March 10, 2025, Beijing Great Hall of the People—A security guard stands at the entrance before the closing ceremony of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. (WANG ZHAO/AFP via Getty Images)
[People News] Following the recent downfalls of Wen Jiabao's secretary and Li Ruihuan's secretary, the internal strife within the CPC has intensified (Part 1). Now, let’s examine Wang Wenhua. At 68 years old, he is a retired official who stepped down from his role as the Director of the Standing Committee of the Qingdao Municipal People's Congress in 2017. His political career began quite prominently: in the early 1990s, Wang Wenhua joined the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, serving as the secretary to then Politburo Standing Committee member Li Ruihuan. Subsequently, he held various positions in local governments, including in Tianjin and Qingdao, with his career closely tied to Li Ruihuan's background in Tianjin, eventually reaching the rank of deputy provincial level.
Wang Wenhua's downfall, similar to that of Tian Xuebin, is attributed by the CPC to allegations of 'serious violations of discipline and law.' However, the specific rules or laws he allegedly violated, the severity of these violations, and the manner in which they occurred have not been disclosed.
According to the CPC's official narrative, these actions are seen as a reflection of 'strict governance of the Party in all aspects,' embodying a 'no-go zone, full coverage, and zero tolerance' approach to combating corruption and maintaining Party discipline. Given the CPC's typical rhetoric regarding high-profile corruption cases, it is unlikely that they will receive lenient sentences.
It is also noteworthy that the water conservancy system, where Tian Xuebin was employed, has experienced a surge in corruption cases in recent years, including the case of former Minister of Water Resources Li Guoying, who was ousted in 2024. Tian's case may be connected to this trend. Additionally, Wang Wenhua's background in Qingdao may involve local corruption networks, particularly in the real estate or state-owned enterprise sectors.
However, both domestic and international observers often interpret these events through a political lens. Some analyses indicate that Li Ruihuan and Wen Jiabao, as retired senior officials, have subtly criticised current policies at various times. Li Ruihuan is known for his philosophy of 'harmony without uniformity,' while Wen Jiabao has frequently advocated for political reform and the prevention of a resurgence of the 'Cultural Revolution.' In the current context, these statements are seen by some as diverging from the mainstream narrative. Is the secretary's downfall intended as a 'shake the mountain to scare the tiger' warning to the elders?
With the 21st National Congress approaching, this sensitive period of personnel changes means that any official's downfall can easily be interpreted as a signal of power struggles.
There is a perspective suggesting that, based on the officials who have been purged in recent years, a significant number have been targeted by Xi Jinping's faction or his close allies. In the military, generals directly under Xi's command have largely been removed, and all commanders and political commissars from various military regions have been dismissed. Following this logic, the targeting of former subordinates of Wen and Li seems to indicate that the anti-corruption campaign has entered a mixed phase, with the unified standard being that someone from each faction must be taken down to counter the accusations of selective anti-corruption often levelled by foreign anti-China forces.
However, a more critical perspective argues that there has been ongoing speculation abroad about the elder faction being in power and Xi losing authority. Now, Xi's faction is pushing back to demonstrate that these rumours are unfounded, asserting that Xi still firmly holds power, that the elders do not hold power, and that those within the party who follow the trend need not be indecisive. They should firmly embed Xi Jinping's thoughts into their souls, minds, and hearts, and uphold the 'two establishments,' 'two safeguards,' 'four consciousnesses,' and 'four confidences.'
The various opinions expressed above seem somewhat chaotic. What is actually happening? The information that has emerged includes both accurate and inaccurate elements. Here, we can simplify the complex issues for clarity.
Li Ruihuan and Wen Jiabao are both key figures from the 'collective leadership' era. Li Ruihuan retired in 2003, while Wen Jiabao stepped down in 2013. Both are now in their eighties and seldom appear in public. However, in the political tradition of the Chinese Communist Party, the influence of senior figures should not be underestimated, especially before major meetings. Secretaries, as 'trusted aides' of these elders, often possess sensitive information, and their removal could disrupt potential networks.
This timeframe aligns with the year leading up to the 21st National Congress. Analysts suggest that Xi Jinping is likely to seek re-election at this congress, which means he must finalise personnel decisions this year, particularly ensuring that individuals who support the spirit of the 21st National Congress are positioned at the local level. Furthermore, younger leaders from the post-70s and post-80s generations are expected to assume roles. Young people tend to be more dynamic, and their ideological conflicts can be challenging to resolve, so those who express dissent must step aside. Any opposition to the revival of the Cultural Revolution, calls for political reform, or discussions of moderate philosophy must be set aside. Consequently, adherents of these ideologies must vacate their positions and cut off their connections. This will facilitate personnel arrangements at higher levels. Grasping the core issue is akin to trimming the edges, while organising high-level personnel is like laying a solid foundation.
The shift from 'catching tigers' to 'swatting flies', and now to the 'lifelong accountability' of retired officials, is all aimed at reinforcing Xi Jinping's authority, which essentially means strengthening the Chinese Communist Party's regime. Within this context, concepts like 'rule of law', investigation transparency, and public disclosure become irrelevant. In this light, the anti-corruption efforts of the Chinese Communist Party have entered a phase of extreme fixation.
(First published in People News)
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