMC Leading Group for Deepening National Defence and Military Reform. In December 2017, he became a member of the Military Election Commission.

As Xi’s closest military confidant, Zhong Shaojun participated in the sweeping military reforms launched by Xi in 2015, including personnel changes across the CMC’s 15 departments, all services, theatre commands, military academies, and the Armed Police Force. He also participated in military personnel selections for the CCP’s 19th Party Congress in 2017 and the 20th Party Congress in 2020.

After the Rocket Force scandal broke, a large number of generals—including Li Shangfu, Wei Fenghe, and Li Yuchao—were taken down, involving at least dozens of generals at the full, lieutenant, and major general ranks. After these generals were placed under investigation by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission, it is possible that some confessed to having paid bribes to Zhong Shaojun.

After Zhong’s problems surfaced, instead of prosecuting him, he was quietly reassigned as political commissar of the National Defence University. This may have been because he turned over part of the illicit funds, submitted a self-criticism to the Central Military Commission, and also to save face for Xi.

Second, possible involvement in the Miao Hua–He Weidong major case.

Miao Hua served as a member of the Central Military Commission and director of the Political Work Department from 2017 to 2024, a total of seven years. During this period, Miao was effectively the military’s “minister of organisation,” responsible for selecting and promoting senior military officers. From CMC departments to the five theatre commands; from the Navy, Army, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force to military academies and the Armed Police Force, all promotions of major generals, lieutenant generals, and full generals across the PLA and the Armed Police were examined by Miao Hua. From December 2017 onward, Zhong Shaojun and Miao Hua both served as members of the Military Election Commission.

He Weidong is a Politburo member and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission who was personally, exceptionally, and rapidly promoted by Xi at the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in 2020. He Weidong oversaw political work and the selection and promotion of senior military officers, making him Miao Hua’s direct superior.

He Weidong was regarded as Xi’s top military confidant, and Miao Hua as the second.

Miao Hua fell in November 2024, and He Weidong fell in March 2025. One of their major crimes was allegedly accepting bribes of “especially huge amounts,” meaning they took large sums of money from senior officers seeking promotion.

After the downfall of He and Miao, a string of full generals were investigated, including: He Hongjun, executive deputy director of the Political Work Department; Wang Xiubin, executive deputy director of the Joint Operations Command Center; Lin Xiangyang, commander of the Eastern Theater Command; Qin Shutong, political commissar of the Army; Yuan Huazhi, political commissar of the Navy; Wang Houbin, the fourth commander of the Rocket Force; and Wang Chunning, commander of the Armed Police Force.

After He and Miao fell, 14 full generals who were Central Committee members were absent from the Fourth Plenum. They were: Wang Haijiang, commander of the Western Theater Command; Wu Yanan, commander of the Southern Theater Command; Huang Ming, commander of the Northern Theater Command; Li Wei, political commissar of the Information Support Force; Wang Renhua, secretary of the CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission; Xu Xueqiang, director of the Equipment Development Department; Xu Deqing, political commissar of the Central Theater Command; Ju Qiansheng, commander of the Strategic Support Force; Xu Zhongbo, former political commissar of the Rocket Force; Xu Xisheng, current political commissar of the Rocket Force; Li Qiaoming, commander of the Army; Hu Zhongming, commander of the Navy; Liu Qingsong, political commissar of the Eastern Theater Command; and Zhang Hongbing, political commissar of the Armed Police Force.

Among these 14 full generals, many may be under investigation by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission for bribing Miao Hua and He Weidong.

As the three top confidants around Xi within the military, He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Zhong Shaojun likely had unusually close ties. Candidates for senior officer promotion vetted by He and Miao would all be consolidated and reported to Zhong Shaojun. In the selection and promotion of senior officers, He, Miao, and Zhong may have “shared the benefits.”

After the He–Miao case broke, it is possible that some of those who fell—whether full, lieutenant, or major generals—confessed to having paid bribes to Zhong Shaojun.

Third, possible involvement in channelling benefits to his family.

It is common for senior CCP officials to use their power or influence to help their families “quietly get rich.” Zhong Shaojun may also have had problems in this regard.

On October 28, overseas sources claimed that Zhong Shaojun’s mother, Zhang Shujuan, had been taken away by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission for investigation.

Zhang Shujuan was originally a small tea vendor in Kaihua County, Zhejiang Province, making a living by selling “Golden Tea.” However, thanks to her son’s status, her “Golden Tea” business flourished.

In June 2013, Zhong Shaojun was transferred to serve as deputy director of the CMC General Office and director of the CMC Chairman’s Office. On August 23 of the same year, his mother, Zhang Shujuan, registered “Golden Latitude Tea Co., Ltd.” in Hangzhou. By the end of that year, Zhang participated in a “health tea bag” procurement tender organised by the CMC’s logistics department. Her “Military Golden Bud” tea bags became standard supplies at military retirees’ sanatoriums.

According to the exposé, “From 2014 onward, she almost monopolised the tea supply for military sanatoriums across the entire PLA, with annual orders reaching tens of millions of yuan.”

Zhang Shujuan also joined the Zhejiang Tea Industry Association, cooperated with professional cooperatives in Kaihua County to establish organic golden tea plantations dedicated to supplying military sanatoriums, and even received agricultural subsidies.

“With connections in high places, it’s easy to get rich.” As a favoured figure close to CMC Chairman Xi Jinping, it is entirely possible that Zhong Shaojun’s mother made enormous profits from her “Golden Tea” business.

Conclusion

In summary, I believe there is a high possibility that Zhong Shaojun is currently under secret investigation by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission.

If he is indeed being secretly investigated, Zhong’s case may remain completely in a black box for some time. Since Zhong Shaojun is still a member of the 20th Central Committee, if he is truly investigated, news may not emerge until before the CCP’s Fifth Plenum in 2026. Another possibility is that the CCP will have Zhong “absent” from the Fifth Plenum while keeping the handling of his case undisclosed.

(Source: The Dajiyuan)